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There have been few unclassified attempts within the
United States, if any, to document the guerrilla war in
Namibia in its totality. This work presents a summary and
analysis of that struggle through December, 1978, focusing
on all aspects of the military and civil insurgency/counter-
insurgency situations. Additionally, Namibia's history, its
present social, economic, and political conditions, and the
militant attitudes of the various actors involved are ex-
amined from the standpoint of tendencies and factors which
could stimulate violent conflict in the future. Salient
aspects of these discussions are integrated to form several
plausible political-military scenarios which include po-
tentials for near and long term violence and for the
involvement of external actors in that violence.
Namibia and the conflict surrounding its pending
independence play a primary role in the current and future
stability of southern Africa. This research is an attempt
to provide policy makers with additional perspective in
regard to the pursuit of that stability.
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Namibia (referred to as South West Africa in all
references predating June, 1968 and still so by South Africa
and the territory's government) is now scheduled to receive
full independence in October 1979 after almost a hundred
years of foreign colonization/administration. It is
currently administered de jure by a United Nations commission
which recognizes the South West African People's Organization
(SWAPO) as the authentic representative of the Namibian
people. De facto administration of the country is in the
hands of South Africa however. The different moral,
political, and historical legal perspectives of these actors
have given rise to differing plans for transitional and post-
independence political/governmental organizations and
processes which have frequently been conflicting and often
mutually exclusive. The population of Namibia has oeen
divided in its support of these different plans and plat-
forms to an extent which is not yet clear. The situation is
further complicated by the existence of ethnic and racial
factions of varying sizes and strengths which are sometimes
characterized by long-standing and, as independence approaches,
increasingly vehement antagonism towards each other.
Guerrilla activity by the military arm of SWAPO in
support of independence began "off icially" in 1966, and was
14

conducted at a relatively low level of intensity until 1975.
At that time the internal turmoil of the Angolan Civil War
and the subsequent establishment of a supportive govern-
ment in that country facilitated the use of southern
Angola as a sanctuary and greater access to foreign military
material and advisory support. The resultant escalation in
SWAPO guerrilla operations has been aggressively resisted by
South African military and police units stationed in
northern Namibia.
The Namibian independence struggle is partially related
to and stimulated by the other ongoing or recently con-
cluded liberation struggles in southern Africa. It is also
differentiated from these struggles by the legal involve-
ment and a greater consequent commitment of the U.N. in
bringing about a true independence of the people, an ex-
tensive, active South African political and military
presence, and the intermediatory maneuvering of several
Western countries in advance of a major crisis flashpoint
to prevent an escalation of violence. The situation is
further complicated by the willingness of Eastern nations
to become actively involved militarily in Africa on behalf
of selected countries and organizations. Finally, the
resolution of the conflict has direct implications for the
questions of internal security and political stability and
the potential for violence on a much greater magnitude in
South Africa. In light of the foregoing, it becomes
apparent that a clear understanding of the issues, attitudes,
15

and capabilities of all interested and involved parties is
imperative as a basis for accurate estimates and sound
formulation of U.S. foreign policy in this matter.
B. PURPOSE
This paper will analyze various specific aspects of the
situation described above and, in light of a continuation of
guerrilla warfare, project likely actions, reactions, and
possibilities for active intervention by those regional and
global actors which may have a stake or an interest in the
final resolution of Namibia's independent status.
C. HYPOTHESES
The hypotheses upon which this paper is based and which
dictated the research objectives for the paper are:
1. That internal ethnic and political cleavages,
exacerbated by diverse expectations of social and economic
changes, have engendered conditions of apprehension within
the territory's population which are unfavorable to a stable
and expedient resolution.
2. a. That the level of militant activism on the par* of
an external actor in support of any of the contending
internal political factions is a function of the degree of
legitimacy internationally accorded to that faction, its
perception of probability of or threat to that faction's
ultimate success, and its perception of the effects of such
activism on its own political stability.
16

2.b. That South African interventionist attitudes and
actions toward Namibia correlate additionally with their
perceptions of two threats: l) the threat to South
African national security presented by international
communism in the guise of African nationalism and, to a
lesser extent; 2) the threat to the safety of the Namibian
White population.
D. OBJECTIVES AND METHODOLOGY
Four basic research objectives were selected to support
the above hypotheses. They are addressed as individual
sections in the sequence listed below, with the methodology
and approach that were applied in each case also indicated.
1. A descriptive historical review of Namibia's ethnic
interactions, racial compatibilities, legal status, and
growth of nationalism.
2. A descriptive history and analysis of the guerrilla
warfare focusing on escalation trends, order of battle,
methods of operation, effectiveness, and external linkages
of the parties directly involved at the time of writing.
3. A descriptive analysis of the prospects for a non-
violent resolution of Namibian independence incorporating
such factors as distribution of population, resources,
wealth, and political, ethnic, racial, and economic
attitudes.
^. A descriptive analysis of attitudes, involvements
and relationships of potential external actors and appropriate
17

comparative analyses of the Namibian conflict with other
southern Africa wars of liberation.
In light of the current and continuing nature of the
overall problem addressed in this paper, it should be
noted that many aspects of research were terminated with
events as of 31 December 1978. This was done to facilitate
production of the paper.
E. TERMINOLOGY
Because social and cultural attitudes in Southern
Africa have been superimposed and developed along racial
lines (and have facilitated, in turn, a heightened sense of
racial differentiation) and because these attitudes and
deliniations are central to the overall problem, clarity
demands an understanding ofthe associated terminology in the
context of its common use in that area. The locally differ-
entiated racial groups are White, African, and Coloured
(mixed White and African) . The Africans and Goloureds are
generally referred to collectively as Non-White. Ethnic
groups are viewed as subdivisions of racial groups and
usually share fundamental cultural values and forms, a
common general heritage, and some degree of political organ-
ization. South Africa's apartheid system places restrictions
on interaction between racial groups. Within racial groups
it further seeks to separate the ethnic groups. South
Africa provides varying degrees of administration at both
the racial and ethnic levels. The lowest significant level
of cultural and political association is the tribe.
18

cases some degree of familial kinship is felt within a
tribe. There can be several tribes within a single ethnic
group. While tribal differentiation between individuals car-
be important within an ethnic group's geographic area, it
tends to diminish and is replaced by a sense of ethnic unity
outside the given ethnic territory.
The use of the territorial names "South West Africa" and
"Namibia" in this paper also requires clarification. "South
West Africa" will be used in referring to all events prior
to June 1968 and in quoting or paraphrasing most South
African or South West Africa Administration statements. In
accordance with recognized international usage, the
territory will be referred to as "Namibia" in all other cases.
F. SOURCES
In evaluating research sources, it was recognized that
reports, analyses, opinions and facts differ significantly
between the opponents in any conflict situation. In this
case, where there were variations in historical accounts,
greater weight was given to those which seemed more reflect-
ive of current African historical perceptions since these
form the foundation upon which the prevalent nationalism is
based. On the other hand, and for several reasons which are
discussed in Section III, combat accounts of South African
origin generally received more credence than those promulgated
Wade C. Pendleton, Katutura: A Place Where We Do Noj
Stay (San Diego, Ca. : San Diego State University Press,
197^)i p. 6, 15, and ?. Barth, Ethnic Groups and Boundaries
cited by Pendleton, p. 10.
19

by SWAPO. Finally, in considerations of conflicting views
of political, economic, and cultural factors, attempts were
made to place them within the broader context of recent
African history in order to obtain proper perspectives.
20

II. THE PEOPLE AND HISTORY OF NAMIBIA
A. PURPOSE AND SCOPE
The purpose of this section is to establish the background,
foundations, and historical tendencies and attitudes associated
with the various factors of the total problem as they will
be analyzed in subsequent sections. Some of these factors
which will be at least partially developed or made self-
evident in this section are:
1. The history of ethnic and racial interactions which
will serve as a foundation for later analysis of the depth
and breadth of associated current and projected perceptions,
attitudes, compatibilities, and stabilities.
2. A background for the assessment of the strength and
scope of the perceptions of the different segments of the
population as to who is rightly entitled to what and who has
been wronged. This will support discussions on the signifi-
cance of popular senses of persecution and apprehension or
mistrust in subsequent sections.
3. A background for considering the volatility and
tenacity of the capability of Namibian Non-Whites for
organized violence and the nature of White response to Non-
White provocation.
^. To establish a background for current apparent levels
of faith in the effectiveness of (and hence the nature
cooperation with) the United Nations in successfully
mediating or resolving the issue of Namibian Independence.
21

5. To establish a foundation for later analysis of the
attitudes and the projection of capabilities concerning
the post-independence national economy.
B. THE PEOPLE OF NAMIBIA
Based on official South African estimates, the population
of Namibia in 197^ was 852,000. If the rate of increase from
the previous census in 1970 to the 197^ estimate has con-
tinued, the population should be well over a million. South
Africa has categorized this population largely along ethnic
lines as shown in Table I. Because much of the African
population is rural and remote, and also because many of
the members of some of the ethnic groups have migrated
throughout the country, some Africans feel that the South
African figures for some ethnic groups are quite low. SWAPO
has stated the total population may be well over 1.5 million.
Map 1 depicts the areas of African occupation in Namibia
before extensive White settlement.
Map 2 depicts the official geographic population
distribution in South West Africa as of 1966. Map 3 depicts
the distribution projected by the Odendaal plan in the
early 1960's. The actual distribution is somewhere in
between these last two since the Odendaal plan was only
partially implemented before eventually being scrapped.
2Interview with Kaimbire Tjamuaha, National Unity
Democratic Organization (NUDO) representative at the United
Nations, New York, N.Y., 27 July 19^3, and Peter Fraenkel
,
The Namibians of South West Africa (London, U.K.: Minorit




Population Groups in Namibia
(197^ estimate)
Percent of Number Resident
Population Group Number Total in Homelands
Ovambo 360,000 ^6.5 290,^00
Whites 99,000 11.6
Damara 75.ooo 8.8 1^,000
Herero 56,000 6.6 18,000
Kavango 56,000 6.6 ^0,000
Nama 37,000 ^•3 10,000
Coloureds 32,000 3.8
East-Caprivians 29,000 3.4 25,000
Bushmen 26,000 3.0 5,000
Rehoboth Basters 19,000 2.2 12,000
Kaokolanders 7,000 0.8 6,000
Tswana 5,000 0.6 300
Others 1^,000 1.8
Total 852,000 100.0
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Map 1 - Population in 1900 before extensive "'/hite settlemer.-




















Population distribution up to 1966




Map 2 - Population distribution up to 1966
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Map 3 - Redistribution •oro'posed under Qdendag.1 Plan
Adapted from Fraenkel , The Namibians of South West Africa , p.
26

Many areas actually became "homelands" for specific ethnic
groups, although the population transfer to these homelands
was rather sparse in some cases, while many of the traditional,
small, multi-ethnic reserves have officially become part of
the White area but have retained a significant Non-White
population base.
The following paragraphs contain brief descriptions of the
different ethnic groups found in Namibia.
1. Ovambo
The Ovambo people include seven tribes: Kwanyama,
Ndonga, Kuambi, Ngondjera, Kualuthi, Mbalantu, and
Ndolonkati-Eunda. The Kwanyama are the largest Ovambo tribe,
with more people than any other Namibian ethnic group. Some
of these tribes, most notably the Kwanyama, are split by the
international border with Angola. The tribal languages are
of Bantu origins and are inter-intelligible. When in their
homeland, the Ovambo are primarily pastoralists and agri-
culturalists. Many young Ovambo men (at least 50 f 000 at
any time) spend much of their time out of the homeland on
contract labor in the rest of the territory. In the past
forty years this flow of labor has reduced the Ovambo
isolation from the rest of the territory. Historically,
their remoteness, numbers, and organized mode of living
protected them from raids from the south and the unsuitabili
of southern land to their way of life precluded any advances
of their own. Later, again due to their numbers and organ-
ization, South Africa sealed Ovamboland off from the rest
27

of the territory, with all entry and exit controlled by the
Administration. Partly due to this isolation, the Ovambo
were long thought of as placid, docile, and content.-'
2. Damara
The Damara are a dark-skinned negroid group who differ
completely from the Bantu-speaking groups. Historically
they have lacked a central tribal organization and were
pressed into servitude by the other ethnic groups. They
gradually gave up their original language and adopted that
of the Nama. The majority of the people are now spread all
over the country as laborers.
3. Herero
The Herero are a Bantu-speaking group (their language
differs considerably from other indigienous Bantu-speaking
groups) and are physically tall and long-limbed. The people
officially recognized as Herero are located throughout the
central and southern sections of the territory in several
areas and in Hereroland, their designated homeland. As will
be discussed shortly, the Kaokolanders in the north are also
-'Ruth First, South West Africa (Gloucester, Mass:
Peter Smith Publisher, Inc., 1975) » P« 38; Sschel Rhoodie,
South West: The Last Frontier in Africa (New York, N.Y.
:
Twin Circle Publishing Co. , Inc. , 1967) , p. ^0; Peter Duignan
& L. H. Gann, South West Africa - Namibia (New York, N.Y. :
American African Affairs Association, Inc., 1978), p. 6, ~;
J. H. P. Serfontein, Namibia? (Randburg, South Africa: Fokus
Suid Publishers, 1976) , p. 11
kFirst, p. 3^-37; oerfontein, p. 14
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of Herero stock although they aren't officially classified
as such. The Herero consist of two tribes: Herero and
Mbanderu. About forty percent of the total Herero population
live in Botswana, with most of these being Mbanderu. The
Herero are frequently described as extremely proud and some-
what aloof. Until SWAPO's emergence as an international voice
in the last ten or fifteen years, the traditional Herero
leaders were the primary indigenous advocates of the
African cause in the territory. As a group, they alone have
offered persistant resistance to any housing, health, and
hospital services proffered by the Administration. Originally
nomadic herdsmen, about half those residing in the homeland
still subsist as herdsmen while the rest have been absorbed
into other aspects of the local economy.
4-. Kavango
The Kavango are another Bantu-speaking people and
include five tribes: Kwangali, Mbunza, Sambyu, Kbukushu
,
and Geiruku. They are generally considered to be "cousins"
of the Ovambo and sources researched didn't indicate how
or when any ancestral divergence may have taken place. The
people are generally tillers, herdsmen or fishermen (Okovango
River) and live in family villages. About a thousand men
are usually away on contract labor."





The Nama are a slight-statured, light-skinned Khoisan
people and their language has the distinctive click sounds.
Because of their light skin they are administered by the
South African Department of Coloured Affairs although they
are not of mixed ancestry. The Nama were once nomadic
herdsmen and consisted of two different groups. One group
roamed south-central Namibia and included the Rooi Nasie,
Velskoendraers , Fransmanne , Groot Dode, Bondelswarts , and
Topnaars. The others were called Orlam Namas and migrated
from south of the Orange River about 175 years ago. These
included the Witboois, Amraals, Af rikaanders , and the Berseba
and Bethanie groups. The Nama are now generally spread through'
out the southern half of the territory and many of them are
7
employed on White-owned sheep farms.
6. Coloured
The Coloured are of mixed White and African descent.
Most are immigrants from South Africa. They generally live
in the metropolitan areas of Walvis Bay and Windhoek and
Q
work as artisans, teachers and fishermen.
7. East Caprivians
Although they are a Bantu-speaking people, East
Caprivians have no ethnic links with the other Bantu-
speaking groups in the territory. The two primary tribes
are the Masubia and Mafue. The people are primarily farmers
and fishermen. At certain seasons the East Caprivi region








The Bushmen or San are a Khoisan people with slight
physical stature and pale skins. Tribal representations
include Khung, Keikum, Barakwengo and other small groups.
They all speak in clicks but the language differs from tribe
to tribe. The Bushmen have traditionally existed as hunters
and food gatherers in small family bands. Generally
unaggressive, they have always fled from or been driven into
the most inhospitable areas of the territory. Most of the
Bushmen have retained their historic way of life although
in the south many work on farms during the winter.
9. Rehoboth Basters
The Rehoboth Basters descended from the racial mixing
of Afrikaner trekkers and Nama women in the areas south of
the Orange River. They are generally proud of their
heritage and prefer to classify themselves as a separate
entity from the other Coloureds. Their language is Afrikaans
and their group character is greatly influenced by a fervent
f ire-and-brimstone Calvinism, also inherited from the
Afrikaner. More then any other Non-White group in the











Rehoboth Basters have managed to sustain their ethnic
solidarity in a single geographic area.
10. Kaokolanders
As mentioned earlier, Kaokolanders are a Bantu-
speaking people of Herero stock (the officially recognized
Herero are sometimes referred to as the southern Herero,
inferring that the Kaokolanders are the northern Herero).
The people belong to either the Himba or the Tjimba tribes
and are primarily herdsmen, often trekking with their stock
12from one watering place to another.
11. Tswana
The Tswana are a Bantu-speaking spill-over from
ethnic groups in Botswana and South Africa and represent an
extremely small percentage of the territorial population.
The proposal of a separate homeland for them under the Odendaal
plan is indicative of the lengths to which South Africa
1?planned to go in separating the different ethnic groups. J
12. Whites
Despite the presence of criteria similar to that
used to differentiate among Non-White ethnic groups, the Whites
are officially recognized as a single ethnic entity. The
Whites include Germans and both English and Afrikaans
speaking immigrants from South Africa. All three languages
are recognized officially. The Afrikaners represent abou
First, p. 4-1-^5; Fraenkel , p. 6; Serfontein, p. 1-.
12Serfontein, p. 12
-^Gerhard Totemeyer, South West Africa/Namibia (Randburgi
South Africa: Fokus Suid Publishers, 1977) i P- 8
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65% of the White population. While many are farmers, the
Afrikaners also fill most positions in the territory's
administration and civil service. A great deal of them
arrived only after WWII, a large proportion have retained
South African citizenship, and many are there strictly in an
administrative capacity. The Germans represent about 23% of
the White population and function primarily as farmers and
businessmen. About thirty percent of the Germans arrived
after WWII and about twenty-five percent still carry West
German passports. It is not uncommon for German youths to be
sent to West Germany for part of their education. The
English-speaking Whites represent about twelve percent of the
White population and are found almost completely in the urban
areas as businessmen. The Germans and the English look down on
the Afrikaners culturally but tend to support them politically
and have come to rely on the firm administrative control
exercised by the Afrikaners. Despite the fact that more than
two-thirds of the Whites live in urban areas, White attitudes
and political opinion have been most heavily influenced by
the farming "frontiersmen" whose perceptions of single-handed
development of the territory in the face of threat from all
.14
sides have resulted in a rigid conservatism.
13- General
The territory contains more than a dozen ethno-
linguistic groups , with many of them further divided into
tribes or categories of varying distinctiveness. About
First, p. 50-56; Rhoodie, p. ^3-^9; Duignan and Gann,
p. 8,9; Fraenkel , p. 6.
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seventy percent of all population groups use their mother
tongue as their usual language. While majorities of some
Non-White ethnic groups reside in their homelands (primarily
in the north) the majorities of other groups (primarily in
the central and southern areas) reside in the White area.
As Serfontein pointed out, effectively there isn't a White
area. There is an African area in the north and a "common"
area in most of the rest of the territory. There is a
possibility that the Non-White population may be larger than
current figures indicate and there is a strong probability
that the White population will shrink significantly after
independence as it is anticipated that many German and South
African citizens will return to those countries. •*
C. THE HISTORY OF NAMIBIA
1. The Africans
It is generally accepted that the Bushmen were the
first people to occupy any of the area now known as Namibia.
They roamed over much of the land as hunters in small family
bands. The eventual advance and settlement of more organized
peoples slowly forced most of the Bushmen into the scattered,
16
remote areas with which they are now generally associated.
Little is known of the origin of the Damara, except
that they were one of the first peoples in the region after
Duignan and Gann, p. 4; Fraenkel , p. 6; Serfontein,





the Bushmen. They differ physically from the Bushmen and
Nama, but like the Bushmen they lacked a central tribal
organization. It has been conjectured they may have arrived
with the Nama, whose language they largely adopted and to whom
17
they have been historically subservient.
The Nama were the first major, organized people to
arrive in ancient Namibia. Although the time of their arrival
hasn't been pinpointed, it was well before the arrival of the
Bantu-speaking peoples. It is known that one group (including
the clan later known as Bondelswarts) settled with their
cattle herds in the area of what is now Southeastern Namibia,
while another group of clans (later known as Orlams) continued
south, stopping below the Orange River in what is now South
Africa. 18
The Ovambo appear to have been the next major group
to arrive. A Bantu-speaking, agricultural people, they
settled along the Cunene and Okavango Rivers and in areas in
between which were washed by annual floods. The Kavango are
culturally and linguistically realted to the Ovambo, and
either derived from them (as the Kaokolanders did from the
Herero) or arrived either with them or at about the same
time. Although this time of arrival isn't clear, it may have
been as early as the end of the first millenium A.D. , at the








Africa areas were settling in southern Africa. ° In any
case, they arrived well before the next Bantu-speaking group
from central Africa, the Herero . These people entered
present day Namibia in the mid-sixteenth century through
Kaokoland, to the west of the Ovambo . Some (now known as
Kaokolanders) remained in that area, but most continued south
with their cattle herds, settling in what is now known as
20Damaraland, between the Ovambo and the Nama.
Although there must have been occasional conflict
between some of the groups discussed above, the first and
primary inter-tribal conflict to receive historical document-
ation was between the Nama and the Herero. The roots of the
conflict lay in the requirements for more land and cattle to
sustain the growth of these adjacent, nomadic , cattle-herding
peoples. This was exacerbated by the return of the Orlam
Namas from the Cape Colony in the late eighteenth and early
nineteenth centuries, as they escaped the pressure of advancing
White settlement. The Orlams spoke Cape Dutch, rode horses,
and carried rifles. With this military superiority, they
moved north under Jonker Afrikaander, marauding for cattle
among the resident Nama tribes, and crowding them tighter
against the Herero to the north. A serious drought in 1829
drove Herero/Nama pastureland pressures past the breaking
point and the older Nama tribes requested the assistance
the Orlams in defeating the Herero. The Orlams were soon
197 Ibid.





victorious and confiscated much of the Herero cattle, forced
them into a treaty which recognized the Orlams as superior
in exchange for protection, and established their "capital"
at Windhoek in the 1830's. 21
When Afrikaander refused to protect the Herero against
subsequent encroachment on their land and cattle by other
Nama tribes, the Herero withdrew from their treaty and a period
of bloody, confused terror followed with both the older Mama
and the Orlams pitted against the Herero, but with the Herero
themselves apparently split, some joining with the Afrikaanders
(an Orlam clan) and others warring independently against the
Mbanderu Herero as well. By the 1850's, the Herero were a
22thoroughly defeated and nearly decimated people.
At a power zenith, the Nama formed "The League of
(Nama) Nations" in 1858 and pledged, inter alia, not to sell
land to any of the Whites beginning to appear from the Cape
Colony nor to allow mining without agreement by all. They did
encourage traders however, and their debts soon became such
that they felt forced to attempt to seize cattle from the
23Herero to use as payment. v
21 Ibid., p. 32; Duignan and Gann, p. 10; Rhoodie, p. 121-5;
Serfontein, p. 12; Randolph Vigne , A Dwelling Place of Cur Own;
The Story of the Namibian Nation (London, U.K. : International
Defense and Aid Fund, 1973), P- 9
^Rhoodie, p. 125
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During this time the Herero were regrouping under
Samuel Maherero and obtaining weapons in trade for cattle.
When they were attacked by Orlams seeking cattle in I863 the
Herero successfully repulsed them. In 1864, and assisted by
a northern Nama tribe, the Swartboois, they were led to
further victories over the Nama by avenging White traders
who had lost cattle to the Orlam Namas . The Nama retaliated
against this outside interference by attacking these same
traders and neighboring missionaries in 1868. This, in turn,
resulted in the first request to the King of Prussia for
oh,
protection against the Africans.
The hostilities were heightened in the late 1860's by
another drought with increased pressures for pastureland.
Hunger from the drought greatly weakened both sides however,
and facilitated the arrangement of a truce by Rhenish
missionaries at Okanhandja in 1870. It was also at this
meeting that the Basters obtained permission to settle in the
Rehoboth area, after having been displaced from the Cape
2 ^Colony in I865 by the Land Beacons Act. J
By this time, German and British traders and
missionaries had become involved as advisors and negotiators
in inter-tribal politics. The Africans found trading cattle
and land for civilized commodities irresistable , but the
negative effects on economic and political stability resulting
24
First, p. 66; Rhoodie, p. 128
2
*First, p. 42,^3; Rhoodie, p. 130
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from increasing African debts and associated White
entrenchment and influence were soon noted by some African
leaders. Jonker Afrikaander proposed at one time that traders
shouldn't be entitled to residence, that prices of goods should
be fixed by the tribal chiefs, and that missionaries should
2.6*
fall under the control of the chiefs. Similarly, Maherero
was chagrined at the transit of the first group of Boer
trekkers through the area and petitioned the Cape Colony for
advice and protection against future trekkers as well as future
Nama attacks. As a result, a special commissioner was sent to
the area from the Cape and he concluded protection agreements
with the Herero and the Basters, but was rejected by the Nama.
The commissioner departed in 1880 when hostilities broke out
again, with the only lasting impact of his presence having
been the British annexation of Walvis Bay in 1378 and its
27
subsequent incorporation into the Cape Colony in 188^.
2. The Germans
Hendrik Witbooi, an Orlam, led the Nama in this new
war and, for awhile, they were assisted by the Rehobothers.
The resident traders and missionaries sought protection from
the Cape Colony. When denied, they turned to Germany. The
Germans soon established a protectorate at Llideritz Bay in
1884 and concluded a protection agreement with the Herero and
a sovereignty agreement with the Rehobothers (in return for
28
military assistance against the Africans). Again, the Nama
First, p. 65, 66
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refused to accept White protection, and in a letter to
Maherero, Witbooi prophetically rebuked the Herero leader's
submissiveness
:
...My dear Kaptein, you will eternally regret your
action in having handed over to the White Man the right
to govern your country. After all, our war is not as
serious a matter as you think... But this thing that you
have done,... to surrender yourself to the White Man, will
be a burden that you will carry on your shoulders ... you
will in due course resent them, and then it will be too
late for you. .
.
29
When the Nama attacked the Herero in 1388, the Germans
were unable to provide protection and the Herero revoked the
treaty. -*
Recognizing that control of Witbooi was the key to
controlling the whole colony, the Germans gradually reinforced
until they felt strong enough to challenge him in 1893 • In
reply to the German ultimatum to accept "protection," Witbooi
opined that "...Those under protection were the slaves of the
protectors..." and asked, "Against whom are we to be protected?"
When the strength of the Germans became apparent in battle,
Witbooi unsuccessfully sought alliance with the Herero. The
Germans soon captured Witbooi and forced a treaty between the
Nama and Herero as well as a Nama protection agreement which
included the provision of Nama soldiers to the Germans when
31
needed.
In the relative peace that followed, land and cattle
swindling by German traders and farmers and an adverse system








rapidly diminished African holdings and kindled a growing
awareness and resentment of the German intentions as later
expressed by an official in the German Colonial Office:
The decision to colonize in South West Africa could
after all mean nothing else but this, namely that the
tribes would have to give up their lands on which they
had previously grazed their stock, in order that the
White man might have the land for the grazing of his
stock. 32
The German subjugation and resultant African resentment and
desparation became go intense that tribal rivalries greatly
diminished as an issue of contention, with all subsequent
African violence being directed against the colonizers.
In 1897 the Mbanderu Herero joined with some of the
neighboring Nama tribes to throw off German control and regain
their lost herds. The Herero people were split in a leadership
dispute at that time and Samuel Maherero (son of Samuel
Maherero mentioned previously) chose not to assist the rebels.
The Germans, aided by Witbooi's men soon suppressed the re-
bellion. In the next few years there were additional short-
lived uprisings by other Nama tribes, the Swartboois in the
33
north and the Bondelswarts in the south. JJ
After 1900 German immigration increased. Farmers
initially bought tracts of land from the Hereros and Namas
,
but soon laws were passed which facilitated the confiscation





extended credit at high interest and confiscated cattle as
34
compensation for non-payment. J
The gradual loss of their main source of livelihood
goaded the Bondelswarts into rebelling once again in late
1903- The Herero had also reached the breaking point, and
with the German soldiers occupied with the Bondelswarts in
the south, they attacked German traders and farmers on 12
January 1904. Maherero sought Witbooi's assistance in com-
batting the Germans, but the Rehoboth intermediary delivered
the message to the Germans instead. Heavily outgunned, the
Herero were steadily beaten back. Finally, following the
decisive battle of Hamakari in August 1904, the entire
people took flight into the Kalahari towards Bechuanaland,
pursued by General Von Trotha and his infamous extermination
3^
orders. '-'
The Germans were initially assisted in all of this by
the Nama under Witbooi, but increasing anti-German sentiment
within the Nama was finally catalyzed by the Germans ' harsh
treatment of the vanquished Herero and Bondelswarts. Witbooi
rallied all the Nama tribes , abrogated the ten year German
treaty, and launched a guerilla war. Witbooi was killed aftei
a year, but the losing battle carried on until 1907 » termin-
36
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Thus, German authority over most of the territory was
finally asserted at a tremendous cost in African lives. Out
of 80,000 Herero prior to the war, only 15,000 remained alive
in South West Africa and only 1,500 had managed to reach
Bechuanaland. Half the Nama had been killed and half of
their Damara "vassals" had also died. The Herero tribal
lands were declared government property and the Herero
survivors were forbidden to own cattle. Laws were soon
passed requiring all Africans older than seven to carry
passes, prohibiting African purchase of land or animals with-
out official permission, and stipulating punishment as a
vagrant for anyone without visible means of support, all of
which were intended to force the Africans into labor service
for the Whites. ^'
Despite the foregoing, the Germans never established
control over the entire colony. Chief Kambonde of the
Kwanyama tribe of the Ovambo had rejected German "protection"
overtures in 189^ » stating, "...The Germans came with friendly
words, but ... they wanted to rule, and that he could dc
himself." After their bloody experiences with the Herero and
Nama, the Germans thought better of antagonizing the numerous
and well-armed Ovambo. To ensure this, in 1906 the German
government forbade further entry to Ovamboland. Sub-
jugation of the Ovambo would be the task of the South Africans.
3? Ibid.
, p. 82, 83
^ Ibid.
,
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As German South West Africa poised on the brink of
WWI, the Africans within the Police Zone (see Map 2) were in
a state of total subjugation. German colonial policy had
been one of frequently ruthless exploitation for the sake
of White settlement. It had provoked the indigenous
population to rebellion, and the response had been genocide,
confiscation of land and a labor system that was close to
19
slavery. -"
3. South Africa's Mandate
WWI combat in South West Africa didn't last long, and
on 9 July 1915 » the small German colonial army surrendered
to the vastly superior forces of the Union of South Africa.
In light of their treatment under the Germans and encouraged
by promises from the highest South African officials, the Non-
Whites were optimistic about their "liberation" and post-war
future. The Rehobothers had vigorously repulsed a German
attack on their town, and Bondelswarts had served as scouts
for the South African army. Most of the other groups had
passively resisted the Germans through non-cooperation. Res-
pite an apparent relaxation of Non-White restrictions in the
next five years under South African military government hew-
ever (e.g., restoration of African cattle rights, use of land





In 1915 t King Mandume (Kwanyama Ovambo), having
rebelled against the Portuguese in southern Angola, requested
South African protection from their savage reprisals. A
subsequent border agreement between South African and
Portuguese authorities split the Kwanyama tribe between the
two territories and gave Mandume refuge in South West Africa.
Reprimands over subsequent inevitable tribal border crossings
led first to Madume ' s open defiance of South African authority
and ultimately to the deaths of him and several of his tribe
in a small battle in 1917. after which his head was carried
to Windhoek and buried as an example.
At the Treaty of Versailles and during the formation
of the League of Nations, Britain and South Africa, as
documented by John Dugard , lobbied long and hard for the
annexation of South West Africa into the Union of South
Africa. World pressure eventually forced them to accept in-
stead a class "G" mandate under the system drawn up by the
League of Nations. This mandate was conferred on Britain,
in
but was exercised for Britain by ^outh Africa.
u Ibid.
, p. 11; Vigne, p. 14; First, p. 98-100; Colin
O'Brien Winter, Namibia (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Wm. 3.
Eerdmans Publishing Co
.
, 1977), p. 107
The former colonies of Germany and Turkey were entrusted
to members of the victorious Allies for administration and
development. These nations were given different mandates for
this trusteeship, of which there were three classes—"A" , "3",
and "C". The gradations of mandates were based ostensibly on
the different stages of development attained by the respective
territories. Less obviously, the gradations also reflected
different degrees of national interest in annexation of the
territories concerned, with C mandate territories having been
those which the various Dominions of the British Commonwealth
had attempted to annex. Only A mandates contained wording whi
implied probable eventual independence. See John Dugard, The
South West Africa/Namibia Dispute (Berkeley, Calif: University
of California Press, 1973), P- 27-7^

The mandate system was shaped against the humanitarian
standards of the nineteenth century-- "native trusteeship" with
no thought or reference to eventual political independence.
Referring to the system, the League's Covenant stated in
part:
To those. .. territories. . .which are inhabited by peoples
not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous
conditions of the modern world, there should be applied the
principle that the well-being and development of such
people's form a sacred trust of civilization,...
It went on to state that, "the Mandatory shall promote to the
utmost the material and moral well-being and social progress
^2
of the inhabitants of the Territory. . .
"
Article 2 of the South African mandate agreement read
in part:
The Mandatory shall have full power of administration
and legislation over the territory. .. as an integral portion
of the Union of South Africa, and may apply the laws of
the Union of South Africa to the territory, subject to such
local modifications as circumstances may require ... ^3
Despite the language of these governing documents,
South Africa's rea3. attitude was readily apparent in the
following report of Prime Minister Botha's statement before
the League:
He would support the Covenant because he knew that the
League of Nations would consist mostly of the same people
who were present on that day, who understood the position






W. R. Louis, "The Origins of the Sacred Trust," in R.





In other words, he accepted the mandate system for
South West Africa for the sake of international agreement,
but he expected its actual implementation to be much closer
to annexation.
This attitude was exhibited again a few years later
in a speech by Prime Minister Smuts to the South African
parliament:
I do not think it necessary to annex South West
Africa. .
.
(the mandate) gives such complete sovereignty, . .
.
that we need not ask for anything more. ^5
The intentions of South Africa regarding this newly
"acquired" territory were also soon apparent to the indigenous
Africans. As stated by Prof. J. H. Wellington of Witwatersrand
University,
The crux of the matter is surely that the mandatory,
having been directed to make the welfare of the natives its
chief concern, and having been given the power to carry out
this policy effectively, seized the best land for its own
(white) subjects, relegating its wards ... to areas too small
for their sustenance, or else... to land far worse than they
were accustomed to . °
A Land Board was set up to allocate farms to new White
settlers. By 1926 the White population was almost double that
of 191^ despite the repatriation of 6,000 Germans, and 380
holdings had been allocated to 1,106 settlers. The govern-
ment gave the new farmers generous loan terms and remissions








capital for stock. South Africa also set up a special fund
to attract 301 Boer trekker families from Angola, with
guarantees of farms, cattle, and sizable cash advances.
To make room for the White settlers, the Africans were
displaced from most of their "traditional" lands which they
had reoccupied under the military government since 1915 , and
they were crowded onto small, ill-suited reserves. In the
case of the Herero , many refused to vacate until their farms
and gardens were finally burned. The government picked the
Omaheke as the Herero Reserve— the same Kalahari sandveld on
which thousands of Hereros had died of thirst and starvation
during General Von Trotha's reign of terror less than twenty
years earlier. White farmers had previously been advised to
move from the southern edge of the Omaheke because of the
local prevalence of lame-sickness in cattle. Hosea Kutako
,
acting Herero chief, inspected the Omaheke and, in rejecting
it as a site for his people, declared:
It is a desert where no human being ever lived before...
It is a country only good for wild beasts... We are human
beings and we do not want to be changed into wild beasts. ~9
Crowded into small, barren reserves, it was impossible
for the Africans to avoid destroying the small amount of
'First, p. 107
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grazing available, and most were soon faced with the choice
of laboring for the Whites or starving. The Whites came to
view the Africans almost solely as laborers, as typified by
a statement in the territory Administrator's report to the
Permanent Mandates Commission in 1921 in which he noted the
"healthy, well-nourished children" which could be seen on
temporary government farms, "representing potential laborers
for the future. "-5°
In one case, this process resulted in a violent
reaction. By 1922 the Bondelswarts had lost so much of
their land and cattle that they were forced to rely on
hunting with their dogs as a last means of avoiding servitude
to White farmers. When the South Africans placed a heavy tax
on dog ownership, many Bondelswarts were unable to pay and
were jailed. The situation was aggravated by prejudicial
cattlebranding requirements. The attempted arrest of some
former leaders returning from South Africa finally sparked
a small rebellion. Fearful rumors among the Whites about
these former leaders escalated the situation, and the
territorial administration called in troops and aircraft
bombing strikes to quell the uprising at a cost of over 100
Bondelswart lives.
In his reports to the Permanent Mandates Commission,
the territorial Administrator acknowledged that perhaps the
Fraenkel
, p. 12
^ Ibid. , Rhoodie, p. 161-2; First, p. 101-3; Vigne , p. 1?
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biggest problem in administering the Africans was dealing with
their frustrations and discontent in having failed to recover
their traditional lands after WWT. The problem, as the
Administrator repeatedly explained, was in trying to make
the Africans understand the impossibility of the situation
due to the "vested rights" of others (White settlers) that had
accrued since the end of W¥I and the resultant unavailability
CO
of sufficient land.^
Even if the duplicity with which these vested rights
had accrued is accepted, however, there still doesn't appear
to have been a land shortage in the extremes stated by the
Administrator. As Ruth First points out, while the government
claimed it was an "utter impossibility" in 1922 to restore the
tribes to their former lands, there were still huge areas
available for the settlement of the Angola Boers in 1928.
The Administrator's annual report in 1937 complained that
there was "so little land available for allotment" but went
S3
on to reveal that "over 21 million hectares are unallocated."^
Any shortage of land appears to have pertained only to the
Africans, as a matter of policy.
The South African government soon promulgated more
overt policies of African restriction. Under a vagrancy law,
Africans could be punished for leaving their reserves except
to work for a White man. The "Masters and Servants Procla-
mation" of 1920 prescribed punishments for neglect of assigned
-
52Fraenkel, p. 12, 13
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duties, drunkeness, desertion from a job, etc. The "Native
Administration Proclmation No. 11" of 1922 introduced the
Pass Laws. "Curfew Regulations Proclamation No. 33" of
1922 prevented Africans from appearing in public in any
town between 9:00P.M. and 4:00 A.M.^ The ultimate right-
lessness of the African was to be seen in the power of the
government
:
To remove any Native from the highest to the lowest,
whether within or outside the Police Zone 'from any place
to any other place within the territory without any right
of interference by the courts of the country. 55
These political restrictions applied to the Rehobothers
as well, and in 192^ they rebelled at having insufficient
constitutional independence, especially compared to their
relatively independent status under the Germans. They formed
a local governmental alternative to the one officially
recognized by the South Africans and appealed to the League
of Nations. The situation was brought under control only
after Rehoboth was surrounded by troops, bombers were flown
over for intimidation, and 638 men were taken prisoner.
The South West Africa Constitution Act of 1925
delegated responsibility for territorial "Native Affairs" to
the territory's Administrator. A 1928 proclamation made him
the"Paramount Chief" of the "Natives" and established "Native
Fraenkel
, p. 13
^1. Goldblatt, History of South West Africa , cited
by Vigne, p. 16, 17
^Fraenkel, p. 12; First, p. 10^-5
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Affairs" commissioners for areas outside the Police
57Zone. '
One last act of African defiance and South African
punitive military response can be attributed to the legal
restrictions placed on the Africans during this period. In
1932 Chief Ipumbu of the Kuambi Ovambo refused to pay a fine
and his people became restive. In a move which the government
tried to keep secret, the South African Air Force bombed the
Chief's village. Ipumbu was deposed and put in detention in
Caprivi, the tribe was disarmed, and the village was destroyed."'
On one occasion, the Permanent Mandates Commission was
told that, "The Native. .. should be allowed to develop quietly
and according to such capacity as he has." The White
estimation of this capacity for development can perhaps be
partially deduced by the low levels of African educational
expenditures rendered by the government during that time. If
just the actual scholars are considered, the expenditure for
each White was almost six times that of each African. If
the expenditures are considered on a per capita basis how-
ever, the White expenditure was more than 100 times that of
the African. Obviously it was anticipated that the
Africans as a whole would develop in a very limited and con-
trolled manner and would therefore have to remain in White
servitude for quite some time.
-57y oerfontein, p 22




The status of the Africans and the attitude of the
South African government during the mandate period was
illustrated clearly by two conflicting official statements.
In 1917. General Smuts declared that the German maladminis-
tration, as evidenced by the colonial brutality recorded in
the infamous Blue Book, rendered "preposterous" any suggestion
that South West Africa be returned to Germany. Yet six years
later, a South African official told the Permanent Mandates
Commission very frankly that, "they (the Africans) soon
realized that conditions would remain practically the same...
as they were in German times."
The fact that the League of Nations was, for various
reasons, incapable of enforcing the rights of the Africans
under the terms of the mandate in South West Africa would
eventually be considered by the Africans as reinforcing
historical evidence of the absolute necessity for self-
generated positive action towards independence.
k. The United Nations, South Africa, and the Namibians
When the United Nations was established in 19^5 » it,
like its League of Nations predecessor, had to deal with the
question of former German colonies. It set up a Trusteeship
committee to work with the original mandated powers in bring-
ing their mandated territories to independence. South Africa
was the only mandated power to reject this course of action,
requesting instead the formal annexation of South West Africa
into South Africa. The refusal of this request by the tJ.N.
60
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and the subsequent counter-refusal by South Africa to place
the territory under trusteeship or to recognize any juridical
authority of the U.N. in the administration of the territory
coupled with its simultaneous statement of intent to continue
to administer the territory in the "spirit of the mandate"
touched off an international legal battle between South
Africa and the U.N. which was to last almost 25 years.
General discussion of the various International Court of
Justice deliberations and considerations and the actions taken
by several U.N. committees and bodies in connection with this
legal argument is beyond the scope of this paper. Specific
cases will be mentioned as needed to indicate the growth of a
widespread feeling within the territory's African population
that they would have to take matters into their own hands to
achieve independence. Some of the international decisions
which supported this indigenous activism will also be
discussed.
Although their impact was greatly filtered by South
Africa's pervasive control of the territory, the same
modernizing forces which accelerated the political sensitization
of most of the rest of black Africa after WWII were also at
work in South West Africa. Traditional African leaders tried
An extensive coverage of these international legal
proceedings is contained in John Dugard's The South West
Africa/Namibia Dispute . Condensed but comprehensive treat-
ments are also contained in Gerhard Totemeyer's South Wes~
Africa/Namibia and J. H. P. Serfontein's Namibia?
5^

to use their right under the terms of the old mandate to
petition the U.N. as the successor to the League of Nations,
but South Africa refused to issue passports. At the request
of Herero Chief Hosea Kutako , Reverend Michael Scott began
petitioning on their behalf in 19^7 • As the years went by,
he was joined by those few Africans who were able to leave
62South West Africa and make their way to New York.
The germ of modern political organization in South
West Africa was contained in the South West African Student
Body, set up by South West African students in South Africa
in 1952. It was reconstituted within South West Africa in
1955 as the South West Africa Progressive Association (SWAPA).
Almost all later nationalist groups had their roots in this
organization. The Ovambo People's Congress (OPC) was founded
by Herman Toivo ja Toivo and Andreas Shipanga in Cape Town
in 1958 for Ovambo workers in that area. When Toivo was
returned to South West Africa after smuggling a taped
petition to the U.N. , this organization was reorganized in-
ternally as the Ovambo People's Organization (0P0) in 1959.
It became the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO)
in June, i960, after petitioners at the U.N. urged that it
avoid being cast strictly as an ethnic based party. The
South West Africa National Union (SWANU) was formed in May
1959 with a base of support primarily among the Herero.
62
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Several other Non-White political parties soon formed also,
and like the two just mentioned, they were all primarily
ethnic based.
During this post-war period two new irritants were
added to the list of aggravations from which Non-White South
West Africans were seeking relief. The first of these was the
rapid expansion of foreign-owned mining operations and the
associated requirements for a greater control of the support-
ing migrant labor system. While contract labor had existed
in South West Africa for a long time, the rapidly increasing
requirements for laborers and the grouping of hundreds and
thousands of these migrants together in single locations
tended to accentuate resentment of the system. The first
aspects of the mining and contract labor situation to aggra-
vate the Africans were the low wages, the generally squalid
living conditions, the extended and repeated family separations
and the hopelessness for most Africans of avoiding this form
of employment. As the Africans as a whole, and especially
the laborers, became more politicized and as their leaders
became more sophisticated, the mining and contract labor
issues took on additional dimensions. Resentment grew over
the arbitrary exploitation of the territory's mineral wealth,
the extremely high profits netted by foreign concerns with
minimal return to the Africans from these activities, and the
distasteful role these factors played in supporting the
continued presence and control by South Africa.
61^Richard Gibson, African Liberation Movements (New
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The second post-WWII addition to the list of Non-White
South West African grievances was South Africa's
institution of apartheid in 19^8. After codification and
legalization of what had become customary in racial separation,
the policy began to expand, became more specific and came
to be perceived by all Non-Whites as a system of maintaining
White supremacy and denying to all others fundamental human
rights. Apartheid forced apart racially mixed communities,
and in South West Africa, this led to the Katutura riots.
Africans were to be moved from the racially mixed "Old
Location" on the edge of Windhoek, where many were free-
holders and many more had lived for a long time, to a township
further from town called Katutura, which was to be ethnically
zoned to minimize contact between the different African groups.
Protest demonstrations and boycotts by the Africans culminated
in a confrontation between police and a large crowd on 10
December 1959 in which eleven were killed and 5^ injured,
after which bulldozers began flattening the town. While
passive African resistance actually delayed the completion of
this transfer process for several years, many of the more
politicized were somewhat dismayed at the ineffectiveness
exhibited by the U.N. during this episode. Despite petitions
before the incident and even after the territory's worst civil
violence in almost thirty years, the U.N. appeared to do
little more than issue perfunctory denunciations and move
on to other business. The need for positive self-reliance
65
was becoming much more apparent to many Africans.
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Sam Nujoma, president of 0P0 , was escorted back to
Ovamboland after the riots. Suppression of 0P0 activities
by local Ovambo traditional leaders caused him to leave the
country and he soon appeared at the U.N. as a petitioner on
behalf of the renamed SWAPO. Between 4-00 and 900 Africans
followed Nujoma abroad in 1961/62 and an expatriate organ-
ization soon formed as an external branch of SWAPO.
The growth of SWAPO External was greatly facilitated
by the formation of the Organization of African Unity (OAU)
in 1963. Through the OAU African Liberation Committee (ALC)
SWAPO received funds and improved international diplomatic
status. It was also under ALC sponsorship that SWAPO in
1963, after little change in the status of South West Africa
despite the independence achieved by most of the rest of
Africa in 1960/61, began training guerrilla fighters as the
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ultimate contingency.
In 1962, Ethiopia and Liberia, as former members of
the League of Nations, petitioned the International Court of
Justice to rule on the accountability of South Africa to the
United Nations for the Administration of South West Africa
and to decide whether or not apartheid violated the pro-
visions of the original mandate. On 18 July 1966 the Court
66
Gibson, p. 133; Totemeyer, p. 62,63
° 7Gibson, p. 135, Vigne , p. 2k
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finally decided that Ethiopia and Liberia had no "...legal
right or interest appertaining to them in the subject
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matter..." and dropped the case.
The court's decision was a significant disappointment
to SWAPO and its African supporters. This, and the generally
unsupportive attitudes displayed at the U.N. by many Western
governments on the territorial issues, tended to confirm, in
SWAPO ' s eyes, the rightness and necessity of the course of
heightened, aggresive self-reliance on which it had recently
embarked.
In September 1965 a small group of SWAPO guerillas
entered Ovamboland. It soon established several small base
camps and began to train thirty locally-recruited men. More
small groups infiltrated in February and July, 1966. Brushes
with the police by some of these groups led to an intensive
search by the South African police and an eventual attack
on the main SWAPO camp near Ongulumbashe on 26 August i960.
Two were killed, nine captured, and the rest escaped. SWAPO
later designated 26 August i960 as the date that it "...
declared war. . . " on the government and administration of
69South West Africa. This war has continued in varying
degrees of low intensity until the present.
A series of actions on the international scene in
the next few years served to encourage SWAPO in its struggle.
Dugard, p. 292
69Michael Morris, Armed Conflict in Southern Africa
(Cape Town, South Africa: Jeremy Spence)
, p. 4 ,5
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On 27 October 1966, the U.N. General Assembly passed a
resolution terminating South Africa's League of Nations man-
date and placing South West Africa under dejure administration
of the U.N. The territory was renamed Namibia by the U.N.
General Assembly in June 1968 and a U.N. Council for Namibia
was appointed to attempt administration of the territory.
In August 1969. the U.N. Security Council passed a resolution
recognizing the legitimacy of the struggle of the people of
Namibia against the illegal presence of South Africa in the
territory and calling upon South Africa to withdraw from the
territory immediately.
In June 1971. in the face of South Africa's refusal to
acknowledge any change in its responsibility and authority
towards Namibia, the International Court of Justice responded
to a U.N. request for a ruling on the matter and confirmed
the legality of the U.N. resolutions and actions and the
71illegality of South Africa's position.
In December, 1973 the U.N. Security Council terminated
a mandate it had given the Secretary General for direct
negotiations with South Africa on Namibia's independence, as
South Africa's actions seemed continually to belie tentative
72
and general negotiated agreements.
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' Fraenkel, p. 16, 18; Vigne, p. 39.^0; United Nations
Department of Political Affairs, Trusteeship, and Decolonization,
"Issue on Namibia" Decolonization , No. 9, October 1977 » p.
71Fraenkel, p. 18; Vigne, p. 39,^0
72Serfontein, p. 78, 79, 91
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In 197^ the U.N. recognized SWAPO as the authentic
representative of the people of Namibia. In December 1976
the General Assembly declared its support for SWAPO ' s armed
struggle for self-determination and independence, and
71
accorded SWAPO permanent observer status. J
Despite the growing international opposition, South
Africa continued to extend its administrative hold over the
territory during the 1960's. By 1969. South Africa had direct
control of Namibia's defense, foreign affairs, police,
African administration, customs, immigration, revenue, labor
relations, mining, health, and other functions. Namibia's
economic links and dependencies on South Africa rapidly
7^broadened and strengthened.
In 196^ a South African government commission promulgated
what became known as the Odendaal Report, which was to be
used as the blueprint for South African development of South
West Africa. Among other things it recommended the "giving"
of a homeland to each population group. The territory,
including the "White area," was to be divided into twelve
separate ethnic units. The Non-White homelands were to
occupy 39$ of the county, with the best land and virtually
all the mines to remain in the possession of the Whites.
After the plan's implementation, the only Non-White group
that would have enjoyed the use of land similar in quality
to that used by the Whites would have been the Rehobothers.
^u.N. Dept. of Political Affairs, p. kl, ^2
Duignan and Gann, p. 13
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The report acknowledged that six of the proposed homelands
weren't economically viable and the Africans doubted that any
of the others were either. This would have forced the
continued reliance of the Africans on the White area for
economic survival but would have legalized their almost total
lack of rights when working in the White area. The plan was
opposed by the Africans not only because of the inequitable
land distribution, but also because they felt these separate
7 *5homelands would be detrimental to racial harmony. •*
South Africa had refrained from vigorous implementation
of the Odendaal recommendations during the time the Inter-
national Court of Justice was deliberating on the administration
of the South West Africa mandate. Once the matter was
"resolved", South Africa pushed ahead and began moving Non-
Whites from the designated White areas to the various homelands.
The first homeland to "achieve" a "self-governing" status was
Ovamboland, on 1 May 1973* Since then, Okavango and East
if)
Caprivi have also received similar status.
The previously mentioned decision by the International
Court of Justice in 1971 against South Africa acted as some-
what of a catalyst for the increasingly politicized Namibian
Africans. Demonstrations and rallies at schools and urban/
industrial locations and statements by various Non-White
leaders evidenced a growing civil militancy within the
7
^Rhoodie, p. 2^1-^5; Vigne , p. 33; Fraenkel , p. 31, 32;
Serfontein, p. 58
7 Fraenkel, p. 17 , 19, 29
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territory. This new activism found fertile ground in the deep
grievances held by the Africans against the contract labor
system and sparked a labor strike in December 1971.
Originally organized in Windhoek and Walvis Bay, it soon
spread throughout the country and by the middle of January
1972 it involved at least 13.500 workers (primarily Ovambo)
and had affected 23 industrial centers, including eleven
mines, seven of which had to shut down. Most of these
workers were temporarily repatriated to Ovamboland. Their
idle discontent precipitated numerous incidents of civil
disobedience and violence against figures or symbols of
authority. These incidents and reports of plans for more
extreme actions were generally attributed to SWAPO organi-
zation. Although the workers eventually returned to work,
the changes made in the labor system proved to be of little
77
substance in the long run.
Nationalistic demonstrations and rallies occurred
with increasing frequency, better organization and greater
militancy. When elections for an Ovambo land administration
were held in August 1973 following its establishment as a
self-governing homeland, a boycott organized by SWAPO and
other opposition parties resulted in an electorate turnout
of only 2.5 percent. A much more spontaneous demonstration
of anti-South African feeling was demonstrated between June
197^- and early 1975 when several thousand people left Namibia
for Zambia via Angola, apparently not so much to join SWAPO '
s
77Vigne, p. 42-46; U.N. Dept. of Political Affairs, p. l6j
Africa Research Bulletin (ARB) , Feb. 1-29, 1972, p. 2387,3.
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struggle as simply to escape what for then was an unbearable
78
situation.
Throughout this period, South Africa sought to contain
and defuse the activities of the internal branch of SWAPO
through increasing arrest and detainment of members and
supporters. By late 197^ it was forced to undertake an
additional approach in the face of increased international
pressure, the pending independence of Angola, and a desire
for detente with other southern Africa states. In an effort
to promote viable African leadership alternatives to SWAPO and
to set the territory on the road to independence, South Africa
convened a constitutional conference (known as the Turnhalle
Conference) on 1 September 1975* Convened on an ethnic basis,
the conference was rejected internationally and by SWAPO and
other Non-White Namibian political parties for its lack of
true representation, the illegality of South Africa con-
vening such a body, and a projected form of government which
appeared to perpetuate the principle of separate ethnic areas
79
and governmerts.
The results of the Turnhalle Conference were subsequently
shelved as a result of a new initiative by the five Western
members of the U.N. Security Council in April 1977 to achieve
q •>
a solution which would be acceptable to all parties concerned.
7 Fraenkel, p. 19; Serfontein, p. 229-31
' 9U.N. Dept of Political Affairs, p. 27; Serfontein, p. 262




Although extensive negotiations have been conducted to date,
a firm, workable agreement has continued to elude the
participants, primarily because of the suspicion and wary
intransigence exhibited by SWAPO and South Africa towards
each other, the Western negotiators, and in South Africa's
case, towards the U.N. as well. Although these negotiations
are continuing, international expectations on their effect-
iveness have diminished. South Africa has conducted internal
elections in which most Non-White political parties did not
participate and the results of which accordingly did not
receive international recognition. SWAPO has responded
with vows to escalate its combat operations with threats of
assistance from Cuba and the Soviet Union.
5. A Brief Bottom Line
The cumulative impact on the African political psyche
of the history of the political/military struggle in Namibia
first to retain independence, then against perceived in-
justices, and finally to regain independence, will be dis-
cussed later in the paper. A generalized recapitulation of
the opposing forces and attitudes consistently at work: in
this struggle is probably appropriate now however.
As in the rest of Africa, definite and often violent
ethnic differences existed before the arrival of the Whites.
Despite these differences, specific issues frequently pre-
cipitated unlikely ethnic coalitions and divisions. Still,
these differences were sufficient to prevent any unity of action
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against the Whites when they did arrive, and even facilitated
playing off one group against another by the Whites. Since
then, ethnic interaction has been largely precluded through
the form of South Africa's "native" administration. Despite
their advocacy of a non-racial, unitary, independent Namibia,
almost all African political parties, including SWAFO , are
perceived as essentially ethnically based. The Non-Whites
feel they have historically received hypocritical and ill
treatment at the hands of the Whites, who are generally re-
garded with skeptical mistrust. Despite moral and material
support, international organizations have thus far been
ultimately ineffective in rectifying the political situation
of the Africans.
The Whites feel their societal position was hard won
and is well deserved, and that it was only through their
efforts that the territory has advanced. South Africa and
the Whites have historically advocated ethnic separation,
have resolutely resisted international opinions and pressures
in the conduct of their internal and external political
activities, and still maintain a very paternalistic attitude




A. PURPOSE AND SCOPE
The purpose of this section is to examine both the
current nature of the insurgent/counterinsurgent warfare
associated with SWAPO ' s struggle for Namibian independence
and the history of its military escalation in order to
establish the military portion of the foundation upon
which projections of future actions will be predicated.




2. The opposing military structures.
3. The breadth and depth of military operations.
^. The operational effectiveness of the participants.
5. The nature of involvement by external actors other
than South Africa.
6. The modification of the Namibian civil legal
system to accomodate counterinsurgent warfare.
7. The militant attitudes or resolve of the opposing
forces and the nature of indigenous popular support.
In discussing several aspects of the military situation
in Namibia (e.g., personnel strength, casualities, operational
effectiveness)
,
greater reliance will usually be placed on
South African accounts and figures than on those announced
by SWAPO. As will be noted later in discussing the use of
propaganda and psychological warfare, it is a common
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insurgent practice to fabricate or greatly inflate claims
of success. On the other hand, since South African troops
only serve in the operational zone for short periods of
time and then return home, the government can't very well
deceive the public on military casualties for any length
of time. Further, given the nature of the operations, and
the size and commitments of the overall South African
military establishment, the figures as reported by South
Africa are generally in line with those reported in other
counterinsurgencies and with the author's own experiences
as a member of the U.S. Navy SEAL team in Vietnam. Still,
given the nature of counterinsurgency warfare, it is certain
that many African casualties reported as guerrillas were
actually civilians caught in suspicious circumstances at the
wrong times and places.
After studying several classified documents on the
military situation in Namibia, it was decided to use only
unclassified material as the basis for this paper. There
were several reasons for this, not the least of which was a
desire to avoid the length of coverage that the much more
detailed classified reports would have encouraged. Secondly,
there is sufficient accurate unclassified information avail-
able for discussion and to facilitate deduction adequate
for the purposes of this section of the paper. Third, in
the course of researching this paper it was noted that there
didn't seem to be any recent complete account of the total
military situation in Namibia available to people working
at an unclassified level. Perhaps this paper will help.
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Finally, it was felt that given the likely distribution
of this paper, those who might have a need for the detail
provided by classified sources would probably have access
to them through their own channels. For those readers,
some of the registered classified sources which might be
of interest are listed below.
B. THEORY
In dealing with a topic of this nature, most writers
delve extensively into their versions of the sciences of
insurgency and counterinsurgency warfare before focusing on
a particular situation. In this case a very short overall
summarization which was synthesized from several sources
Do
will be presented. The purpose of this is to provide a
framework for evaluation of the situation in Namibia.
Deleted to permit wider distribution.
Q o
If the reader desires a greater depth of discussion
on these opposing types of warfare, it is recommended that
he consult any of the following sources:
David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare , (New York, N.Y.:
Frederick A. Praeger, 1964)
John J. McCuen, Lt. Col. U. S. Army, The Art of Counter-
Revolutionary War
,
(Harrisburg, Pa.: Stackpole Books, i960)
Julian Paget, Counter-Insurgency Operations: Techniques c:
Guerrilla Warfare
,
(New York, N.Y.: Walker and Company, 19'
Special Operations Research Office, Human Factors Consider-
ations of Undergrounds in Insurgencies , ^Washington, 2.Z.:
American University, 1965)
Special Operations Research Office, Undergrounds in Insurgent ,






Theories of. insurgency warfare seem to differ
primarily only in the number of phases into which a part-
icular writer has decided to divide the total process.
Additionally, differences in terminology (e.g., guerrilla,
insurgent, revolutionary) usually reflect a narrow concern for
whether or not the situation is developed primarily from
within or without a country, whether or not the controlling
government is legitimate, and the degree of popular support
accorded to either side. It is interesting to note that
South Africa, both officially and within the press, describes
the soldiers of all African liberation movements as
"terrorists" on the grounds that more common terms such as
guerrilla or insurgent imply the recognition of a state of
war, a degree of legitimacy, and internal popular support.
South Africa has defined "terrorist" officialy in its legal
code in such a manner as to apply in all situations of
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violent indigenous action against the ruling government. J
Unfortunately, there seems to be a paucity of recognized
terms for specifically describing a member of the military
wing of a liberation movement which is recognized inter-
nationally as legitimate and who fights from an external
base against a government which is recognized internationally




terminology used in this paper for discussing these
subjects will apply in a very broad sense. Members of SWAPO '
s
military wing, the People's Liberation Army of Namibia (FLAIJ)i
will usually be referred to as guerrillas. Terms such as
insurgent, liberation fighter, or revolutionary will have
a broader connotation which can include members of the
political organization the guerrillas are supporting and
those involved in sabotage, terrorism, and even civil dis-
obedience as well. The forces opposing them within Namibia
(the South African Defense Force (SADF)
,
police, Namibian
forces, etc.) will normally be referred to as counter-
insurgents, security forces, etc. It should be noted that
inside Angola, PLAN is frequently required to function as a
counter-guerrilla force in conjunction with the Armed Forces
of the People's Republic of Angola (FAPLA) and Cuban forces
in their struggle with the guerrilla forces of the National
Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA)
.
The aim of an insurgent force normally is to achieve a
political objective by military means. This usually consists
of harassment of the opponent by small, lightly armed groups
utilizing mobile tactics. Civil disobedience, sabotage,
and terrorist tactics are frequently incorporated into this
struggle as well. The intent is not so much to defeat the
enemy in open battle as it is to achieve a stalemate or a
continuing level of activity which eventually forces the
counterinsurgents to decide that the cost of continuing an
indecisive struggle is no longer worthwhile.
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Within an insurgent organization the political body
is usually structured on country, region, state, district,
and village levels. The military structure frequently
parallels this. In most guerrilla situations the small
basic units usually operate rather independently in areas
alio ted to them. Large units aren't maintained permanently
but may be formed by concentrating several groups for a
particular operation.
The basic requirements for a successful insurgency
are generally categorized in terms of:
a. A simple, inspiring, and convincing cause.
b. Support from the local population, whether active,
passive, voluntary or coerced, for such things as food,
information, recruits, freedom of movement, and security.
c. Bases and sanctuaries relatively inaccessible to
the security forces.
d. Sufficient mobility to attack security forces
consistently on guerrilla terms.
e. The ability to move freely, concentrate forces,
attack, and rapidly disperse.
f. Material support (arms, equipment, food, medical
supplies, money, clothing) either from an outside source
or a sympathetic population.
The model insurgency process is usually discussed in
phases. Initial phases usually are categorized in terms of:
a. The clandestine formation of an underground
which includes recruiting, training cadres, soliciting funds
and developing external support.
72

b. A psychological offensive which includes political
agitation, civil disobedience, and selective terrorism.
c. An expansion in which front organizations are
established and mass support is crystalized.
After the above groundwork has been laid, the military
phase normally begins and, as the insurgent strength and
effectiveness grows, it passes through the following stages:
a. Harassing tactics by small guerrilla units aimed
at forcing the government to overextend its defense activity.
b. Security forces are compelled to defend
installations and territory with substantially larger forces.
c. The extension of guerrilla warfare and the
creation of "liberated areas".
d. A conventional offensive against the security
forces and government strongholds.
The last phase in the insurgent process is the con-
solidation phase in which positive control is extended over
the populace.
In October 1977, Major General W. Black, Director
General of Operations for the SADF listed five phases in a
classic insurgency war:
a. Establish a revolutionary party within the
country which is being attacked.
b. Clandestine subversion of the local population.
c. Open revolt, internal unrest, terrorism, sabotage.
d. Classic guerrilla warfare.
e. Spreading the security forces to such an extent
that a certain area could be taken and from there move further.
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General Black indicated that South Africa was then
QI4,
involved in a third phase situation in Namibia.
2. The Counterinsurgent
It is usually more effective and economical for the
government and security forces to defeat the insurgents by
making it impossible for them to continue fighting than to
kill them all in battle. It is simple but valid to say this
can be done by depriving the insurgents of their basic
requirements as discussed above: the will to win; support
of the population; bases; mobility; supplies and information,
The most effective way to weaken an insurgent's will
to win is to neutralize the cause for which he is fighting.
Additionally, propaganda and psychological warfare coupled
with decisive military victories can be used to undermine
his will to fight by convincing him of the hopelessness
and danger of his position.
Denial of popular support to the insurgents usually
involves a combination of negative measures and positive
incentives. Negative measures include such things as cur-
fews, detention of suspects, and restrictions on individual
liberties. Other controls for isolating the populace from
the insurgent include food denial, resettlement, and
establishment of a local militia. Positive measures include
protection of government collaborators and the populace as a
whole from insurgent reprisals, civic action, propaganda,
84
Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Sub-Sahara:
Africa (FBIS.SA), 26 October 1977, p. 55
7^

redress of popularly perceived grievances, and the promotion
of viable alternatives to insurgent programs and courses of
action.
Counterinsurgent forces should make enemy bases their
first priority target in preference to pursuing individual
gangs. If it is impossible to attack guerrilla bases,
action should be taken against the political organization
instead.
Restriction of insurgent mobility can be accomplished
through many of the controls just discussed with respect to
denial of popular support. Additionally, such measures as
population registration, checkpoints on lines of communication,
standing patrols, observation posts, and ambushes will also
curtail insurgent mobility.
Finally, denial of popular support and elimination of
insurgent bases as discussed above will diminish the flow
of information and material support for the insurgents.
To accomplish the foregoing, the civil and military
sectors must effectively adapt and coordinate in a total
counterinsurgent effort. The legal system must be modified
to accomodate security and control measures of a more
repressive nature. Although good intelligence, mobility,
proper training and equipment, and adequate force levels
are basic requirements for any successful military campaign,
their natures in counterinsurgency are much different than




C. THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT
1. Boundaries
Namibia's northern border is 1460 km long. It is
formed naturally in parts by three rivers, with the rest
being straight line segments between these rivers. The
portion of the border formed by the Gunene River is
approximately 290 km long; the segment between the Cunene
and Okavango Rivers is about ^35 km; the segment along the
Okavango is 320 km; the straight line between the Okavango
and the Zambezi Rivers is 300 km long; and the last segment
along the Zambezi is 115 km long.
The two overland segments of border are marked by
"cut lines" and "no-go" strips and are fenced and mined in
the most vital areas. The cut lines are eight meters wide
and have been defoliated. The no-go areas are one kilometer
wide and have been depopulated. The cut lines bound the no-
go areas on both the north and south. D The degree to which
the rivers act as barriers is not clear, although they are
felt to be fairly effective. Most of the Cunene runs
rapidly, with some falls, through a glacial valley with
generally steep and rugged terrain on either side. The
Okavango, although slower, still moves fairly rapidly.
It's depth is generally well over a man's height and it is
several hundred meters wide in some places. The Zambezi
%. V. Bournes, Col., USA, ex-Defense Attache, U.S.
Embassy, Pretoria, RSA, in taped correspondence with the




























































is quite wide and fast-flowing, with Katima falls being part
of this border stretch. Published accounts of operational
activities have included very few instances of PLAN units
infiltrating across these rivers.
Frequent reference will be made to the "Border
Operational Area" (BOA, operational zone or area). The BOA
includes Ovamboland, Kavango , and Caprivi. Although some
SADF troops are stationed in Kaokoland, it apparently isn't
considered as part of the BOA. Additionally, the term
"border area" is frequently used by South Africa and appears
to connotate proximity to the actual northern border.
2. Terrain
There are four distinct natural regions in Namibia:
The 80-120 km wide belt of Namib Desert reaching along the
entire coastline; the semi-arid mountainous hard veld
plateau covering the central part of the interior; the lower-
lying eastern and south-eastern sandveld areas which are
extensions of the semi-arid Kalahari; and the relatively
well-watered, bush-covered, sandveld plains to the north
and north-east of the Etosha Pan.
Moving from west to east along the border the terrain
changes substantially. After leaving the Namib desert,
Kaokoland is quite barren and mountainous with few trees.
In Ovamboland the northern and eastern areas are termed open
forest while the western and southern portions are called
tree steppes. The terrain is extremely flat and sandy.
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Owambo (RSA: Department of Foreign Affairs of the
Republic of South Africa, 1971) , p. 3
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The terrain through most of Kavango is also flat, but it
increases in bush density and forestation as one moves east,
especially along the Okavango River. Past the Kwando River
the terrain becomes very swampy. The nature of the swamp
varies with the season, with water rising in the rainy season
from November to April, and then, inexplicably, again in the
87
middle of the dry season. Pictures of Ovamboland indicate
that between the occasional high trees, the vegetation is
either four-to-five foot bush or very low grass with fair
88
amounts of open, packed sand.
Further south in the rest of the territory, vegetation
of any height becomes much scarcer. The central plateau
averages ^000 ft in altitude, while some of the small
mountain ranges reach 8000 ft. None of these mountains
form any significant natural barriers.
3. Precipitation
The annual rainfall generally varies from almost
nothing in the south and along the west coast to a substantial
amount in the northeast. Representative annual rainfalls
are: 3.^ in. at Warmbad; 15-1 in. at Windhoek; 20.? in.
at Tsumeb; and 26.6 in. at Katima Mulilo. Most of this
rain occurs in the summer, from October or November through







Encyclopedia Britannica , Vol. 20 (Chicago, 111.:
William Benton Publisher, 1967)1 p. 1026
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During the rainy season, much of the BOA becomes
swampy and untraff icable off paved roads. In Ovamboland,
most of the water drains into shallow temporary lakes (called
pans) in its southern portion, the largest being Etosha Pan.
South of the BOA the rainfall gives rise to temporary rivers
which flow either to the coast or into Botswana. When these
are dry, there are no rivers within Namibia.
k>. Population Distribution
The population distribution in the northern portion
of the country varies considerably. Kaokolanders are spread
thinly throughout their rugged area east of the Namib desert.
In Ovamboland, as can be seen from Map 5» the population
is concentrated in the north central part of the area. In
Kavango , the population is generally distributed along the
river. The western part of Caprivi , the 32 km wide strip
leading to East Caprivi, is almost entirely uninhabited
90
except for a small number of Bushmen . ' The population
distribution in the East Caprivi area is not known, although
it is probably spread thinly also.
The population in the rest of the territory is
distributed very sparsely. With the exceptions of Windhoek,
Walvis Bay, Tsumeb, Keetmanshoop, and perhaps OtjiwarongD, all
91
urban areas number less than ten thousand. The overall
density rate is 1.04 persons per sq. km., one of the lowest
90Rhoodie, p. 97
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rates in the world. If Ovamboland and the two largest urban
areas (Windhoek and Walvis Bay) are excluded, the density
drops to .48 persons per sq. km.
5. Lines of Communication
The lines of communication in Namibia are restricted
in many ways. The highway system totals about 34,000 km, but
92
only slightly more than one-tenth of that is paved. The
basic system consists of a single main route running from
the southern border to the northern border. Additional legs
extend from this main artery to towns to the east or west.
In the north, the main road runs through Ovamboland, but
branches connecting Kavango and Caprivi meet at Grootf onteir..
Within the BOA, highway travel is slow. The main road
from Grootfontein is only partially paved. The roads into
Kavango and leading to Caprivi are relatively unimproved
and traff icability decreases during the rainy season. A
bridge across the Okavango River and a hard-surface all-
weather road through the center of Caprivi to Katima Mulilo
were recently completed, greatly improving access to that
area. Military convoy traffic is further complicated by
the necessity of sweeping for mines. Consequently, it can
take several days to travel from Grootfontein to any of the
urban or military centers in the BOA. The ability of this
road system or that in the rest of the country to support
continuous heavy military traffic is doubtful.
92Samuel C . Adams , Zimbabwe Namibia, Anticipation of
Economic and Humanitarian Needs (The Agency for International






" ' ' ' "" Railroad
Map 6 - Primary Surface Lines of Communication
Adapted from Fraenkel , The Namibians of South "Vest Africa , p. -
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The rail system includes almost 2,500 km of track.
It basically parallels the main highway from the southern
border north to Grootfontein and Otavi. Branches extend
west to the coastal towns of Luderitz and Walvis Bay, and
east from Windhoek to Gobabis. The vast majority of military
traffic arriving at the main BOA support base at Grootfontein
arrives by rail.
There are small airstrips at many small towns, and
private planes are common in the sparsely populated rural
areas. Facilities at Windhoek, Walvis Bay, and Grootfontein
can easily accomodate large aircraft. Air facilities at the
urban command centers in the BOA must certainly have been
improved to this capability also. Although air transport can
reduce travel times within the BOA by factors of 15 to 20
and more, the limited numbers and natures of military air-
craft in the BOA preclude their use in this capacity except
in special circumstances.
Port facilities in the territory are extremely limited
Walvis Bay is an excellent natural harbor, but as will be
discussed later, it and a surrounding area of 1,124 sq. km.
legally belong to South Africa. Luderitz is the only other
port facility but is little used and relatively remote from
the rest of the territory.
6. Military Considerations
The conditions in the BOA, especially in the border





Although the rivers restrict access along much of the border,
the terrain and population densities generally facilitate the
clandestine movement of small groups. The vegetation is not
sufficiently dense to allow large groups to remain undetected
for very long. The flatness of the ground facilitates sur-
veillance from raised observation posts in areas of sparse
vegetation (e.g., the cut lines). While the effects of rain
on the terrain tend to hinder security force mobility, the
effects of the dry season on the terrain tend to enhance
mobility, with even two -wheel drive vehicles apparently
capable of travelling rapidly through the bush in most areas
not heavily forested. In the more populated area of
Ovamboland, the population density is such as to facilitate
both mingling of guerrillas among the population for cover
and an adequate amount of sympathetic support, even if the
percentage of active sympathizers were to be relatively low.
South of the BOA the guerrilla loses what environmental
advantages he had. The population and vegetation is much
sparser. The population mix and distribution would also
not be conducive to guerrilla operations, as most farms
and ranches are operated by Whites , and some members of the
other Non-White ethnic groups tend to perceive the guerrillas
generally at Ovambo , making the level of local voluntary
support questionable. Aerial observation, observation posts
QI4,
Bournes tapes; A. J. Venter, bouth African military




on some of the numerous small mountains, and the vast
expanse of the territory would all tend to mitigate against
the undetected movement of even small units on foot.
open country would also facilitate pursuit by the security
forces.
A serious vulnerability of the infrastructure in the
south is the railroad. Its length makes it virtually im-
possible to defend against small teams of saboteurs, and its
importance to both the economy and the military effort make
it an inviting target.
D. THE COURSE OF THE WAR
In discussing the history and trends of the insurgency
in Namibia, the narrative of the early years will consist
primarily of the presentation of a series of representative
events, since the apparent very low level of activity defies
quantitative summarization. The discussion of the war in more
recent years will be structured more in the form of semi-
annual summaries, although particularly significant events
will also be mentioned specifically. It should be noted that
some of the figures and locations cited will be approximate
at best, as South African censorship precludes continuously
accurate reportage of the insurgency. Further, since much
of the information is summarized from virtually all research
sources, footnotes will be limited to specific incidents or
statements
.
1. The Early Years
A very early indication of SWAPO ' s (then 0P0) intent
or consideration of the use of violence to achieve its
86

political goals appeared in a letter from Mburumba Kerina
at the U.N. to Herman Ja Toivo in South West Africa in
February, 1959- It stated in part that if any chiefs spoke
out against disruption plans "...tell our people to burn
o<
their places at night—secretly of course.' J
As noted earlier, by the early 1960's SWAPO had come
to the realization "...that to rely on the United Nations
intervention to liberate Namibia was to leave this liberation
96
to mere chance." The subsequent exf iltration, training,
and infiltration of SWAPO guerrillas which resulted in the
police raid near Ongulumbashe in August, 1966 has already
been noted in Section II. Prior to that, in May, 1966
,
SWAPO had promulgated a document of campaign instruction
for combatants in South West Africa which specified a broad
97
spectrum of insurgent actions and targets.
In September 1966, insurgents carried out their
first attack on a government installation (albeit a non-
military target) against a compound of the Department of
Bantu Affairs at Oshikango. Although the buildings were
^From the Windhoek Commission of Enquiry Report,
presented as evidence in the SWAPO trials in Pretoria
in September 1967. as cited by Morris, p. 2
9 Hamutenya and Geingob, "African Nationalism in
Namibia," in Potholm and Dale, Southern Africa in




substantially damaged, no casualties occurred. Planned
simultaneous attacks at Oshikati and Ondangua failed to
« . , 98
materialize.
The first White casualty occurred in December 1966
when a farm 130 km north of Grootfontein was looted and
99its owner wounded.
The first attempted assassination of a civic figure
occurred in December 1966 at Ukuambi and resulted in the
death of a bodyguard.
During the time discussed so far, the South African
Police (SAP) had continued to track down and capture or
neutralize most of those insurgents who had escaped at
Ongulumbashe. SWAPO ' s combat presence or capability within
South West Africa was reduced to the point of almost complete
ineffectiveness and remained so for the next four years.
This capability was reportedly further exacerbated by in-
sufficient food and military supplies for the insurgents.
One exception to this inactivity occurred in June
1968 when insurgents established a temporary camp in
Caprivi , looted a store, and ambushed an SAP vehicle patrol.
It also appears as if two police helicopters may have crashed
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this incident was officially denied, Al Venter, a journalist
in good repute with the Government, claims to have interviewed
. • . 102SAP participants m the incident.
SWAPO introduced mine warfare in 1971. The first
detonation was in May in eastern Caprivi near Katima Mulilo
,
10 ?killing two SAP and injuring nine others. -* This type of
warfare was particularly advantageous for SWAPO as it could
be carried out by small groups who could infiltrate from
Zambia, plant mines, and exfiltrate in a matter of hours.
The roads were sufficiently primitive to afford quick and
complete concealment and the vast majority of the vehicles
were operated by the civil administration or security forces.
SWAPO could thus be relatively sure of acquiring satisfactory
targets at low risk, and the incidents gave the impression
of a more vigorous liberation struggl-e.
A SAP follow-up operation after another mining
incident near Katima Mulilo in October 1971 resulted in the
first charges by Zambia against South Africa for violation
of Zambian territory.
As noted earlier, the turbulence in Ovamboland
following the repatriation of thousands of striking workers
resulted in the imposition of security conditions akin to









the door to SADF participation. PLAN military activity
continued to be confined almost entirely to Gaprivi
however, as SWAPO did not yet have adequate access to
Angola as a base of operations.
In 1973 PLAN began operating more aggressively
in larger groups against SAP units. This included a
recoilless rifle attack on a SAP outpost in January and an
ambush of a SAP foot patrol in April, both in Caprivi. ^
The first SADF death as a result of insurgent action
occurred in a mine incident in Caprivi in May 1973*
In response to South African "detente" initiatives
in 197^i Zambia adopted a policy of dialogue with South Africa,
Although denied by Zambia and the SWAPO Central Committee,
dissidents have reported that Zambia curtailed PLAN operations
107
at that time and seized most weapons.
2. 197 5
Portugal's decision in November 197^ "to grant
Angolan independence in November 1975 > the subsequent re-
duction of Portuguese military control in the country, and
the ensuing violent struggle for power among the three






107Kenneth Abrahams, "The Formation of the SWAPO
(Democrats)," The Namibian Review , No. 12, June 1978, p. 2
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of Angola (MPLA) , National Front for the Liberation of
Angola (FNLA) , and Union for the Total Independence of Angola
(UNITA)) finally provided SWAPO with access to southern
Angola for use as a base and sanctuary for insurgent
operations in Ovamboland. Public reports of SWAPO presence
began to emanate from southern Angola in late spring and
1 CiP,
early summer. Because of the contiguity of UNITA 's
area of operations to Namibia, SWAPO had always maintained
good relations with that movement. At this point, the two
were cooperating closely with some sharing of camps and
109
equipment, and there were allegations by MPLA of SWAPO
involvement in the Angolan situation on UNITA' s behalf.
With this new access PLAN'S first raid into Ovamboland since
1966 occurred in October 1975 when two tribal policemen,
a deputy headman, and four other civilians were killed in
an attack at some makeshift border posts.
When SADF became actively involved in the Angolan
conflict in late October on behalf of UNITA and FNLA however,
SWAPO was forced to reappraise its situation. Despite both
the distastefulness of UNITA 's new relationship with South
Africa and allegations that UNITA had agreed to guide the
108ARB, December 1-31, 1975, P- 3871
1Q9 Times of Namibia , July 1977, p. 19
110ARB, September 1-30, 1975, p. 3771




SADF to SWAPO camps in exchange for active assistance,
SWAPO was so firmly entrenched in UNITA territory that the
SWAPO leadership didn't formally shift allegiance to MPLA
until a few months later in January. Even so, the shift was
unpopular in some SWAPO quarters as many SWAPO personnel and
approximately 30»000 Namibian refugees were still located
within the UNITA region of control when it occurred and since
there were strong ethnic ties (Kwanyama Ovambo) between many
SWAPO and UNITA members.
This shift in guerrilla allegiance apparently didn't
sit well with Zambia either, as Zambia favored UNITA over MPLA
at that time. In addition to the weapons already confiscated,
there were further reports of war material shipments through
Zambia for PLAN being diverted to UNITA. PLAN was a
demoralized and very poorly armed organization at this time
113
and proved easy prey for the SADF. J
South African Army (SAA) presence in the very southern
part of Angola in most of August through most of October was
later justified on the grounds that it was protecting the
Calueque pumping station of the Cunene River/Ruacana Falls
dam and hydro-electric project 30 ^^ inside Angola's southern
border and that there was a need to prevent any increases in
SWAPO activity which the turbulent power vacuum in Angola
might facilitate. During this time this SADF presence
grew as MPLA * s military wing, FAPLA continued to advance
112F3IS,SA
, 2 March 1976, p. 2
113^Abrahams, p. 2, 3
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south and as the SADF conducted more operations against
SWAPO deeper into Angola. No information has been published
on the extent of the operations conducted against SWAPO by
the SADF in southern Angola, although it appears to have
been considerable, as will be seen shortly. Several
accounts were published of SADF follow-up or hot pursuit
operations in October through December which ostensibly
originated in Ovamboland and spilled over into Angola
against PLAN bases. These all resulted in substantial
casualties for PLAN, with one skirmish alone accounting
for sixty-one PLAN killed-in-action (KIA) against three
n kSADF losses
.
On 16 December it was reported that since May, 1973
1
three hundred and forty-one guerrillas had been killed and
that the SADF had experienced twenty- two losses in "over a
month. " -* Since the level of activity in this two and a
half year period had been extremely low prior to the latter
third of the 1975 » it can be surmised that most of these
SWAPO casualties occurred at that time. Of these, only
ninety-three were publicly tied to SADF operations
originating in Namibia. This would indicate that at least
two hundred of these casualties probably occurred in
southern Angola in unreported incidents.
SWAPO also reactivated its dormant policy of
selective terrorism during this time. In August, the Chief
MS» December 1-31, 1975, P- 3872
1:L ^FBIS,SA




Minister of Ovamboland, Chief Filemon Elifas, was
assassinated. There was also an attempt on the life
of the Ovamboland Justice Minister and three White civilians
were killed in two incidents, one as far south as the
vicinity of Grootfontein.
3. January - June, 1976
SWAPO casualties in the first four months were few
in number. This was attributable perhaps to reduced
operations as a result of the high rate of casualties and
general demoralization experienced in the previous four
months and the physical reorganization following the shift
of allegiance to MPLA, which was compounded by UNITA being
pushed back into the area which SWAPO had used as a case of
operations. The operational effectiveness of the PLAN forces
in Zambia at this time continued to be greatly restricted by
severe shortages of arms, food, and medicine and a growing
ll 7discontent with SWAPO political and military leadership.
This led initially to the detention by Zambia of many of the
SWAPO leaders in Zambia (April) and eventually to the detention




The few operations which were conducted appear to
have been relatively successful however. A casualty summary
ll6ARB, August 1-31, 1975, p. 37^2
117 FBIS, SA , 27 April 1976, p. 23; Abrahams, p. 2,3
ITS
ARB, April 1-30, 1976; "Open the Detention Camps,"
Times of Namibia , July 1977. p. 16; Abrahams, p. 3
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published in April (again dating back to May 1973) indicated
that SWAPO losses had only increased by nine, to three hundred
and fifty, while SADF losses during the time of its inter-
vention in Angola (withdrawal completed on 25 March) had
119
climbed to fifty-four. This is substantiated by published
incident accounts which cumulatively indicate SADF casualties
as twelve killed-in-action (KIA) and seven woundeded-in-action
(WIA) against eight PLAN KIA and unknown WIA during the first
four months of 1976.
The number of insurgent incidents, particularly
skirmishes, began to increase in May. The military
casualties for the last two months of the period were 17 SADF
WIA and 44 SWAPO KIA with 17 WIA. PLAN military activity was
focused almost exclusively in Ovamboland although there were
indications of reconnaissance taking place in Kavango . There
were a few occasions of very deep SWAPO penetration, as a
shootout took place between police and two SWAPO members
120
near Windhoek m April and a group of ten insurgents was
121
noted "embarrassingly" far south in the White area in June.
Selective terrorism also continued. The death of
122two Whites on a farm near Okahandja, coupled with the
119ARB, April 1-30, 1976, p. 4007; F3IS.SA , 27 April
1976, p. E5
12QFBIS,SA
, 21 April 1976, p. 3
121
ARB, June 1-30, 1976, p. 4069
122AR3, February 1-29, 1976, p. 3941
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White deaths noted earlier, spurred the farmers in northern
Namibia to request that the government install protective
. 123fencing around their farms. v A few prominent Ovambos
opposed to SWAPO were also abducted, among them the
Ovamboland leader of the Democratic Cooperative Development
124
Party. It was announced in April that since August 1975,
14 civilians had been abducted by PLAN.
Finally, a few civilians were killed or wounded
in acts of apparent "blind" terrorism.
4. July - December, 1976
The increased tempo of PLAN'S military activity
noted at the end of the period just discussed continued for
the first month of this period. This was reflected in pub-
lished casualty figures in July which summed to seven SADF
KIA and three WIA and 44 SWAPO KIA and 11 WIA. On 13 July,
a South African spokesmen announced that a recent series of
125
mopping up operations had netted 50 SWAPO KIA. •*
Most published reports of military activity in
August dealt with the SADF tracking efforts and gradual
elimination of a unit of about 15 PLAN soldiers who had
penetrated south of Ovamboland. There were several skirmishes
as the evading unit split up into smaller elements. 3y the
12:3FBIS, SA , 4 May 1976, p. E5
12^FBIS,SA
, 21 April 1976, p. E3
12 ^FBIS,SA , 21 July 1976, p. E6
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time the whole unit was finally neutralized in September,
126
eight of them had been killed.
There was also some South African/Zambian interaction
in July and August, which included allegations of a SADF
raid on a Zambian village with 22 casualties and some mortar
shelling back and forth.
When noting the low level of insurgent activity
after the first month of this period, most South African
authorities attributed it to the rainy season or to a greater
focus on terrorist activities against the civilian populace.
Published reports don't support this however, with the only
significant civilian incident noted being the deaths of the
family of one of the bodyguards to the Ovamboland Chief
Minister. 127
More likely reasons for PLAN'S diminished activities
in Namibia during this time were that first, as noted
previously, almost the entire PLAN contingency in Zambia
(1,000-1,800 men) was detained by Zambian authorities in
July to avoid possible intra-movement fighting, and second,
beginning in late August the PLAN forces in Angola became
heavily involved (albeit somewhat reluctantly) in the
FAPLA/Cuban operations against UNITA in southern Angola.
In a determined effort to neutralize UNITA' s effectiveness,
MPLA and Cuban forces mounted a large scale campaign in the
south which apparently included a great deal of populace
126FBIS,SA
, 11 August 1976, p. E4; 1 September 19?6,
p. E10; 15 September 1976, p. E12
127ARB, July 1-31. 1976, p. ^-100

intimidation. SWAPO was forced to participate as the
price for MPLA and Cuban support and assistance in its own
struggle for Namibia. This operational requirement for
SWAPO has continued to the present and has surely detracted
from the effectiveness of its activities in Namibia. In
line with this participation, there were reports in September
that PLAN had abducted 1^2 Kwanyama Ovambo UNITA sympathizers
129from Ovamboland and had eventually executed 120 of them. 7
There is some doubt as to whether or not this was a valid
report however. In addition to the usual denials from Angola
and SWAPO, a South African summary of abductions the next
year didn't include this figure, although if the abductees
were actually refugees from Angola (a good possibility), that
status may have differentiated them from Namibians for
purposes of accounting.
5. January - June, 1977
The factors which dictated a low level of PLAN
military activity in most of the last time period were still
operative throughout most of this one also. An incident in
the Caprivi Strip in February was the first in that area in
over a year and a half and resulted in three SAEF WIA and
twelve PLAN KIA."^ There was also a brief period of military
128FBIS,SA
, 30 September 1976, p. So; ARB, October 1-31,
1976, p. ^205; FBIS.SA , 9 November 1976, p. Ell; F3IS.SA ,
15 November 1976, p. Ell, 12; ARB, December 1-31, 197oT~o.
^257
129ARB, September 1-30, 1976, p. ^17^
130ARB, February 1-28, 1977, p. ^337
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activity during most of April in Ovamboland which included
several incidents of cross-border fire and resulted in 20
PLAN and one FAPLA KIA. 1 ^1
In contrast to the low level of insurgent military
activity, terrorist actions against the civilian population
apparently increased. Significant reported incidents of
selective terrorism included the abduction of a White man
132 133
and four of his children, v abduction of a tribal leader, JJ
and an unsuccessful ambush on the Commisioner- General for
Indigenous Peoples in South West Africa, Jannie de Wet. J
The most significant act of general terrorism was the
abduction of 126 students and staff from a mission school
in April, during the brief period of PLAN military activity
135
noted above. ^
6. July - December. 1977
The low level of PLAN military activity noted in the
two previous periods continued for the first four months of
this period. At the end of October however, a small cattle
took place which marked the beginning of a period of PLAN
military aggressiveness.
131ARB, April 1-30, 1977, p. ^08
132FBIS,SA
, 10 March 1977, p. ^5
133FBIS,SA
, 2 June 1977, p. 29




, 21 April 1977, p. E7
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A SAA patrol clashed with an 80 man PLAN unit soon
after it crossed the border into Ovamboland. In the ensuing
action, fire was allegedly received from a PLAN base across
the border in Angola, and reinforcements were called in for
hot pursuit. The skirmish lasted 36 hours and resulted in
61 PLAN KIA against five SAA losses. This was the most
significant engagement since the SADF operations during the
Angolan intervention, and was the first time a group of
1 ?6insurgents that large had been noted in Namibia. J
There were several subsequent reports of SADF clashes
with large (^0-50 men) PLAN units and the overall level of
activity also increased. This turn of events resulted in
protective increases in the size of SAA patrols as well.
Cumulative military casualty figures from published reports
for this period were 113 PLAN KIA and 13 SADF KIA. SADF
casualties for the year were announced as being a third less
1 37than experienced in 1976. J
Insurgent activities among the civilian populace also
increased. Although security forces thwarted an attempted
abduction of 50 young Ovambos by PLAN in August, J there
were ten successful abductions of tribal figures, bodyguards,
and Home Guardsmen in November and December. At the end of
the year it was announced that 23 village headmen had beer.
136ARB, October 1-31 , 1977, p. ^617
137FBIS,SA , 28 December 1977, p. E4
138?BIS,SA




murdered in 1977. It was also noted that PLAN landmine
activities increased significantly during this period.
Although surely not the first occurrance in the war,
the first noted report of PLAN sabotage was in July. This
involved the destruction of power lines to the Galueque
water scheme in Angola which provides Ovamboland with most
of its water. The first instance occurred in Ovamboland,
but after the lines were repaired, they were cut again in
1^1
Angola.
Finally, one of the few incidents in the Caprivi
area involved a mortar and machine gun attack on Katima
Mulilo from across the river in Zambia, alledgedly by a
1^2Zambian army unit.
7» January - June, 1978
The upward trends in SWAPO insurgent activity noted
at the end of the previous time period carried over into
this period and escalated further, especially with respect
to acts of terrorism among civilians. An SADF statement
in mid-February indicated that border violations since
August of the previous year had increased considerably,
with ^9 known as of the end of January. D
139J Eric Marsden & Harold Evans, "Murder is the midwife
for country's new birth," London Times
, 9 April 1973, p.
8
1^°FBIS,SA
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^"Hot Pursuit into Angola Reported; 18 Said Dead,"
The Windhoek Advertiser , 13 February 1978, p.l, in Joint
Publications Research Service, Sub-Saharan Africa (JPRS.SA)
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Although published accounts of military clashes in
the first few months of the period didn't mention PLAN units
as large as those encountered a few months earlier, they
still must have been fairly large, as the SADF announced in
late February that there seemed to be a new pattern in the
war, with higher casualties on both sides coming from fewer
incidents. This statement was supported by the cumulative
casualties for January and February, which appear to have been
about 22 SADF KIA and 55 SWAPO KIA, much more balanced than
usual, especially if the high-casualty operations like the
one the previous October are viewed as unusual.
Although casualties dropped, the frequency of
incidents continued to rise in March (49) and April (42),
with a flurry of incidents reported at the end of April. It
must be remembered however, that the majority of these weren't
military engagements as the figures also included such
things as civilian intimidation, movement reports, and mine
145discoveries. •*
An unofficial count at the beginning of April placed
the fatalities in twelve years of war at 166 for South
African Security forces and 689 insurgents for SWAPO. This
would indicate a total of less than 1,000 military and civilian
deaths in twelve years as compared to approximately 8,500 in
1
^ARB, February 1-28, 1978, p. 4762
14^^
"Geldenhuys Reports Recent Border Incidents," The
Windhoek Advertiser
, 3 July 1978, p. 2, in JPRS,SA
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five years in Rhodesia at the same time, indicative of the
differences in insurgency intensity levels.
As mentioned earlier, terrorist activities against
civilians also increased markedly during this period.
Reported casualties due to landmine explosions were much
higher than ever reported previously, with six deaths and
25 injuries in several different incidents. There were
several large scale abduction incidents which were conducted
by large PLAN elements (60-80 men). In January an entire
1^7
settlement of 19 was abducted. In February 119 students
were reported abducted from a mission school close to the
border, although there is some doubt as to whether or not
1^8
this was a bonafide kidnapping. Finally, in April, 73 people
were hijacked in a bus on the road between Oshikati and
1^9 ...Ruacana. When all the individual abductions were included,
the total for the whole period was well over 300*
The incidents of selective terrorism were similar to
those in the previous period, with the most notable cases
being the assassinations of the Ovamboland Minister of
Health and Welfare in Ovamboland in February •> and Chief
Clemens Kapuuo in Windhoek on March 27. He had been President
—
mzLarry Heinzerling, "Namibia War Called a Chess Game
in the Dark" (AP) , Monterey Peninsula Herald , 2 April 1978
p. 5C
1
'"SWAPO Gang Abducts 19," Johannesburg Star , 19 January
1978, p. 3, in JPRS , SA
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, 27 February 1978, p. S8 , ARB, 1-28 February
1978, p. 4762
^FBIS.SA , 26 April 1978, p. E^
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of the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA) and Paramount
Chief of the Herero. 5 Chief Kapuuo ' s death was the most
significant incident in a spate of political violence in
Windhoek during March and April. Clashes between Ovambo
SWAPO supporters and Herero DTA supporters resulted in about
152
50 deaths ' and marked the first significant civil violence
since the turbulence in Ovamboland in early 1972 following
the nation-wide strike.
Although South Africa agreed on 25 April to accept
the western proposals for a constitutional settlement of
Namibian independence and installation of a U.N. peacekeeping
force, events and circumstances (The one germane to this
discussion was the escalation of insurgent activity. Others
will be discussed later. ) compelled South Africa to carry out
what was probably the most significant military action in
the war to date. This was the May ^ airborne raid on the
main SWAPO/PLAN military command center at Cassinga, Angola
(code-named "Moscow"), 250 km north of the border, and
simultaneous raids at other, smaller SWAPO bases in Angola,
one of which was code-named "Vietnam". More than 700
paratroopers participated in the main twelve-hour raid, which
was mounted from within South Africa. Preparations for the
raid may have been masked by Operation Quick Silver, a large
army exercise in South Africa in April and May. Casualties
151ARB, 1-3 March 1978
1
-
52ARB, 1-31 March 1978, p. ^79^
10^

in the raids were apparently only six SADF KIA, but more than
1000 SWAPO KIA with at least 500 of these being PLAN guerrillas
,
250 WIA, and 63 prisoners. Although many of those killed were
refugees and women and children, there has been speculation
since then that the guerrilla casualties might well have been
1 *>!
much higher than reported at the time. JJ
The effects of the raids on PLAN military capabilities
was immediate and obvious. In addition to severe losses of
personnel and equipment and organizational confusion, there
is evidence that FAPLA evacuated PLAN groups from southern
Angola and concentrated them at towns deeper in Angola to
1 ^deter a repetition of the South African raid. -* Angola also
ordered a cessation of PLAN cross-border operations until
it could increase its own anti-aircraft capabilities near the
southern border. The operational result of all this was a
reduction in insurgent activity from 91 incidents in the two
months prior to the raid to 27 incidents in the two months
following the raid, with many of these being mine incidents
in which the mines had been planted before the raid. ^
Two reported sabotage incidents in May and June
deep within Namibia gave evidence that despite the slowdown
153ARB, 1-31 May 1978, p. 4865-^868, F3IS.SA , 25 April
1978, p. E8
1 "&J Devin Benson, "After Action Report: South African
Strike Into Angola," Soldier of Fortune , November 1978, p. 50
Geldenhuys Reports Recent Border Incidents," The
Windhoek Advertiser
. 3 July 1978, p. 2, in J?RS ,SA
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in activity in the operational area, the SWAPO underground
was apparently widespread and becoming more aggresive.
first of these was an attempt to explode the bridge across
the Guruchab River, ^0 km south of Keetmanshoop. The second
was the explosive destruction of some track on the railroad
from Windhoek to Walvis Bay and the subsequent disrailment
of a train. The first case was the first insurgent incident
that far south in Namibia, while the- second case, together
with a similar but unsuccessful attempt the previous month,
was the first time insurgents had tampered with the railroad. ^
8. July - December, 1978
PLAN'S military inactivity stemming from the raid
at Cassinga carried over into July. Although there were
reports by the end of the month that PLAN elements were
starting to move back into the operational area in greater
strength, actual contacts were infrequent and there were no
deaths reported on either side during the month. Although
there were several civilian casualties, most of these were
in landmine incidents in which the mines may have been
planted much earlier.
As August progressed, it became obvious that PLAN
was regaining much of its aggressiveness and capability.
Although still desirous of avoiding and breaking contact
with security forces as much as possible (as indicated by
continuing low casualty figures), both the sizes of many
1 ^6D
"Saboteurs Derailed Train," Johannesburg: Star , 22 June
1978, p. 5, in JPRS,SA ; "Russian-Made Rifles Confiscated,"
The Windhoek Advertiser , 18 July 1978, p. 1 in JPRS ,5A
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of the PLAN units and the frequencies of contacts and other
incidents seemed to have returned to pre-Cassinga levels.
In late August, another major clash occurred which,
although apparently on a lesser scale than Gassinga, also
ranks as one of the most important military engagements of
the insurgency to date. This was the PLAN rocket and
mortar attack on the town and base at Katima Mulilo early
in the morning of 23 August, and the SADF retaliation into
Zambia which commenced almost immediately and lasted until
26 August.
Perhaps feeling the needs to gain some measure of
revenge for the devastation at Gassinga and to demonstrate
to the rest of the world that SWAPO still retained a viable
military effectiveness capable of liberating Namibia, the
attack followed several SWAPO statements that it planned
to intensify the struggle. Origination of the attack from
Zambia into Caprivi as differentiated from the normal Angola/
Ovamboland pattern may have stemmed from the weakened state
of PLAN in Angola, a refusal by Angola to permit an incident
which would invite South African retaliation, or a SWAPO
estimate that Katima Mulilo was relatively lightly defended.
Plans for the impending attack were apparently known far enough
in advance by the SADF to have permitted a warning to the
military advisor of the visiting U.N. investigatory team and




bunkered. J The quick and foreceful response of the SADF
was also indicative of ample forewarning and preparation.
The actual rocket and mortar attack lasted
sporadically for two hours. PLAN forces initiated it
from bases across the border in Zambia. After SAA return
fire had silenced them, Zambian forces opened fire from the
town of Sesheke, across the river from Katima. Shortly after
the Zambian fire had been suppressed, the SAA initiated its
armored car and mechanized infantry counter-attack. At this
point, the casualties apparently stood at nine SADF KIA and
ten WIA (all from one rocket, apparently after their officer-
in-charge failed to ensure they were under cover) and twelve
Zambian civilians killed, with six wounded. PLAN casualties
at that point remain unknown.
While South Africa has never announced any PLAN
casualty figures for the retaliation, sixteen corpses were
brought back to Katima Mulilo at the end of the first day.
The actual numbers of casualties appear to have been much
greater however, although this can only be deduced. The
South African government didn't deny unofficial reports that
SWAPO bases had been destroyed and hundreds of SWAPO fighters
1 ^7?BIS ,SA , 23 August 1978, p. S3; Jean Fischer, "Jean
Fischer from Windhoek," To The Point , 1 September 1978, p. 11
158FBISXSA, 2k August 1978, p. E3,E^; F3IS.SA , 25 August
1978, p. E10; Carel Birkby, "SWAPO ' s Desperate Gamble that
Failed," To The Point
. 1 September 1978, p. 9
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had been killed or that SADF units were chasing down fleeing
SWAPO groups as late as 26 August. J7
It was known prior to the incident that ^00 to 500
PLAN troops occupied two bases in the vicinity. When this
knowledge is coupled with post-operation statements by the
Commander of the South West African Command (SWAC) of the
SADF such as "...terrorist bases had been wiped out...",
it became obvious that a great deal more transpired than was
officially released. The apparent length of the battle supports
this as well. While the 16 acknowledged PLAN casualties were
reported after the first 2^ hours, Zambian sources indicated
that fighting was still raging 2^ hours later, and it wasn't
until another 36 hours had passed that the South African
Defense Minister announced completion of the retaliation.
Finally, an on-the-scene question to an SADF officer
participant as to whether or not only 16 had been killed was
answered with "Hell, no... We wiped the bloody murderers out."
Another noted that, "We just killed a helluva lot of
,,160terrorists .
"
Routine PLAN military activity continued right through
September. Contacts were infrequent, and casualties
totalled only one SADF KIA and eight PLAN KIA.
The last three months of the period saw an increase
in PLAN aggressiveness towards the security forces, as
1 ^9J Birkby, p. 9; Humphrey Tyler "South Africa moved
swiftly after SWAPO attack," The Christian Science Monitor ,
28 August 1978, p. 8
l6
°Birkby, p. 9, 10; FBIS.SA , 28 August 1978, p. E5-E?
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contacts, sizes of units, and casualties all increased to
pre-Cassinga levels or higher, with PLAN initiating a large
number of the skirmishes. Of note during this time were
two instances of cross-border fire by FAPLA elements and
another by a Zambian unit (in addition to the major clash
described above). In January 1979. the SADF KIA figure
for the year was reported as 30.
Although there were no mass abductions during this
period (seven children in September being the largest group),
Namibian civilians suffered more casualties within the
country than previously, with the vast majority of these
being landmine or bomb victims. Published accounts indicate
that casualties were at least 33 killed and one hundred and
eleven wounded. Casualties in the first half of the period
can probably be attributed to the relative safety of civilian
targets for a weakened PLAN. Those in the latter part of the
period were related more to attempts to disrupt elections,
with many of them occurring deep within Namibia. Incidents
of note were the deaths of 17 and 12 civilians in different
Ovamboland vehicle mining incidents, three bombings with 15
injuries in Windhoek just prior to elections, and another in
Swakopmund on 30 December which resulted in 60 injuries.
Instances of murders and abductions of African symbols of
authority continued at about the same rate as in previous
periods.
Also of interest during this period was an apparent
upsurge in minor sabotage in Ovamboland. Beginning in July
and continuing at least through November, there were frequent
110

cases of destruction of telephone poles and communications
lines and of sabotage to water pipelines, water towers, and
reservoirs.
Despite the instances of civil and urban violence
noted above, SWAPO disruption of the internal elections did
not materialize on the scale which had been expected.
E. THE OPPOSING FORCE LEVELS
In estimating probable force levels of the opposing
military structures in Namibia, SWAPO will be discussed
first since any deductions about the security forces will
logically be predicated on SWAPO ' s military strength.
1 . The Insurgents
There have been many public estimates on the personnel
strengths of SWAPO external and PLAN, although differentiation
between SWAPO, PLAN and refugees isn't always clear.
It was noted earlier that between ^4-00 and 900 members
of SWAPO followed Sam Nujoma abroad in 1961/62. In late 1968
162
several thousand Africans left East Caprivi for Zambia.
Several thousand (some estimate 6,000) left Namibia in 197^/
1 6 7
75- From June through August 1977 500 youths crossed the
164border to Angola. Numerous others have left individually
lolFBIS,SA





^D.G. Santos, "SWAPO Takes Its Stand.'" South Afrirar.
Report & Comments , April 1978, Vol. I No. 2, p. 7, reprinted
from Armed Forces Magazine of South Africa .
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or in small numbers ever since the early 1960's and many
others have been abducted and pressed into service.
December 1976 Ovamboland officials claimed knowledge of at
least 5>000 Ovambos who had left the territory for PLAN
military training and acknowledged that the actual figure
was probably greater. D In May 1978, South African sources
indicated that about 30,000 Namibians were believed to be
] 66
refugees from the territory." From these estimates must
be subtracted the numbers of those who may have already been
killed in combat (about 2,000), those who are receiving
academic training abroad (estimated at between 600 and ?60
1 67
since 1975 )» dissidents placed in detention (reported at
between 1,000 and 1,800 ), and the considerable staff of
SWAP0 ' s worldwide political organization.
As to the numbers of those actually trained and
ready as guerrillas, in September 1966, the South African
Police in the territory claimed knowledge of more than
169
250 SWAP0 soldiers in transit camps in Zambia and Tanzania."
lo5ARB December 1-31, 1976, p. 4 266
166^
167,
l ARB, May I-31 , 1978, p. 4866
General J. J. Geldenhuys, "SWAPQ is likened to fleas
on a dog's back," Interview by Colleen Hendricks in The
Johannesburg Star , undated in May 1978.
lo8ARB, May 1-31, 1977, p. Wj-2} "Shipanga Return





By 1970 a South African estimate indicated that SWA?0 had
170
1,500 men under arms. In July 1975, the South Africans
estimated that 3,000 guerrillas were under training in
171Angola and that 500 were already armed and combat ready.
"
In July 1976 another South African estimate of 5,000 men
172
under arms was announced and a paper produced for the
office of the U.N. Commissioner of Namibia arrived at a
range of between 2,500 and 5,000 total PLAN combatants. 17
Between October and December 1977, there were estimates of
PLAN strength as being: 2,000 in Angola, 1,400 in Zambia,
and 300 in Ovamboland; 7 3,000 in Angola and 400 in
17 *?Namibia; J and 2,000 in Angola, 800 in Zambia, and between
250 and 300 in Namibia. 17 In May 1978, shortly after SADF
units had killed or captured between 1,000 and 1,500 SWAP0
supporters in the raid at Cassinga, The Chief of the SAC? in
Namibia stated there were still 2,700 PLAN guerrilas in
170
' Sean Gervasi, "South Africa's War on Namibia," prepared
in the office of the U.N. Commission for Namibia for the Q.l ,
Security Council, July 1976, p. 11
171ARB, July 1-31, 1975, P- 3711
17 2





, 26 October 1977, p. ?5
17
^Geldenhuys
176?BIS , 28 December 1977, p. E4
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southern Angola and another 800 in Zambia. ' A few months
later in September, South African intelligence sources were
quoted as estimating ^,500 SWAPO guerrillas in Angola and
"I rpQ
Zambia. In light of all of the foregoing, it is reason-
able to assume that PLAN probably has a total strength of
from 3,500 to ^J-,500 or 5.000.
Regarding the disposition of these forces, exact
locations are unavailable at the unciassif ied level. A
1976 South African estimate of 800 guerrillas in Ovamboland
was probably high, perhaps purposely so in order to stimulate
greater internal support for the South African position. A
more recent estimate of 100 PLAN combatants within Ovamboland
i fin
at any one time may have been accurate at that point (given
the recent events at Cassinga and Angola's subsequent clamp-
down on PLAN cross-border operations) but, in a more general
context, is probably low given the overall trend of the war.
In light of the changes in both the local and international
situation since the 1976 estimate, this one may have been
purposely inaccurate also, in order to convey an impression
of confident control. Despite the existence early in the war
of bases within the territory (e.g., trenches, excavated
sleeping quarters, water supplies, ammunition storage at
181Ongulumbashe and in the Singalamwe Forest in East Caprivi
177Geldenhuys
178FBIS,SA






which were used by PLAN for several months and despite
continuing claims by SWAPO of semi-liberated areas and bases
1 Op
in the territory, most of the PLAN forces presently
in Namibia on more than a one or two day basis are either
constantly on the move or else dispersed among the population
in given areas for short periods of time. J
Estimates of PLAN strengths in Angola and Zambia
were given above. There are some indications that within
Zambia there may be some co-location of PLAN and Zambian
184
military forces, perhaps as a deterrent to South African
raids or shelling. Within Angola, many of the combat-ready
guerrillas are located at camps fairly close to the Angola/
Ovamboland border, while command, support, reserve, train-
ing, and administrative forces are stationed further north
(e.g., Cassinga, 250 km north of the border). D
In estimating the number of combatants SWAPO might
be able to activate within the territory at present or in the
future, one also needs to consider the members of SWAPC '
s
internal political organization and whatever militant under-
ground may be in existence. Despite the results of the
l82,,SWAP0: Mobilize the People with the Truth," Dakar
TAXAW , May 1978, p. 8, translated in JPRS.SA ; Marja Liisa k
Kimmo Kiljunen, "South African Presence Dominates Everywhere,"
Southern Africa, August - September 1978, p. 12
l8
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recent internally supervised elections, it is generally
accepted that SWAPO has a wide base of political support
and might obtain a clear majority in a U.N. supervised
election. Given both the violence which has attended
Namibia's political campaigning and the organizational
potential facilitated by numerous large clusters of African
laborers throughout the territory, it is reasonable to
assume that should the political/military situation
deteriorate and should sufficient arms be available
(although not an absolute prerequisite) , SWAPO could probably
call upon tens of thousands of potential guerrillas. These
could either be used in the capacity of widening the
present insurgency or of providing behind- the-lines resist-
ance should PLAN attempt to escalate the struggle to a more
conventional level with communist support. As of yet however,
there have been relatively few caches of insurgent war
material discovered south of the operational area, indicating
that this sort of uprising would not have optimum effect, at
, ..... 186least initially.
In discussing the existence of a SWAPO underground
and its potential combat strength, the increase in sabotage
outside the operational area in the past few years and the
assassination of political figures in urban locations, if
not carried out by the underground, were surely set up and
supported by one. An underground can be widespread and ve





Additionally, because of their well established covers, they
are usually more valuable in that capacity until such time
as their area has been secured by the insurgent forces.
Therefore, it is unlikely that SWAPO would count on
significant military support from this section of its
organization in any attempts to expand the struggle internally.
2. The Counterinsurgents
Before discussing force levels of the SAL? in Namibia,
a basic understanding of its overall structure is required.
The SADF has three military services: The Army (SAA) ; the
Air Force (SAAF) ; and the Navy (SAN). Within each branch,
the active duty forces at any given time include members
of the permanent force (minimum three year enlistment) and
national servicemen (conscripts, with an active duty
obligation recently increased from one to two years , followed
by eight years of varying reserve duty). At their induction,
national servicemen are designated as members of either the
civilian force or the commandos and ultimately serve their
reserve duty in those capacities. The differences are that
the citizen force is trained and structured to augment the
permanent force, while the commandos are geared mere towards
local home defense and internal security. While in the
reserves, individuals and units are normally called up for
active duty three weeks each year, although for the past
117

three years the call-up for citizen force reserves has been
extended to three months. '
The South African Police (SAP) assisted by indigenous
Africans, were the first security forces involved in counter-
insurgency operations in South West Africa. South African
military presence in the mid-1960' s was confined to an army
base at Walvis Bay and a small air base near Katima Mulilo
in eastern Caprivi (due to its seasonal geographic isolation
from the rest of territory, eastern Caprivi was administered
separately by South Africa at that time) . The size of the
police force at that time is unknown. The earliest
quantitative reference found with respect to police strength
was a statement three weeks after the police raided the
camp at Ongulumbashe that the size of the police force in
188
northern South West Africa had been more than doubled.
It is probably safe to assume that if the strength of the
security force could be doubled in that short a time, it
couldn't have been too large to begin with.
The strength of the police force continued to
increase and they performed all aspects of counterinsurgent
-I Qry
'International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS),
The Military Balance 1977 - 1978 , (Dorking, U.K. : Adlard k
Son Ltd. , Bartholomew Press, 1977), p. ^7; "Military Units
Have Service Time Extended," F3IS , SA , 18 December 1975 , ?•
E2, 3; "Botha Says Military Service Doubled to Two Years,"
FBIS.SA
, 22 April 1977, p. S5
l88ARB, September 1-30, 1966, p. 620
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warfare: intelligence, security, small unit patrols,
189targeted operations, and light air support.
The outbreaks of civil violence in Ovamboland in
January and February 1972 resulted in an airlift of police
reinforcements from Pretoria to Ovamboland and the announce-
ment that where necessary, SADF units would assist the police
190in protection of the international boundaries. 7 This
precipitated the beginnings of the SADF troop build-up
throughout Namibia, as increases in operational troop strengths
in the northern areas required administrative and logistic
support which was then established further south. Most
public estimates of SADF troop strengths in Namibia prior
to the South African involvement in the Angolan civil war
were proferred by SWAPO or sympathetic organizations primarily
as propaganda and were extremely high.
In 1973, 7.000 South African troops participated in
191
"Operation Swaland Blitz" in Namibia, although it isn't
clear what connection there was between this and the normal
security force levels in the operational area.
SAA activities in Angola in 1975-76 in connection
with that country's civil war were launched from Ovamboland.
Estimates of SAA strength in Angola were numerous at the
189M.Morris, p. 3-1^
19
°ARB, January 1-31, 1972, p. 2358,9 and February
1-29, 1972, p. 2387,8
191 IIS, Strategic Survey 1973 , (London, U.K., 197*0
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time, but in retrospect, the annual survey of the International
Institute of Strategic Studies was probably more accurate than
most. It noted a force of about 2,000 as being involved in the
main penetration, with most of these being logistic, artillery
,
and light mechanized armor support for FNLA/UNITA guerrillas.
Additional troops were active against SWAPO/PLAN bases closer
192
to the border and guarded several refugee camps. These
deployments tend to jibe with a January 1976 report by the
South African Defense Minister that 4,000 - 5,000 SADF troops
held and were patrolling a tract of land up to 50 miles deep
193into Angola. v It is reasonable to conjecture that this
force was backed up by a fairly sizable contingent (probably
1,000 -2,000) in reserve across the border in Ovamboland.
The expansion of the military infrastructure which had begun
throughout Namibia in 1972 had rapidly accelerated to support
the Angolan intervention. Given the bureaucratic momentum
of large military organizations and the ascendancy of a hostile
MPLA government supportive of SWAP0 in Angola, it is unlikely
that South Africa drew down its troop level in Namibia to
any extent immediately following its withdrawal from Angola.
It is more likely that some of these or additional troops
were spread out to reinforce the .more secondary areas of
concern in the operational zone (Kaokoland, Kavango , Caprivi)
192IISS, Strategic Survey 197 5 , p. 30
19
^IISS, Strategic Survey 1976 , p. 48
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and that much of the supporting infrastructure further south
was consolidated and improved into a more permanent status.
As anxiety over the possibility of a near term PLAN/FAPLA/
Cuban invasion of Namibia subsided, it is possible that
much of the armor was withdrawn as it would 've been of little
use in the counterinsurgency effort. This would 've left
an SAA force of 3,000 - 5,000 in the BOA.
Toil
If a SAP presence in Namibia of 2,000 is accepted,
with the majority of them (perhaps 1,300) probably located
in the operational area, then all of the reports and
associated deductions above lead to a cumulative estimate
of active SAA and SAP counterinsurgency forces in the field
in the BOA at that time of ^,000 - 6,000. Despite occasional
fluctuations, the tempo of the guerrilla warfare in the BOA
hasn't escalated significantly and there haven't been any
public reports of increased SAA deployments to that area
until just prior to the recent elections. Increased lengths
of active duty call-up for South African citizen reserve
forces with assignment to the operational area, and extensions
of active duty obligations for national service conscripts
19 ^
with additional assignments to the operational area -' were
19^7 Kenneth W. Grundy, "The Use of Blacks in the South
African Armed Forces," presented at the 21st Annual Meeting
of the African Studies Association, Baltimore, Md. , November,
1978, p. 12
19 %BIS,SA
, 18 December 1975. p. E2,3; ARB, January 1-31,
1976, p. 3903; FBIS.SA , 23 April 1977, p. E5; Gherhard
Pieterse, "Longer 3order Duty," Johannesburg Sunday Times
,
2^ September 1978, p. 8, in JPRS.SA
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implemented to reduce the strain on SADF manpower resources
rather than to increase troop levels. Therefore, a strength
of ^,000 - 6,000 for the field forces in the operational area
is probably still valid. Should the level of guerrilla
activity remain fairly constant, this presence may even
decrease some if the developing Namibian army units prove to
be effective.
This estimate becomes more credible if one accepts
a commonly held security force: guerrilla ratio of 10:1 as
196being required for security forces to maintain control.
Despite the existence of several thousand PLAN forces in
southern Angola and Zambia, South Africa is primarily con-
cerned with controlling PLAN activities in the BOA (offensive
missions targeted against specific PLAN positions in
southern Angola are not the same as trying to control
southern Angola, and don't require much if any increase in
troop strength) . If 300 - 500 is accepted as a very
generous upper limit on PLAN strength in the BOA, with most
of them being in Ovamboland, is theoretically quite adequate.
Used conventionally, that many troops might not be very
effective in defending an area the size of the BOA or
even Ovamboland. Spread throughout the area in small units
however, and with the consistently aggressive patrolling which
the short deployments (until recently, three months) could
196
A rough average of force ratios in several counter-
insurgencies obtained from various sources.
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facilitate, a counterinsurgent force that size could be very
effective, especially in light of PLAN'S general low level
of activity.
There is very little information available on South
African Air Force (SAAF) activity in Namibia. There are
several small air facilities in the operational area,
generally several hundred kilometers apart. Although the
Impala MK II jet was recently taken into service and was
projected as being very useful in counterinsurgency war-
197 ...fare, there has been no indication of its presence on a
regular basis in the operational area. Tactical air activity
has been largely confined to medevac, troop transport, command
and control of follow-up or pursuit operations , and some
aerial observation or reconnaissance, all carried out by
198
various classes of helicopter or Light propellor planes.
Estimates of the numbers of these aircraft stationed in the
operational area are such that the number of personnel re-
quired for operation and support is almost certainly less
than 500.
Various units of Namibian soldiers have also been
employed in the operational area. Ovambo and Kavango
1 gobattalions were first organized in 1976 and a year later
numbered "several hundred. " In mid-1977 The Pretoria
News reported that a Bushmen battalion and Rehoboth Baster
197ARB, May 1-31. 1976, p. ^028,9
Venter, taped correspondence.
199ARB, November I-30, 1977, p. ^6^3
200FBIS,SA




and Nama companies had also formed. Training for members
of other ethnic groups was planned also, with recruiting
20 2
targets of 160 per group. All Non-White military per-
sonnel except Ovambo , Kavango , and Bushmen were eventually
incorporated into the largely non-ethnic 41 Battalion. It
is composed of five companies with a total troop level of
400 - 600. It deployed to the operational area in September
1978 and has been touted as the nucleus of Namibia's projected
20 3
army. J Plans for another Namibian battalion of paratroopers
were announced in September 1978. Not including the
paratrooper battalion, the combined strengths of the others
is probably in the vicinity of 1,200 - 1,600. This is
generally compatible with South African claims that twenty
percent of the troops in the operational area are Non-White,
given the 4,000 - 6,000 figure deduced earlier which included
20 "5
some Non-White troops deployed from South Africa. J
201DIA Intelligence Information Re-port (IIR) 6 880 0^2 77 ,
9 August 1977
202ARB, November 1-30, 1977, p. 4643
20 3JGrundy, p. 16 j "South-West's Own Army Trains," Die
Republikein, Windheok
, 9 June 1978, p. 4, translated in
JPRS ,SA , "Proposed Paratroop Battalion," The Windhoek Advertiser ,
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In addition to the security forces discussed so far,
Ovamboland, Kavango , and Gaprivi each have their own Home
Guard. These are paramilitary organizations which generally
function in support of the civil counterinsurgency effort
in conjunction with the police in such things as crowd
control, security and as body guards for tribal leaders,
although there has been some evidence of participation in
206
SAA army patrols as guides, trackers, or interpreters.
The Home Guards probably don't total more than several
hundred.
In light of the foregoing, the cumulative strength
of all the forces which are or could be used in actual com-
bat against SWAPO/PLAN insurgency within the Border Operational
Area in Namibia is probably 5*500 - 8,000.
Another general military rule-of -thumb is that there
should usually be a 2:1 ratio between support and combat
troops to optimize effectiveness. This yardstick surely
doesn't apply in Namibia however. Because of its proximity
and long-standing status as essentially an extension of
South Africa, and because of the very transient nature of all
SADF deployments in the BOA, a large amount of the required
staff, logistical, and administrative support probably
takes place in South Africa. Based on this, a very rough
approximation of the SADF support forces required in Namibia
might be half the combat forces in the BOA. Most of these
support forces are probably located at the larger military
or) A.
"Tradition, pride, and discipline. .. all belong to the
DLI,' Paratus, South Africa, April 1978, p. 8,9
125

installations south of the BOA. Although armour, heavy
artillery, and conventional infantry haven't played much of
207
a role in the BOA counterinsurgency , it would make sense
strategically for South Africa to keep some of these forces
in reserve south of the BOA in case the warfare should
suddenly escalate to a more conventional nature. Given
overall SADF strength levels, a 2,000 man force of this
nature might be supportable, primarily with active duty
reservists.
Thus, through a process of logical deduction based
on acceptable reports and of rough approximations stemming
from reasonable military strategies and practices, an
estimate of 11,000 - 1^,000 as the strength of government
forces within Namibia has been arrived at. This figure is
lower than the 15 » 000 - 25 > 000 range of estimates contained
in most Western press reports.
A recent development, of as yet undetermined
permanency, was a troop build-up in Ovamboland prior to the
recent elections. It was cited by the Ovamboland Chief
Minister as "...a considerable build-up. .. to safeguard the
territory from interference and intimidation from outside
during. .. (the) election..." and "...would remain... for as
long... as deemed necessary." A "considerable build-up"
can be speculatively quantified as an increase of perhaps
Venter, taped correspondence.
208PBIS,SA
, 30 November 1978, p. E^
126

25 percent, "but certainly no more than 50 percent. Based on
the estimation arrived at earlier, the security forces in
the operational zone can be recalculated as being between
7,000 and 12,000. This probably resulted in anincrease in
overall "in-country" troop strength since this augmentation
wouldn't have been drawn from the contingency forces south
of the operational zone, as they would have been held in
place as an election security insurance for the urban areas.
This leads to a new estimate of overall troop strength as
13.000 - 18,000, although this may only be a temporary peak.
The headquarters for the South West African command
(SWAC) are in Windhoek. The primary support base for the
BOA is at Grootfontein. The BOA is divided into two military
areas and one sub-area for local command and control purposes.
1 Military Area includes Kavango and the western part of
Caprivi up to the Angola/Zambia border. 2 Military Area is
Ovamboland. 13 Sub-area is the eastern portion of Caprivi.
A small number of troops are also located in Kaokoland.
Prior to final posting in the BOA, all units receive two
21
weeks of counterinsurgency training at Oshavello.
As mentioned before, the majority of the security
forces are deployed in Ovamboland. The general scheme of
troop deployment follows logically from part of the SADF
209ySADF Directorate of Intelligence, "Military Service




mission in the BOA, which can be summarized as the pre-
vention of PLAN guerrilla infiltration into Namibia and the
protection of the population from those which do infiltrate.
Accordingly, larger and more permanent SADF bases are
generally located near the larger towns which are close to
the northern border. Numerous small field bases and
observation posts are located in proximity to the actual
border and known infiltration routes. The rest of the
border area and the rural areas in the rest of the BOA are
211
covered by temporary roving patrols.
Some of the known troop concentrations in 1 Military
Area are the headquarters at Rundu, Andara, and the Bushmen
212battalion in the western Caprivi area. Any units consisting
of African and Portuguese refugees from Angola probably are
posted in western Kavango or eastern Ovamboland since this
is where most of the ^0,000 refugees are located. Although
some UNITA units may work from this area also, most of those
which remain in Namibia for any period of time apparently
are posted further south at Grootfontein and are moved to the
211border or into Angola only for operational missions. J
211 ibid.
212
Ibid., "A Deserved Abode in 1 Military Area," Paratus
,
June 1978, p. 35
213^Francois Soudan, "South African attack rumours:
rationalization for foreign presence," Jeune Afrique
,
No. 93^ f 22 November 1978, p. 22, JPRS.SA , translation.
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The headquarters for 2 Military Area is at Oshakati,




Headquarters for 13 Sub-area are at Katima Mulilo,
with most of the troops based there also.
Most bases mentioned here within the BOA also have
SAAF detachments co-located or in the vicinity. These
detachments normally consist of from five to ten aircraft,
usually a mix of Alouette and Puma helicopters and small
21 5fixed wing observation planes. ^
The White commando organization within Namibia hasn't
been discussed due to a lack of information. At this point
they don't constitute part of the standing security forces.
Should the conflict spread beyond the BOA however, they
might be activated as additional security within their
local areas. Additionally, if a conflict situation should
ever arise in which the SADF didn't actively participate and
yet there were still many Whites in the country, the commando
organization or its remnants could form the nucleus for
White or conservative armed resistance.
F. EXTERNAL MILITARY PARTICIPATION
In discussing the military participation of external
military actors in the Namibian conflict to date, it is
21^4-
SADF Directorate of Intelligence, p. 3; Gervasi,





frequently difficult to determine fact from fiction.
Allegations of external participation by both sides have
been numerous, as they make good propaganda.
1. Military Support for the Counterinsurgents
The most frequent charges made by SWAPO against
South Africa concern the support and use of UNITA guerrillas
in both Namibia and Angola. The allegations, which started
with South Africa's collaboration with UNITA during the
Angolan civil war, are generally true, although perhaps
21 6
not on the scale charged by SWAPO . South Africa has
rendered substantial material support to UNITA 's estimated
10,000 to 12,000 troops in Angola. Additional claims have
included the training, outfitting, and harboring of several
battalions of UNITA soldiers and Angolan refugees in eastern
Ovamboland and Kavango . These units have been used against
PLAN and FAPLA elements in Angola both as large forces in a
217
more conventional manner and as small clandestine units.
It has also been alleged that these same units have intimidated
the civilian population in the BOA in Namibia while charading
as PLAN elements in order to influence public opinion against
SWAPO. Although this last claim is harder to substantiate
or accept, things of that nature frequently occur in counter-
insurgency warfare, and therefore it must be considered as
a definite possibility.
21 6
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1978, p.l
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E5; 19 January 1977, p. El
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Allegations of a less likely nature have included
the participation of Chilean army units, both in the
instruction of the UNITA troops and in the intimidation
of civilians in Angola and Namibian while disguised as
Cubans. Although Chile and South Africa are on good
terms, with some military interaction, that type of
participation is hard to accept. The high risk of greater
adverse world opinion towards Chile should it be found
out would seem to greatly outweigh the apparent absence of
any benefit to either country from such a relationship.
Other less frequent charges by SWAPO of participation
219by U.S. , British, Israeli, and West German mercenaries are
almost certainly not true except perhaps for isolated
individuals in the UNITA units. Claims of Portuguese
220
mercenaries are more credible, but again, these would
be working with the UNITA units also.
In 1975 South Africa acknowledged assistance from
the Israeli military in the form of antiguerrilla tactics
221training for SADF officers.
~
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2. Military Support for the Insurgents
a. Angola
When SWAPO opted for cooperation with MPLA vice
UNITA during the Angolan civil war, one of the driving
factors was the potential for increased Soviet and Cuban
support of its own struggle for Namibia. Part of the
arrangement appears to have been an agreement to assist these
combined forces in defeating UNITA. Although SWAPO hasn't
reneged on its bargain, it would seem that the involvement
has carried on much longer than originally anticipated.
Once again, it is hard to separate reality from false
propaganda, but the weight of reports seems to indicate
that the relationship between PLAN and FAPLA has sometimes
been less than cordial and that it is experiencing in-
creasing strains as the Angolan and Namibian guerrilla
wars drag on.
In 1976 and early 1977 there were several
reports of fighting between PLAN and FAPLA units over
222
scarse supplies. More recently, the restraints placed
on PLAN'S cross-border operations by Angola in order to
avoid massive SADF retaliation into Angola and the pressures
applied by Angola's President Neto on SWAPO ' s President
Nujoma to accept the Western proposals for U.N. supervised
elections have surely hindered PLAN activities in Namibia
and have perhaps caused some resentment. There have also
pop^^FBIS.SA
. 30 June 1976, p. E6 ; AR3, January 1-31, 1977,
p. 4302; FBIS.SA , 10 February 1977, p. Ell
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been reports of FAPLA dissatisfaction with PLAN participation
against UNITA. It has been said that MPLA feels the first
priority should be to eliminate UNITA as this would give
SWAPO clear lines of communication for its fight in Namibia.
SWAPO ' s attitude is said to tend increasingly towards the
223
view that the UNITA issue is an Angolan domestic matter.
In any event, SWAPO really has no alternative but to cooperate
with MPLA if it wants to maintain both its Angolan sanctuary
and the promised eventual full support of Cuba and the Soviet
Union.
Focusing more on the actual military conflict
in Namibia, there have been several isolated incidents
involving FAPLA cross-border small arms fire at border posts
and towns from Ruacana to Rundu. There have also been a
few FAPLA KIA on the Namibian side of the border. These
incidents probably reflect a lack of control within FAPLA
more than a policy of direct action against the SADF however.
The policy usually proclaimed publicly by MPLA is that its
full support for SWAPO' s struggle stops short of crossing the
border into Namibia. The only military roles that FAPLA
theoretically plays in the Namibian conflict are those of
border defense against SADF incursions and, to a lesser
extent, protection of SWAPO camps from SADF raids. In both
cases, any "success" is much more a function of constraints
placed on the SADF for South African political reasons than




The headquarters for SWAPO ' s external
organization are in Luanda,
b. Cuba
The roles of Cuban troops in the Namibian
guerrilla war so far have been primarily instructional
and advisory. Despite reports of a few Cubans KIA inside
224Namibia and several more during the raid at Cassinga,
the military activities of the reported 25.000 Cuban troops
22^in Angola has been focused almost exclusively on eliminating
the guerrilla liberation movements left over from the Angolan
civil war. At this point it appears that the only clash of
any significance between Cuban and South African troops
since the Angolan civil war occurred during the SADF raid
at Cassinga. At that time, several Cuban advisors and
instructors were reported killed at the camp and a Cuban
armoured column sent to assist was stalled by landmines
set by SADF paratroopers.
Knowledgeable observers have noted that the
quality of the PLAN soldier based in Angola has improved
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Although SWAPO had maintained cordial relations
with the Soviet Union and had received some equipment and
training from them since the early 1960's, it wasn't until
after the Angolan civil war that substantial support
really became available. At that time the Soviets allegedly
offered large amounts of aid and instructors for a "quick
kill" war similar to the climax of the Angolan civil war.
The price of this was for SWAPO to scale down and phase out
any Chinese support it received. *" Since then, SWAPO '
s
President Nujoma has repeatedly acknowledged the support
rendered by both the Soviets and the Cubans.
During the long negotiating process between
SWAPO, South Africa, and the Western members of the U.N.
Security Council, there were frequent reports of Soviet
pressure on SWAPO to reject any compromise solutions and
229
to continue and escalate its armed struggle.
Most recently, there has been concern in South
Africa over reports of a build-up of top level Soviet
military planners in Angola, allegedly to plan and direct
a military campaign in Namibia in a manner similar to the
Soviet planning and direction functions demonstrated in
Ethiopia. The Russians are reportedly determined to crush
UNITA resistance before launching any campaign in Namibia
228ARB, February 1-29, 1976, p. 39^2
229Louis Wiznitzer, "Proposals for Namibia garner yes- cut
answers," Christian Science Monitor
.
2 May 1978, p. 10; Lawrence
Pintak, "Zaire and Angola leaders ready to bury the hatchet,"
London Times , 19 August 1978, p. 5
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however, and this determination is said to have resulted in
an influx of East Germans to replace Cubans in many field
•+• 230leadership positions. •*
d. East Germany
Although the presence of small numbers of "East
European" military personnel in Angola has been frequently
reported since the civil war, it wasn't until 1978 that the
East Germans began to be mentioned in increasing numbers and
almost to the exclusion of all others.
All reported combat participation has been
against UNITA, with the East Germans apparently leading FAPLA
platoons and flying troop helicopters. Although most reports
to date were originated by UNITA or South Africa, a recent one
from West German government sources indicates that there may
231be at least 5»000 East German troops in Angola. J
The. potential for eventual East German military
involvement in Namibia gains some credence linguisticly
and culturally. It is further supported by reports of the
formation of an East German "Afrika Korps" consisting of
several thousand civilians. This organization is alleged
to be a "shadow" administration for Namibia which would be
230J
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installed upon a SWAPO takeover to assist SWAPO in running
232
the new country. -*
e. Zambia
Zambia has provided sanctuary for SWAPO almost
from its inception, and most of the U.N. sponsored programs
for SWAPO are maintained in Zambia. Lusaka also served as
the headquarters for the external SWAPO organization until
its recent relocation in Luanda.
Despite this close relationship, Zambia has
been unable to provide any real military assistance to SWAPO
aside from allowing the establishment of PLAN bases close
to the Zambia/Namibia border. Zambia's traditional inter-
national political position has precluded direct access by
Cuban and Soviet advisors and instructors to PLAN units in
Zambia. Additionally, arms and equipment for the PLAN troops
in Zambia have arrived via Tanzania as opposed to a more
direct delivery for units in Angola. Consequently, the PLAN
troops in Zambia have, on the whole, been of a lower quality
233
and more poorly armed than those in Angola. JJ
As noted earlier, Zambia constrained PLAN
operations while attempting detente with South Africa and
again when SWAPO initially shifted allegiance to MPLA.
Zambia also detained almost the entire Zambian faction of
?32
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PLAN in the summer of 1976 in order to sqelch a potential
mutiny. There are conflicting reports as to whether or
not these people have yet been released.
There have been numerous reported incidents of
small arms and even mortar fire from Zambian troops near
Sesheke directed at the town and SADF base at Katima Mulilo.
As in the case of FAPLA cross-border fire however, most of
these incidents are attributed to a lack of Zambian Army
command and control over remote units and not to an over-
all agressiveness in the Zambian political/military
22^posture.
f . S ummary
In summary, it can be said that so far, foreign
military involvement on behalf of SWAPO has been limited
to provision of equipment, training, advice, and ineffective
protection. While there is potential for more direct
military involvement by some of these external actors, it
probably will not come to pass until, among other things,
UNITA has been neutralized as a guerrilla force. It is for
this reason, and the related fact that many PLAN troops
will remain tied up against UNITA in the interim, that
South African can be expected to continue to support UNITA
in its struggle in Angola.
ARB, May 1-31
, 1977; F3IS.SA , k November 1977, and
22 December 1973, p. E7
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G. COUNTERINSURGENCY AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM
During the early phases of a counterinsurgent effort,
law and order are normally still the responsibility of the
civil administration and are bounded by the prevailing civil
legal system. Usually it soon becomes apparent that effective
counterinsurgent action is hampered by laws and procedures
which were not intended or designed to cope with subversive
activities. It is at this point that special legal powers
and procedures begin to appear to facilitate the military
and police control required for effective counterinsurgent
activity, both preventive and reactive. These special
legal powers wouldn't be acceptable under normal conditions,
but, together with stern punishments for the insurgents,
they are supported on the grounds that innocent lives must
be protected and that insurgents operate outside the law
in ruthless fashion and would otherwise escape the punish-
ment they deserve. -^
The special legal and security measures which have been
implemented in Namibia governing military/police interaction
with both the civilian populace and members of SWAPO/FLAN
in the prosecution of the counterinsurgent effort will be
discussed in the following paragraphs. Additionally,
examples of political and civilian harassment and support
by the administration for different political factions
under the guises of legal counterinsurgency powers and




Namibia's relationship to South Africa has greatly
facilitated the construction of a pervasive counterinsurgent
legal system in the territory since, in many instances,
appropriate laws were already on the books in South Africa
and procedures to support then were in effect. ^ Trans-
ferring these controls to Namibia has been a simple process.
The degree of population control inherent in apartheid
(homelands and reserves, pass laws, curfews for Non-Whites
in White areas, etc.) not only fulfilled some counter-
insurgent requirements, but, to some extent, also conditioned
the general populace to living in a closely controlled society.
Modification of South West Africa's civil legal system
began in October 1966, shortly after SWAPO ' s "declaration
of war" two months earlier. The anti-sabotage provisions
of South Africa's 1962 General Law Amendment Bill were
extended to South West Africa. Willful acts of damage or
destruction of essential buildings or installations were
made punishable by death or a minimum of five years in
237prison. -"
In June 196?, South Africa gazetted the Terrorism Act
and extended its powers to South West Africa. It provided
for punishment by death for the crime of terrorism and for
unlimited detention of people suspected of either terrorist
' The Suppression of Communism Act was promulgated in
1950 and various General Law Amendment Acts were promulgated
in South Africa in the early 1960's dealing with such things
as sabotage, placards, meetings, and detention on suspicion.
237ARB, October 1-31, 1966, p. 642
1^0

activities or of withholding information about such
activities. ^ It was made retrospective to 27 July 1962
when the first members of SWAPO were recruited for terrorist
239
training abroad. J ' It was on this basis that the 37
Africans who were arrested at and after the police raid at
Ongulumbashe in August 1966 were tried for nationalistic
activities aimed at overthrowing the government and
administration of South West Africa. Since there was
some doubt initially as to whether the retroactive extension
of this law would hold up in court, the men were also
charged alternatively under the Suppression of Communism
Act.
2^
When thousands of Ovambo workers were transported back
to Ovamboland following the nation-wide strikes which began
in December 1971. South Africa enacted extensive emergency
regulations with respect to Ovamboland in January and
February 1972. These were known collectively as
Proclamation R17. Ovamboland was effectively placed under
martial law, entrance was strictly controlled by permit,
a news blackout was imposed, news media access was severely
restricted with all subsequent reports requiring administration
approval, meetings of more than five people were generally
238ARB, June 1-30, 1967, P- 801
239Morris, p. 19,20
2
^°ARB, August 1-31, 1967, p. 8^+6
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prohibited, and indefinite detention without charge was
permitted. In May 197° Proclamation R17 was extended
to Kavango and Caprivi as well when those areas were
officially termed "security districts" and overall political
2^2
power in all three areas was transferred to the military.
Additional powers were also granted to uproot villagers in
"prohibited areas," order curfews, search premises or people,
arrest suspected terrorists, and control population
2^3
movements. y
In February 197*+ South Africa passed the Riotous Assemblies
Bill, designed to further limit the possibilities for sub-
version by permitting the banning of any meeting of any size,
public or private, lawful or unlawful as long as there was
reason to believe that public peace was endangered by the
the
2^5
meeting. In April 1977 South Africa extended pro-
visions of the Riotous Assemblies Act to Namibia.
By January 1977 » the flow of people from embattled
southern Angola into Namibia, both refugees and those just
seeking food or medical treatment, reached such proportions
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Namibians in order to limit the possibilities of PLAN
members infiltrating into Namibia posing as Angolan
civilians.
By mid-1977 the military and police had essentially been
given a free hand to conduct the civil counterinsurgent
effort in the operational area. Although this did
facilitate near total control of the civilian population and
effectively supported generally successful military operations,
the moral acceptability of these repressive measures began
to hinder South Africa's international negotiating position
after it had agreed to drop its plans for an internal inde-
pendence settlement in favor of an internationally recognized
solution. Faced with the eventual prospect of "one man, one
vote" elections and with a majority of the potential voters
living under Proclamation R17 » both the need to improve the
internal political climate of Namibia in order to favorably
influence a future poll towards an outcome acceptable to
South Africa and the need to allow greater freedom of
speech and movement to conduct election campaigning were
recognized. Consequently, shortly after he was installed as
the Administrator-General of South West Africa, Mr. Justice
Steyn repealed Proclamation R17 in November 1977 and replaced
it with two less stringent proclamations. At about this same
time the pass laws were abolished for the territory as a
whole, the homelands were opened to visits by other ethnic
24-6
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groups and the Riotous Assemblies Act was amended.
The election campaigns of the main political parties
soon heated up and resulted in numerous violent political
clashes in Windhoek. Additionally, SWAPO took advantage
of the relaxed civil controls and stepped up its campaign
of political assassinations, culminating in the death of
Chief Clements Kapuuo in March 1978. This series of events
precipitated the promulgation of emergency measures the
following month which gave broad powers of arrest and
detention without trial to the Administrator-General
249during the period of independence negotiations. y These
measures were still in effect at the end of 1978.
Other laws or processes which have played a role in
countering subversion in the Namibian civil sector are:
an old law, recently updated (July 1978) by an Administrator-
General proclamation, permitting the expulsion of anybody
who "...threatens the peace or good government of the
territory..." which has been used most notably against
religious leaders who have openly opposed administration
2 SOpolicies; -/ a law prohibiting illegal exit from the
territory; and stiff penalties for anyone found guilty of
• • . . 2 SIintimidating or trying to discourage potential voters. J
7AR3, November 1-30, 1977, p. 4643
248c ?3IS,SA
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It should be noted that two civilian control measures
frequently used in other co.nnterinsurgent situations which
have not been used in Namibia are population resettlement
2^2
and food control programs, J The former is usually intended
to both facilitate protection of the populace and restrict
any supportive interaction between the population and the
insurgents. Food control programs are aimed at limiting
the possibilities for the local populace to provide sub-
stantial food support to insurgents. It may be that South
Africa feels the situation within the operational area is
not of sufficient intensity to warrant these types of
actions
.
Based on this adapted legal foundation, any time the
general situation has become particularly tense (e.g.,
following Kapuuo ' s assassination, periods of increased
activity in the operational area, during elections) the
response of the authorities has been to round up and
detain prominent members of SWAPO ' s internal organization.
Additionally there have been several instances where
individual SWAPO officials have been detained and tried
for offenses which in other situations would seem to be
extremely trivial. While these and many other instances
of legal harassment make good press for SWAPO and its
supporters (in light of South Africa's "illegal" administration
2S2
•* Venter, taped correspondence
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of the territory) , they are valid security measures within
the context of a counterinsurgency , and when placed in the
perspective of counterinsurgent efforts in other places, in
many ways the situation is actually more liberal than the
norm.
Other practices by the administration which don't
necessarily derive from specific security legislation and
are not anti -subversive in a strict sense, but which do
reflect the intention and capability to restrict SWAPO
activities and influence the population towards an eventual
non-SWAPO resolution have included such actions as:
1. Allegedly permitting administration officials and the
DTA, SWAPO ' s primary political opposition, to carry out
frequent voter intimidation during the registration process
253
and again during elections. -^
2. Police dispersal of SWAPO political rallies as being
too violent and disorderly after allegedly having allowed
DTA members to interfere and stimulate the violence despite
theoretical police protection for the rallies. a
"""Church Report Charges Fraud," New York Times , 6
December 1978, p. A3; Chege Mbitiru, "Kenyan reporter gives
first-hand account on elections," Nairobi Daily Nation
,
11 December 1978, p. 6 in JPRS ,SA "
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, 6 February 1978, p. 5, in JPRS , SA ; Bishop James
Kauluma, "Things stay the same says Bishop," interview by
Karen Rothmeyer, Southern Africa , April 1978, p. 22
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3. Alleged job transfers of SWAPO supporters employed by
255
the government. -^
k. Permission to tribal authorities in Ovamboland
to detain and publicly flog people on the grounds that they
were members of SWAPO. ^
South Africa has also taken several steps to legalize
and facilitate military operations in Namibia's operational
area. The designation of the three northern security districts
was mentioned above. The presence of troops in those areas
prior to that, which contravened the provisions of South
Africa's League of Nations Mandate for the territory, was
justified on the grounds that the heads of government in
those homelands had requested military protection of their
2^7international borders. "
In support of frequent public statements by South
African government leaders as early as 1970 regarding the
intent to carry out "hot pursuit" D and to provide greater
legitimate latitude for offensive action, South Africa
promulgated the Defense Amendment Act in January 1976.
This bill gave the Defense Minister the legal right to order
2
""Teacher transfers laid to SWAPO affiliation," The
Windhoek Advertiser , 17 January 1978, p. 1
2
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South African forces into action anywhere in Africa south of
the equator to counteract any security threat.
An additional act designed to limit PLAN militarily was
the designation of a strip one kilometer wide on the
southern side of the Namibian/Angola border as a depopulated
"no-man's land" in May, 1976 at the same time these areas
were declared security districts. vy This also is alleged to
have stemmed from requests by homeland political leaders.
It involved the resettlement of approximately 3»000 people
in Ovamboland. Known as the "Jati" strip, it runs along the
entire northern border between the Cunene River and the
Okavango River with Oshikango as the only legal crossing
point. A similar strip runs along the northern border
of western Caprivi.
Finally, it should be noted that the incorporation of
all the foregoing security measures into the civil legal
system has resulted in treatment and prosecution of PLAN
guerrillas as common criminals vice prisoners-of -war.
In attempting to determine the effectiveness of
implementation of this adapted legal system against the
insurgency in Namibia, there is very little specific
information available to use as evidence. When one con-
siders the vastness of the area to be controlled and the
2 ^9ARB, May 1-31, 1976, p. ^-037
260FBIS,SA
, 19 May 1976, p. E5 and 6 July 1976; AR3 ,
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relatively small security force so employed (compared to
other counterinsurgent situations), the apparent success of
the overall program so far may partially be a reflection of
the lack of an active SWAPO underground within Namibia and
a limited effectiveness of PLAN forces in general. South
African journalist Al Venter has covered warfare in Africa
and the Middle East since the early 1960's. In his opinion,
compared to other situations he has covered, the police and
SADF in Namibia have been quite lax or liberal with such
262
things as road check points, curfews, and border control.
As noted previously, this may be due primarily to the low
intensity of the insurgency.
H. THE PURSUIT OF POPULAR SUPPORT
Two of the most important aspects of any counterinsurgency
war are the amelioration of the popular grievances which
fueled the insurgency and the winning of the hearts and minds
of the population. Successful accomplishment in either
endeavor by the government in power is tremendously hindered
by the repressive atmosphere which normally exists in a
counterinsurgency situation, as noted in the previous sub-
section. In the Namibian situation, the popular grievances
have been addressed primarily through reforms to the apartheid
legal system. The pursuit of increased popular support for




well-being and living conditions has occurred primarily in
the BOA and has been addressed largely through SADF civic
action programs.
1. Legal Reforms
The first significant South African attempt to come
to grips with the growing demands for independence and
equality in Namibia was the Odendaal Plan for autonomous
homelands, discussed earlier. As far as most Namibians are
concerned, this was not so much an attempt to solve the main
problem as it was to reduce it to several small, similar
problems which could be more easily contained. This plan
was eventually abandoned under pressure both from abroad
and within.
In November 197^ » the South-West Africa Native
Administration Proclamation of 1922 was amended to allow
African officials in homeland governments and other African
political leaders recognized by Pretoria to travel freely
throughout the country without passes. ^
In May 1975 » the African pass law and the Masters
and Servants Proclamation of 1920 was abolished. The South
African government also placed limitations on the flogging
of political opponents which had been taking place for more
26^than two years under tribal leadership in Ovamboland.
^ARB, November 1-30, 197^. p. 3^2
26
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In June 1975. the legislative assembly in Windhoek
officially eliminated some aspects of racial discrimination
by permitting the admission of all races to hotels,
26 <5
restaurants and cafes at the discretion of the owners. y
In September 1975 South Africa convened a
constitutional conference (the Turnhalle Conference) on the
future of Namibia. As discussed earlier, this was an
attempt to arrive at an internally-generated plan for
independence under South African guidance. The conference
was eventually eliminated as an official body in the face
of international pressures, although the conference principles
have been adopted as platforms by some of the conservative
political parties. September also saw the removal of "Whites
Only" and "Non-Whites Only" signs from all public buildings
in Windhoek.
In June 1976, the constitutional conference passed a
series of resolutions to appeal to the various South African
government departments in Namibia to eliminate many aspects
of apartheid and racial inequality. The issues addressed
indicated that implementation of most of the reforms dis-
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The territory's first multiracial political meeting
was held in September 1976 in Khomasdal , the Coloured quarter
of Windhoek. It was attended primarily by Coloureds, with
a few Whites and Africans present also.
In January 1977 » South Africa agreed to the abolition
of apartheid in Roman Catholic schools, hospitals, and
clinics in Namibia. Any positive effects of this were soon
offset when the South West Africa Administration withdrew
its subsidy to Catholic schools on the grounds that they had
defied the National Party policy of segregated education.
It was also announced in January that all Namibians would
soon receive identical identification cards regardless of
269
race. y As discussed in the previous subsection, this was
aimed primarily at controlling Angolan refugees, but it was
also a step away from ethnic I.D. cards prescribed under
apartheid.
Following South Africa's decision to negotiate on
an internationally acceptable independence for Namibia and
the July, 1977 appointment of an Administrator-General for
South West Africa during the territory's transition to
independence, the rate of legal reform accelerated.
In October, all laws prohibiting marriage and sex
across the color line were eliminated. Pass laws were
268FBIS,SA
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abolished first outside the military zones and a few weeks
later within the military zones (repeal of Proclamation
R17) , although how these abolitions differed from the one
announced two years earlier isn't clear. Laws providing
for indefinite detention and requiring permits for meetings
270
of more than five people were also scrapped.
It was announced in December that all private
schools would be allowed to accept students of all races
although government subsidies would only be provided for
271White students. All restrictions on the purchase of land
272by Africans in African townships were set aside and the
Windhoek City Council announced plans for a new "open" or
273
"mixed" residential area in the city. ' -' Finally, it was
announced that the Bantu education system was to be
abolished, to be replaced by a single national syllabus for
27^
all students.
In June 1978 it was announced that all government
employees and public servants would receive equal pay for
27
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equal work and equal qualification. The new pay structure
27 5
was implemented on 30 November.
In September the First National Development
Corporation was established to provide low interest loans
for business and industry in order to stimulate the economy
and create employment opportunities. It's board includes
members of all major ethnic groups and the corporation
superceded the Bantu and other homeland development
corporations. The potential for this corporation appears
somewhat limited at the present, however, as capital flight





In the past few years the South African administration
and the SADF have expended considerable effort in the BOA
and at other base areas in norther Namibia in order to
offset the presence of PLAN and its terrorist tactics, to
win the hearts ' and minds of the people, and to encourage a
97 <
^"Government equalizes salaries and wages," Allgemeir.e
Zeitung , Windhoek, 1^ June 1978, p. 1, JPRS .SA translation;
"Equal pay implemented," The Windhoek Advertiser , 1 December
1978, p. 3. JPRS, S
A
"Steyn announces National Development Corporation,"
The Windhoek Observer , lo September 1973, p. 1, JPRS ,SA
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"Flight of capital, economic transition problems
discussed," Johannesburg, Sunday Times-Business Times
,
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November 1978, p. 15, in JPRS , SA
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flow of operational information from the civilians to the
security forces.
Signs of "20/80" are posted all over as a constant
reminder of the SADF formula for a successful counter-
insurgency: 20 percent combat and 80 percent people or
political programs. This starts with explicit standing
orders that no man in uniform is to molest the locals in
279
any way.
Many reserves on active duty with appropriate
civilian backgrounds are sent to the BOA expressly for civic
action programs. These programs include extensive medical,
agricultural, and veterinary services, road improvement,
construction projects, educational assistance, and athletic
supervision for young people. While many personnel are
assigned exclusively to "static" civic action projects,
others participate in "contact" patrols, which include armed
security forces and medical, agricultural, and veterinary
personnel. These patrols go out into the bush for several
days and carry out civic action and elicit information in
pQ-I
the more remote areas. One U.S. military observer
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B. Redelinghuys, Col., SAA, SAA Attache at South
African Embassy, Washington, D.C., in interview with the
author, 10 August, 1978
279Venter, taped correspondence
"A deserved abode in 1 Military Area," Paratus,





estimated the overall SADF civic action program to be as
pp p
intensive and thorough as any he had ever witnessed.
While most of the SADF effort has been manpower
intensive, the Administration has poured large sums of money
into northern Namibia for extensive housing developments,
sports and recreation facilities, shopping centers, extension
of electrical facilities, street improvements and lighting,
and water, storm drainage and sewage systems. The advertised
purpose of these expensive schemes is to boost the African
pO p
living standard. Unmentioned but almost as obvious is
the intent to buy support for a "moderate" approach to
independence and resistance to SWAPO politicizing.
3. Propaganda
Propaganda and civilian terrorism are essentially
the only means SWAPO has to counteract and discredit South
African and political opposition politicizing and other
popular support efforts as described above. With no liberated
areas, SWAPO has been unable to implement and demonstrate any
of the programs it espouses for the population as a whole.
The ability of SWAPO ' s internal party in Namibia to distribute
information on a mass basis has generally been quite restricted
through government interference of one form or another. A
great deal of information is passed through regular radio
pQ p
Bournes taped correspondence
pO pJGail Visagie , "Plans underway to boost living standard,"
The Windhoek Advertiser , 13 September 1978, p. 2, in JPRS ,5A
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broadcasts from Zambia and Angola by SWAPO ' s external
political organization however, and these usually reach at
28^-
least as far as Windhoek. In the BOA, PLAN infiltrators
occasionally conduct political meetings for groups of
civilians gathered at gunpoint. •* Terrorism, especially
selective terrorism, is used to discredit the capability
of the security force to protect the populace and to dis-
courage people from accepting positions of authority in
opposition to SWAPO. SWAPO propaganda has followed lines
similar to those of many other African insurgencies (e.g.,
reports of constant victories, economic exploitation,
charges of racism, allegations of atrocities) , but South
Africa's illegal presence in the territory, SWAPO ' s status
in the U.N. as the only authentic representative of the
Namibian people as a whole, and the depiction of the
moderate political opposition as South African puppets have
all received extra attention.
Although South Africa has, through various means,
effectively limited the distribution of information within
Namibian by SWAPO ' s internal wing, they have not restricted
it nearly as much as they could, which would be simply to
prohibit it on the grounds that it is subversive. Further,
apparently there has been no attempt to jam SWAPO radio
28^Venter, taped correspondence
-""ibid. ; Bournes taped correspondence
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286broadcasts or to prevent Namibians from listening to them.
This seeming laxity could simply reflect the low intensity
of the insurgency and the level of real threat that South
Africa perceives. More likely however, it is also a
conscious restraint, aimed both at demonstrating South Africa's
impartiality during the transition to independence, and the
prevention of SWAPO ' s mystique being enhanced through denial
of public information.
The more conventional forms of South African
propaganda within the country have generally focused on the
Marxist nature of SWAPO, the need to prevent domination of
one ethnic group by another, the fallacy of SWAPO ' s claim
to represent Namibians as a whole, dissention within SWAPO
ranks, civilian atrocities, the depiction of PLAN as an
ineffective military force, and improvements in living
standards.
Within the political arena, the moderate and
conservative opposition has generally echoed the South
African propaganda, and their political campaigns have
tended to focus more on discrediting SWAPO ' s image and per-
ceived platform than on expounding on their own merits.
The government controlled radio programming within Namibia
has been dominated by SWAPO ' s moderate opposition, the DTA,
286 T , . ,Ibid.
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evidencing close ties with the South African administration.^
Finally, South Africa's Information Department scandal has
surfaced in Namibia with strong allegations that government
money was used to buy two independent newspapers , after
288
which they began supporting the DTA very strongly.
I. THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE STRUGGLE
In attempting to assess the effectiveness of each side
in prosecuting the opposing war efforts, the problems of
censorship and misleading propaganda tend to cloud realities
much more than on most topics discussed so far. While
practices and programs are proclaimed proudly in some cases
and can be easily deduced in some other cases, neither side
is willing to admit failure or misdoing.
1. Objective Accomplishment
Objective accomplishment is a logical place to start
in the assessment of insurgent/counterinsurgent effectiveness
in Namibia. Although official, comprehensive and specific
statement of objectives in the actual struggle apparently
have not been promulgated as programs be either side, they
can probably be summarized as follows.
7
"SWANU leader scores UN/HCR, DTA actions," The
Windhoek Advertiser
, 9 February 1978, p. 5; "Returnee mentions
changes in 15 years, scores DTA, AKTUR," The Windhoek
Advertiser , 10 February 1978, p. 6, both in JPRS ,SA
poo
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(1) Gain the support of the majority of the
population.
(2) Disrupt South African and local government
administration processes and discredit the security forces
and opposition figures of authority.
(3) Establish a liberated zone within Namibia.
(*0 Defeat the security forces.
b. South Africa and the Security Forces
(1) Win the support of the majority of the
population through neutralization of grievances and accept-
able alternatives to those programs advocated by SWAPO.
(2) Prevent PLAN military infiltration into
Namibia in order to facilitate a peaceful transition to
independence.
In very simplistic and general terms, it would
appear at this point that SWAPO can probably be considered
as successful in the accomplishment of its first objective,
while PLAN has had only very limited success in the second,
and virtually none at all in the last two. On the other
hand, although the security forces have been extremely
successful in accomplishing their military objective
against PLAN, it would appear that, while some progress has
been made, the degree of true popular support for South
African and the political parties and programs generally
associated with it is probably less than they have hoped
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for. These answers are too simple however, and don't shed
any light on the factors of which they are comprised.
2. Operational Constraints
In assessing combat effectiveness, both sides have
been operating under constraints which have prevented the
continuous exercise of their full capabilities. PLAN'S
involvement in Angola's continuing struggle with UNITA has
certainly detracted from the military effort in Namibia. On
the other hand, PLAN soldiers may have gained considerably
more real combat experience in that endeavor than they have
in Namibia. This is especially true if one considers the
possible eventuality of a more conventional war in Namibia
with participation by Cubans or East Germans. Operations
from Zambia were minimal from late 197^ through 1977 due
initially to government constraints and then to detention of
the whole PLAN contingent. Further constraints were placed
on PLAN in the summer and fall of 1978 when Angola and Zambia
both exerted pressure to minimize cross-border operations
during independence negotations and, at least in Angola's
case, until anti-aircraft border defenses could be strengthened
as protection against South African retaliation. Finally,
on the occasions when SWAPO/PLAN appear to have suffered
very high casualties (i.e., in Angola in the fall of 1975. at
Cassinga, and in the Katima Mulilo follow-up) operational
activity has decreased thereafter. It should be noted tha~
the time required for recuperation after a major setback
appears to be decreasing, however.
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The restraints placed on the security forces in
Namibia so far appear to have been primarily political in
order to minimize any damage to the South African negotiating
position at the U. N. The South African objective is not to
destroy PLAN, but merely to keep it from operating in
Namibia (although elimination would certainly achieve this).
Large scale cross-border operations have generally occurred
only as follow-ups to PLAN operations in Namibia or as pre-
ventive measures when the intensity of PLAN activity in
Namibia appeared to be escalating beyond levels acceptable
to the South Africans. While the security forces have scored
impressive victories on those few occasions when operational
constraints were relaxed, it must be remembered that those
operations generally caught PLAN by surprise. It would be
foolish to think they could be repeated again and again
under less restrained rules of engagement. Another constraint
on the security forces is the standing policy to avoid antag-
onizing the local populace. It was noted earlier that harsh
treatment of suspects and the local populace during interro-
gation is a common aspect of counterinsurgency. Despite
frequent allegations of atrocities committed by the security
forces against African civilians, South African has demonstrated




3. Normal Modus Operandi
In assessing the effectiveness of the ordinary modus
operandi of both sides, it should be noted that if the
casualties suffered in the extraordinary situations discussed
above are set aside, the PLAN:SADF casualty ratio of approx-
imately 3 or ^:1 isn't especially outstanding within the
context of counterinsurgency warfare.
PLAN operations normally consist of the infiltration
of a unit into Namibia for a few days at most, with a
specific mission in mind. Penetration is normally shallow,
20 to 30km. Equipment and weapons are usually stashed during
the day. The group generally remains concealed during most
of the day although some members with contacts in the area
may mingle with the local people. Following accomplishment
of its mission, the unit exfiltrates back across the border.
Although most penetrating groups are still quite small, there
has been some tendency for guerrillas to infiltrate in larger
groups (50-100) for protection and then to split into smaller
elements for actual mission accomplishment. Most missions
involve civilian targets, placement of landmines, or
sabotage. Very few if any units are specifically targeted
against security force bases or patrols. Clashes usually
result from chance encounters or targets of opportunity,
although there have been numerous ambushes of security
force border patrols initiated near the border both within
the BOA or from Angola or Zambia.
289Bournes and Venter, taped correspondences
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Security force operations have continuously adapted
in order to cope with the changing insurgency. The basing
scheme and the civic action "contact" patrols were pre-
viously discussed. Other types of normal patrols are
motorized border patrols along the cut lines and other roads
in the vicinity, border ambushes along frequent infiltration
routes, and reconnaissance/combat patrols with the purpose
of finding and engaging PLAN elements.
A few years ago the reconnaissance and combat patrols
were small (five to ten men) and stayed out for several days.
As the size of some PLAN infiltrations has increased, the
security force patrols have also become larger. Platoon-
size (20-30 men) patrols are the rule now, with larger
groups of up to 60 working in known infiltration areas. Once
contact is made, follow-up forces are frequently called in.
Depending on the situation, these can include helicopters for
fire support and command and control, additional mortar fire
support from nearby bases , helicopter-borne troops
,
motorized troops, horse-mounted troops, Bushmen trackers, or
dogs. There have also been reports of motorcycle troops
being used in follow-up operations. Artillery heavier than
mortars is generally not used for tactical fire support
within Namibia.
Border surveillance apparently relies almost ex-
clusively on patrols and static visual means augmented by
the use of landmines in the no-go strip. On the whole,
these are reportedly insufficient to prevent determined groups
164

or individuals from crossing in either direction. There
have been recent reports of the installation of mechanical
sensors in hopes of improving the surveillance effort.
k>. Intelligence
Given the relatively small size of the security force
vis-a-vis the extent of the BOA and the porosity of much of
the border, the security forces rely heavily on intelligence
in order to maintain control. South Africa apparently
operates an extremely effective counterinsurgent intelligence
organization. Military Intelligence most likely controls the
field work conducted in Angola or Zamiba, while the effort in
Namibia involves the police as well, although there have been
reports of friction between the police and SADF in this area.
While well-placed and loyal informants probably provide a
great deal of the information in Namibia, it has been noted
that the local populace as a whole is much more responsive
to both the intelligence system and security force reconnaiss-
ance patrols after PLAN has suffered a setback in the area.
Within any counterinsurgency this is one of the reasons the
security forces week to protect the populace and why the
insurgents seek to discredit the capability of the security
forces to provide this protection. As evidenced by the high
PLAN casualties, the instances of tactical surprise, the




the foreknowledge of attack, the SADF obviously has excellent
290
knowledge of PLAN activities outside Namibia.
Much less is known about PLAN'S intelligence
capabilities. Most of its selective terrorism is probably
based on intelligence although it may be collected in the
immediate vicinity as opposed to through a broad and
continuous organized effort. PLAN units also frequently
rely on the local populace to either cover their presence
291
in the area or to warn them of approaching security forces.
5. Quality of the Combatants
South Africa likes to portray PLAN as a demoralized,
under-equipped, under-fed, and poorly led band of terrorists.
They support this with testimony from defectors and UNITA
guerrillas which include reports of dissension, disertion,
arrest, and execution in both Angola and Zambia, as well as
claims of ethnic favoritism, weak leadership, hunger, poor
medical treatment, and dismay over SADF victories at Cassinga
292




"Hundreds said shot," Johannesburg The Star , 1 February
1978, p. 15; "Why SWAPO could never take the South-West by
force of arms," Windhoek Die Republikein , 16 June 1978, p. 2;
"SWAPO soldier surrenders," Johannesburg Post , ^ July 1978,
p. 10, all in JPRS.SA
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by SWAPO dissidents who experienced the situation in Zambia
and southeastern Angola from 197^ to 1976. All of the
above is probably true in varying degrees, although perhaps
less so now than in previous years. The fact that PLAN
seems to recuperate faster after each major setback isn't
indicative of declining morale. While the killing of wounded
comrades to prevent their capture by security forces might
offend western sensibilities, it also evidences more than a
294
normal level of commitment.
While the quality of the PLAN soldier is generally
29 ^denigrated by most South African sources, 7J Al Venter,
after covering African insurgencies for almost twenty
years, ranks PLAN military professionalism generally higher
than any of the other liberation armies currently or recently
fighting in southern Africa. As evidenced by some of the
operations they have conducted, he placed some of the elite
PLAN units on a par with almost any special forces organi-
• ^ ^296zation in the world.
SADF soldiers are well trained and generally well
motivated for duty in the BOA. Their motivation is due
2
^Kenneth Abrahams, "The Formation of the SWAPO
(Democrats)," The Namibian Review , June 1978, p. 1-7
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"Terrorist comrades cut throat," The Windhoek
Advertiser
. 1 September 1978, p. 1» in JPRS ,5A
-^Bournes taped correspondence; Dr. W. Bruckner de
Villiers, "External Influences," Bulletin , Vol. 16, No. -




primarily to a constant barrage of government and media
reports and warnings depicting South Africa as almost a lone
crusader against communism and stressing the need to prevent
Namibia from becoming a communist springboard into South
Africa. When this is overlaid on the Afrikaner spirit of
determined survival and resolute superiority, the struggle
becomes very moral and almost religious for many. On a
more pragmatic level, the previous SAD? tours of three months
in the BOA (twice during a two year active duty service) with
only ten weeks actually operational were very conducive to
enthusiastic attitudes. A soldier was transferred back
home before he had a chance to be worn down by the war.
Although operational tours for active duty national service-
men were increased to five month tours a year ago, there
hasn't yet been any public feedback on what effect this may
be having on morale.
Despite the foregoing, there have been reports of
the beginnings of an attitude at the lower SADF levels which
can be characterized as "Why are we fighting here if they're
(Namibia, SWAPO) going to get their independence anyway, no
297
matter what we do.' There have also been reports of
boredom on the part of most SADF troops as only two percent
have supposedly actually ever seen a terrorist, dead or
298
alive. Despite the admitted low intensity of the
war, this figure seems quite low given the number of SAD?
297 ibid.
29 SADF Directorate of Intelligence, p. 6
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troops reported in the BOA and the frequency and geographic
spread of clashes with PLAN units.
Of interest is the apparently high level of morale
and increasing level of quality of some of the Non-White
troops, particularly the Namibian ethnic battalions. Although
educational and cultural deficiencies have made for a slow
development process, the progress of many of these units
has received favorable South African comment, although some
of this was obviously propaganda. While much of the military
attraction for the Africans is financial and the total
strength of all the units together is relatively small in
the context of the total war effort, morale is high and long
299
waiting lists for entry are reported. ' This seems to
mirror the experiences of the Portuguese in which African
units were steadfast in their loyalty to Lisbon, and
remained as cohesive and disciplined units even after many
of the European troops refused to fight or respond to
orders. The battalions associated with the homelands in
the BOA have seen sufficient operational duty to have
301proved their worth, although the leadership is still
in the hands of Whites. It is of interest that while the
Ovambo battalion has generally proved effective, it is by
29977
"Military contributes to Caprivi economic development ,
"
The Windhoek Advertiser , 20 October 1978, p. 4, in J?RS~,5A
^ Thomas H. Henriksen, "Portugal in Africa: Comprehensive
Notes on Counterinsurgency , " 0R3IS , summer 1977, p. ^05,406
301J Venter, taped correspondence
169

far the smallest of the BOA ethnic battalions despite
having a population base almost ten times that of any other
BOA homeland. While much of this can probably be attributed
to the high numbers of military-age Ovambo men who are work-
ing on contract in the South, it may also say something
about the ethnic perceptions of SWAPO by different ethnic
groups and their associated willingness to support or
oppose it.
6. Popular Attitudes
In assessing the effects of both the civil programs,
propaganda, and the actual military activities of both sides
on the local populace, it must be remembered that indications
of support for one side or another may not reflect true
political inclinations so much as a desire to avoid or
minimize violence. The African churches in Namibia exert
a strong influence on the attitudes of a very large number
of the Non-Whites, including those in the BOA. While the
churches generally support SWAPO goals, they are opposed
to violence, and this attitude has carried over to much of
the population. There have also been reports of civilian
cooperation with the security forces which appear to have
been motivated more by desires to help the security forces
finish their operations in the immediate vicinity so they
would leave, rather than having been founded in a sincere
animosity towards the guerrillas. Although the soldier
with the gun tends to command the respect of the civilian
populace under his immediate authority, the nature of that
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respect and its long term implications are ultimately
determined by the manner in which that authority is exercised.
Despite frequent SWAPO claims of South African
atrocities against civilians in the BOA, it would appear
that the harshness of the situation in Namibia is perhaps
less than in most other counterinsurgencies , although that
may not have much meaning or comfort for the BOA population.
More odious to the Africans perhaps was the sudden appearance
of large numbers of White troops who have since exerted great
control over their lives while displaying a collective
attitude of frequently ill-concealed contempt. It must be
remembered that the White presence in the areas which
comprise the BOA was almost non-existent a little more than
ten years ago
.
The Non-White security forces are also sometimes
viewed with trepidation. The high morale of the ethnic
battalions was noted above. Unfortunately, this high
morale has sometimes manifested itself as overzealousness
in controlling the local population. The Home Guards
mentioned previously have apparently earned the worst
reputation of all as a result of their lack of discipline
and frequent incidents of belligerent drunkeness and
302
apparently indiscriminate abuse of civilians. In light
of the foregoing, even if individuals in the civilian
302J Bishop James Kauluma, "Things stay the same says
Bishop," interview by Karen Rothmeyer, Southern Africa , April
1978, p. 22; Allen Pizzey, "Mission pupils on the run with




population have no first hand knowledge of security force
atrocities, their general perceptions of the security forces
might make them receptive to such claims by 3WAP0
.
While SWAPO/PLAN may be more guilty of atrocities
than the security forces, and although these incidents
are touted as prime examples of SWAPO barbarism, their
negative effect on the population may be less damaging to
SWAPO objectives than the reports of security force abuses
are to theirs. Selective terrorism is targeted against
representatives of the homeland administrations which, at
least in Ovamboland, are generally held in low regard.
Although many mass abductions are bonafide kidnappings, a
good portion of them have occurred under questionable
circumstances, especially those involving young people who
may have followed PLAN soldiers on their own free will. Acts
of blind terrorism (e.g., landmines), while directly attribut-
able to FLAN, may also be mitigated somewhat in African eyes
by a point of view in which they are seen as an unfortunate
aspect of a war for which South Africa is ultimately
responsible.
Although some of the foregoing rationale for weighting
the public opinion more heavily against the security forces
than PLAN may be a bit flimsy, the bottom line is that there
are at least JO, 000 Namibian refugees in Angola and Zambia,
30 3
and emigration is continuing. -' ^hile some of these are
3
-^"Alleged SWAPO crossers," The Windhoek Advertiser ,
19 September 1978, p. 2, JPRS.SA '
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families of PLAN soldiers, most of them appear to have left
Namibia more to get away from South African control than to
actively participate in SWAPO ' s struggle. This is supported to
a certain extent by numerous reports of Angolan and Namibian
abductees being pressed into service with PLAN, which
would indicate that few of the available refugees are
joining.
The reception of the South African civic action
programs and legal reforms within the civilian populace
is also questionable. The degrees to which these are
perceived as crash programs with ulterior motives and
solely as the result of international and nationalist
pressures is unknown, although these factors worked against
30 ^the Portuguese in their colonies. ^ Although there is no
proof, it is likely that the beneficiaries of much of the
largess reported earlier are Africans tied to organizations
popularly perceived as pro-administration. Additionally,
the normal disparaging attitudes towards rural Africans by
the majority of the SADF who aren't directly involved in
civic action, especially when displayed under arms on
patrol, and the delays between passage and implementation
of some legal reforms have probably limited the overall
positive potential of these programs. Finally, some knowl-
edgeable South African observers have opined that despite
30^FBIS,SA




its breadth, the overall civic action program has been less
successful than intended.
In summary, it would appear that SWAPO has been
able to achieve more politically among the civilian
population through propaganda and terrorism than South
Africa has with civic action, legal reform and fairly
good internal security, although this may be less true in
non-Ovambo areas
.




A. PURPOSE AND SCOPE
The purpose of this section is to examine several
internal, non-military factors and variables in the Namibian
equation and assess their individual potentials for causing
violent conflict of a nature that would invite participation
by external actors. Topics which will be discussed are:
1. The platforms and bases of support for the primary
political bodies and their images among the population as
a whole.
2. The attitudes of the Whites towards the Africans,
power-sharing, and majority role, and their likely post-
independence reactions.
3. The nature of ethnicity in Namibia and the
possibilities for post-independence primordial violence.
b. The African educational deficiencies and their
impact on post-independence stability.
5. The structure and focus of the current economy, the
natures of possible post-independence economics and
attitudes and their potentials for popular frustration and
strif e,
6. The military, economic, and political aspects of
the ultimate sovereignty of Walvis Bay.
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B. THE POLITICAL CONTENDERS
The increasing political consciousness of the Namibian
Non-White in the last 15 years combined with the ethnic
heterogeneity of the population has given rise to almost
^0 political parties and interest groups. Most of these
parties have specific ethnic orientations, are quite small,
and are based on limited platforms. With the approach of
actual elections, most of this hodge-podge realized the
hopelessness of many of the individual situations. The
trend in the last two years has been towards the formation
of coalitions or alliances capable of greater political
clout. These unions have occurred across ethnic and ideo-
logical lines. With the exception of SWAPO , all the important
political forces in the territory are now alliances of one
form or another.
The rest of this subsection will be devoted to a
discussion of the organizations, platforms, and popular
support of the four most significant political bodies in
Namibia. These are the revolutionary South West Africa
People's organization, the centrist Namibian National Front,
the conservative Democratic Turnhalle Alliance, and the very
conservative Action Front for Retention of Turnhalle
Principles.
1 . The South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO)
a. Party Organization
Although SWAPO theoretically functions as a
single organization within and outside Namibia, there are
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actually several factions with different political roles.
The external wing of SWAPO (SWAPO External) is headquartered
in Luanda, Angola, is quite militant, and has been the sub-
ject of most of the discussion on SWAPO in this paper thus
far. This faction looks after all aspects of international
relations, finances, and negotiations associated with SWAPO '
s
pursuit of Namibian independence. This faction also directs
the guerrilla activities of PLAN and either conducts or
arranges for training and education of young Namibians who
will fill professional and administrative roles in an
independent Namibia. Under President Nujoma and a Central
Committee, SWAPO External functions essentially as a
government-in-exile. The other SWAPO factions are inside
Namibia.
The SWAPO Youth League can be described as
radical and somewhat militant. It is a self-governing
federal body headquartered in Windhoek. Although it
includes some who aren't actually SWAPO members, its
program is based on lines set down by SWAPO. It advocates
liberation through struggle and a revolutionary political
orientation. A large portion of the Namibians who have
left the territory to join the external struggle have either
been members of the SWAPO Youth League or were recruited or
307influenced by it.
^ 'Totemeyer, p. 64
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The rest of the internal organization, 37JAP0
Internal, exists essentially in two groups although there
apparently isn't any administrative differentiation. The
primary function of SWAPO Internal is to conduct political
activity in order to broaden SWAPO' s support base within
Namibia. One group's presence is primarily in Ovamboland,
and to a much lesser extent, in Caprivi.-^ The other group,
which includes the leadership of SWAPO Internal, the National
Executive, is headquartered in Windhoek and draws its support
from contract workers at mines and in the urban areas
(primarily Ovambo) and from a multi-ethnic cross-section of
African professionals, students, and religious leaders.
SWAPO Internal's political approach to struggle and resistance
has remained relatively moderate in order to retain legal
status within the territory. This can also be attributed
in some degree to police harrassment of the leadership to
the point where many have left the territory, and to close
monitoring and restrictions of political activity imposed
by the South African administration, especially in the BOA.
Another factor is the strong influence of the various African
churches. As a whole, Africans in Namibia are devout
christians. The churches have actively promoted the SWAPO
goals of independence, but have rejected violence as a means
of achievement and Marxism as an ideology. These views have





Although SWAPO External has produced a national
program and SWAPO Internal has produced a set of constitutional
proposals, both of which address the administration and
development of an independent Namibia, they are both a
few years old and many points in these statements haven't
received the clarification that many of those involved in
the Namibian situation would like to see, especially in
light of the increasingly radical tone of SWAPO External's
public statements. This absence of specific information
may stem from either a conscious effort by the SWAPO
leadership to mask their intentions for fear of losing
Western support in negotiations or the simple lack of a
309
comprehensive program, as charged by many dissidents.
If the later is the case, it may reflect either a fear that
the process of formulating a specific plan of action might
split the party before independence, an all-consuming focus
310
on the liberation process itself as once reported in Zamcia,
TL1
uncertainty because of the number of variables involved,-'
or a combination of these. In any event, those aspects of
a platform which SWAPO has announced have been made under
^ ^Abrahams, p.l
310ARB, October 1-31, 19?6, p. ^20^
^i:LShafashike Kahana, Deputy Representative, SWAPO
Permanent Observer Mission to the U.N. , interview with the
author, 1 August 1978, New York, N.Y.
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the assumption that it will be the controlling political
power in the Namibia and will not need to compromise or
.
. 312
enter into a political coalition. J
With respect to popular perceptions of SWAPO
,
the following list includes the more important points of
those post-independence projections which it has announced
313publicly at one or another. J J
(1) A national system of local government
which rejects the principles of homelands or regionalism
based solely on ethnic affiliations, and rejection of the
authority of traditional leaders,
(2) A raceless society with a place for
everybody, but on SWAPO terms only. SWAPO fully expects
most Whites will leave.
(3) Termination of relations with South
Africa until it becomes truly democratic.
{W) Those having opposed the struggle will be
condemned as traitors.
(5) Planning and development of the economy
will be governed by the principles of scientific socialism.
(6) The economic equalization of all
according to merit.
(7) Private ownership of property and means
of production will be allowed only if it serves the interests
312IMd.




of the people. Home ownership and monetary savings will
not be affected.
(8) State ownership of natural resources,
all infrastructure, and the media.
(9) Land will be given to the tillers and
the government will assist farmers in the organization of
cooperatives. Those who acquired land prior to independence
will be required to enter into new agreements which will de-
fine the terms by which the land could be owned.
(10) The banking system will be owned by the
people.
(11) Education will be free and compulsory.
(12) The inclusion of Walvis Bay as an integral
part of Namibia.
SWAPO Externa 's public pronouncements and its
discussion of political concepts have taken on more of a
Marxist tone since it increased its association with the
Soviet Union and Cuba. Although the language of African
liberation draws heavily on Marxist terminology, the
changes in SWAPO ' s character are noteworthy, as it was
previously unaligned and its ideology was relatively
moderate in nature. While it isn't clear whether this
reflects a sincere change in political attitude, it has




The degree of popular political support for
SWAPO in Namibia can only be addressed in general terms.
Based on all accounts, it is safe to say that in an open
election SWAPO would garner more votes than any other party.
Whether or not this support would extend to a majority of
all votes isn't clear. It is generally expected that
SWAPO would attract a large majority of the Ovambo voters.
SWAPO also appears to have substantial minority support
among the Nama, the Damara, and the Caprivians. Some of
the factors which impact on SWAPO popularity or which may
serve as partial barometers are presented in the following
paragraphs
.
Despite SWAPO calls to boycott and accepting
charges of widespread voter intimidation, the voter turn-
out in the recent internal elections organized by South
Africa was almost 90%. Compared to turn-outs of 2% in 1973
and 55% in 1975 for Ovamboland elections held under similar
conditions , this high figure must reflect some erosion of
SWAPO popular support.
The civic action programs in the BOA have surely
had some positive effect on South Africa's image (and, by
association, DTA's) relative to that of SWAPO ' s among the
local population.
^ Clive Cowley, "Political parties in SWA/Namibia,"
Bulletin , Vol. 16, No. Ur 8c 5, 1978, p. 153
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If active support by the people v/ould have
facilitated the establishment of a greater and more
effective guerrilla presence in Ovamboland, then the failure
to do so may indicate a less-than-advertised popularity.
As noted in other places however, this is also due to a more
passive political attitude internally and to pragmatic
self -survival in light of the security force presence.
SWAPO political objectives are probably still supported by
the majority and free polling would probably reflect this.
Allegations of PLAN participation in numerous
atrocities in Angola against Kwanyama Ovambo supporters of
UNITA, accompanied by the presence in the BOA of ^0,000
Angolan refugees from this fighting may have cost SWAPO
some support among the Namibian Kwanyana, the largest tribe
of the Ovambo
.
Outside the BOA, although there is still a long
way to go, the legal reforms of the past few years have pro-
bably softened some Non-White attitudes towards South Africa,
at the expense of SWAPO.
With the media controlled by South Africa
largely for the benefit of the DTA, the constant barrage
of adverse propaganda depicting SWAPO as a communist Ovambo
organization, highlighted by President Nujoma's statement
that SWAPO was not fighting for majority rule but rather to
seize power, ^ has also surely had some effect. Reports
^
*
"SWAPO nails its colors to the mast," Johannesburg
The Star , 27 February 1978, p. Ik, in JPRS.SA
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SWAPO plans to eliminate the political opposition and to
eliminate the Herero have been taken at face value by
many. J With most of its leadership detained, harrassed,
or in exile, SWAPO Internal has been unable to mount an
effective campaign to counter this propaganda.
SWAPO intransigence in coming to terms on the
details of an agreement for U.N. supervision of elections,
while based in part on mistrust of South African intentions,
may also reflect less than complete confidence in its
ability to poll a clear majority of votes. It has con-
tributed to a growing impression among many in Namibia
that SWAPO may increasingly favor revolution just for the
sake of revolution. It has also created some annoyance
with SWAPO leadership on the part of some leaders of front-
line states and a feeling that SWAPO may be letting
opportunities and events pass it by.
Despite both the foregoing and its general lack
of military success, SWAPO still draws heavy Ovambo
support and is viewed by many others as the torch-bearer
of Namibian independence. SWAPO has taken up arms while
the other parties have not. SWAPO has been recognized by
the U.N. as the sole authentic representative of the
Namibian people while the others have not. These factors,
together with the promises of immediate social and economic
equalization and the vituperance of the SWAFO/South African




is especially appealing to those who have experienced the
harshest aspects of apartheid (contract laborers) and to
many of those whose rising expectations have been most
frustrated (students, professional people). In many non-
Ovambo ethnic groups it is accepted that while the trad-
itional leaders have the support of a majority of the older
population, SWAPO has the support of a majority of the
younger population.
The recent extensive coverage of the 1976
dissension in SWAPO External in Zambia was expected to
adversely affect SWAPO' s base of support, but apparently
this hasn't happened. While the dissension obviously
hindered the military struggle, there is still sufficient
agreement over objections for the party to have retained
most of its internal and international support.
There has also been some recent trepidation on
the part of church leaders over alleged violence against
civilians by PLAN and the increasing Marxist tone of SWAPO
External. The churches have withheld any definitely ad-
verse comment however, on the grounds there hasn't been
sufficient evidence in either case to warrant a change
in position. 317
J Anglican, Catholic, Lutheran churches express
viewpoint," Johannesburg, The Star , 21 February 1978, p.
20, in JPRS , SA ; Caryle Murphy, "Namibian Church Leaders
Reexamine Ties with Guerrillas," The Washington Post ,
January 1979. p. A15
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2. The Namibian National Front (NNF)
a. Organization
The NNF is a coalition of six parties and ethnic
factions. Another party, the SWAPO Democrats, has signed a
joint statement with NNF stating that the SWAPO Democrats
were in full and unqualified agreement with the NNF, although
they apparently stopped short of formally joining the coalition
The SWAPO Democrats was formed by some of the SWAPO leaders
imprisoned in Zambia in 1976.
b. Platform318
The NNF envisages a vote for all adults, a
democratic system of government, and an independent
judiciary. The NNF pledges to secure national unity and
territorial integrity in a unitary state, but allows for
the establishment of two to five provincial councils.
It proposes a unicameral parliament as the
supreme legislative body. A third o'f the members would
be elected in single-member constituencies, while another
third of the seats would be divided among political parties
,
in direct proportion to their share of the total vote in
a general election. Together, such members would
constitute an electoral college, which would allocate the
remaining one-third of seats to minority groups.
The executive would consist of a figure-head
president, a prime minister and a cabinet.
^Cowley, p. 151 ; "NNF issues policy declaration on




The NNF supports the principles of a mixed
economy, with both public and private participation, pro-
vided that the latter excludes unhealthy monopolies and
"other forms of abuse." The private sector would be
closely involved with the state in national development.
Progressive taxation is envisioned as a measure
to eliminate "excessive accumulation of economic means"
and to accomplish an equitable distribution of wealth.
Expropriation or nationalization would be the exception
rather than the rule, it would only take place in the
national interest and fair compensation would be paid.
The NNF rejects any regionalism of the
Namibian state in homelands in whatever form it may occur.
Walvis Bay is to be retained as part and parcel
of Namibia.
Education will be compulsory for all Namibians
without discrimination, with equality of opportunity in
schooling.
c. Popular Support
Since the NNF boycotted the recent internal
elections there are no real measures of its base of suppor*.
It is felt to have the support of about half the Basters
and Coloureds, and perhaps a majority of the Damara. It has
minority support within the Herero and the Nama, and to a
much lesser degree among the Whites. As presently con-
stituted, NNF has very little support from the Ovambo , but
this could change dramatically if the SWAPO Democrats are
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able to attract a large Ovambo following and if they can
be persuaded to close ranks with the NNF. Of the three
major political coalitions, NNF has the most potential for
growth. A major obstacle in this growth is a serious lack
319
of financing. •* *
Most criticism of NNF policies has come from
the political right, and has included the following charges:
(1) The NNF has mistakenly associated
ethnicity with apartheid and therefore is wrong in
rejecting it.
(2) The NNF economic policies will strangle
large companies, frighten away potential investors, and
cause national income to shrink.
(3) Progressive income taxes will reduce
production and growth incentives.
W The NNF and SWAPO have the same goals,
their only difference being the method of obtaining them.
Criticism from more radical political opposition
usually depicts NNF as lacking liberationist authenticity.
3. The Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA)
a. Organization
The DTA was formed in October 1977 just prior
to South Africa's dissolution of the Turnhalle Constitutional
Conference. When the all-White National Party refused to
ratify the constitutional proposals of the Turnhalle





left the party and established the Republican Party. He
then called upon the conference representatives of all the
ethnic groups to form political organizations and join in
an electoral alliance to seek election on the basis of the
draft constitution of the conference. This was done, and the





The DTA proposes a multi-ethnic government on
the first tier and representative authorities for ethnic
groups on the second tier. In a division of powers between
the two tiers, the former would deal with matters of national
importance, the latter with affairs of community concern. The
bulk of powers would be allocated to the central government.
Deputies to the national assembly would not be
elected directly. Instead elections would be held for
ethnic authorities, which would be constituted as electoral
colleges, to choose their deputies to the national assembly.
The eleven ethnic communities would be given equal weight in
the assembly, in effect one vote each, with the size of their
deputations determined on a sliding scale related to their
populations. If such arrangements were found to deny repre-
sentation to some of the people, possibly on the grounds that
they defied or opposed ethnic classification, the national
assembly would institute an electoral college or colleges
for them.
320ARB, October 1-31, 1977, p. ^616
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In consultation with their representative
authorities, ethnic deputations to the national assembly
would each appoint a minister, not necessarily from their
own ethnic group, as well as a deputy-minister from their
own ranks.
Likewise the power to dismiss ministers, or
deputies to the national assembly, would rest exclusively
with ethnic groups.
Both the national assembly and the council of
ministers would make decisions on a basis of consensus
unless they agreed in advance to a majority vote. A single
deputation in the assembly or a minister in the council of
ministers, would be able to veto a decision.
The DTA proposes a bill of fundamental rights
,
as part of the constitution, with the removal of racial
discrimination and the protection of ethnic identity as
prime objectives.
Finally, the DTA supports the principle of a
free economy, with maximum participation in the private
sector and government involvement only where necessary.
c. Popular Support
The DTA is the primary political opposition to
SWAPO. It draws primarily on the conservative, traditional
elements in Namibia and has little support from the youth
or the detribalized. The majority of its supporters are
relatively unsophisticated and live primarily in rural
areas. In terms of variety, the DTA draws upon a wider
ethnic base of support than any other party or alliance.
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It appears to hold majority support among the Herero and
the Kavango , and support from about half the Coloureds, the
Basters, and the Caprivians. It holds some minority support
among the Whites, the Nama, and the Ovambo . It apparently
321has little support from the Damara.
The DTA has received tremendous financial
support allegedly from West Germany and South Africa. ^
Criticism of the DTA by its more liberal
political opposition has generally included the following
charges
:
(1) The emphasis of ethnic autonomy in the
second tier of government is only cosmetically different
from the concept of bantus tans or the Odendaal Plan and
will tend to perpetuate racism and apartheid and promote
civil unrest.
(2) The principle of consensus in the
central government will make it hard to act as a nation and
there will be little chance of changing the laws that
facilitate White dominance.
(3) The ministers of the central government
will be at the mercy of the ethnic groups from which they
came.
(^) The unqualified capitalist economic pro-
gram will perpetuate the profits of those currently monopolizing
321Cowley, p. 1^7
3 Pretoria Funded Namibia Press," Africa Report ,
January-February 1979 » p. 25
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the means of production to the detriment of the African
population.
(5) DTA's conservative opposition, AKTUR, has
charged DTA with trying to lead the country down the path
323
to racial integration. *
Despite the overwhelming vote it received in the
recent internal elections, DTA's image, at least inter-
nationally and among the opposition, was tarnished con-
siderably. Instances of varying degrees of intimidation
were frequently reported during the long registration
process. There were numerous reports of disruption of
opposition political meetings by DTA members. The massive
funding for DTA and its domination of the media heightened
suspicions of South African collusion. Finally, during
the election, many of the illiterate apparently received
32^
excessive "help" in marking their ballots.
There is a growing concern among some of the
Non-White leaders in the DTA that ethnicity and consensus
have been over-emphasized and that the DTA platform should
be changed. Most of the rest of the Non-White DTA leaders
feel that the ethnic measures should be viewed as trans-
itional in nature and they foresee an eventual abolition
^
-'June Goodwin, "Namibian Elections: World Credibility
Gap Widening," Christian Science Monitor , k December 1978
,
p. 6
3 Chege Mbitiru, "Kenyan reporter gives first-hand
account on elections," Nairobi Daily Nation , 11 December




of the measures. J Many of the Non-White leaders also
expect that many Whites will eventually leave the country
even under a DTA government, as the anticipated evolution
into a non-racial state under black majority rule will
probably be unacceptable to many of them.
4. The Action Front for Retention of Turnhalle
Principles (AKTUR)
a. Organization
AKTUR was formed when the Whites -only National
Party was excluded from the DTA after the dissolution of
the Turnhalle Constitutional Conference. In addition to
the National Party, its members include deeply conservative
Whites from the old United Party, and some Coloured and
Basters.
b. Platform
AKTUR proposes basically the same system of
government as the DTA. The difference is to be found in
emphasis and attitude. AKTUR would give fewer powers to
the multi-ethnic central government, more to the second-tier
representative authorities for ethnic groups, where it could
continue to resist social desegregation if it retained
control of the White authority. It is prepared to accept
the development of residential suburbs. Similarly it argues
that DTA policy would lead to the desegregation of hospitals,




schools and other public institutions. In essence AKTUR
seeks to retain aspects of White exclusivity and privilege
in a situation of change which it does not fully agree
with. 327
c. Popular Support
Based on the results of the recent internal
elections, AKTUR has very substantial support among the
White population, and surprising minorities in the Coloured
and Baster groups. Although it is doubtful that this support
will grow, it probably will not decrease any in a U.N.
supervised election either. On the other hand, DTA's recent
election results will be subject to very considerable
erosion to SWAPO and the NNF
.
5- Summary
In a fair election it is quite likely that none
of the political bodies discussed here would be able to
garner a dominant majority position. Although there are
possibilities for majority coalitions (SWAPO/NNF, DTA/
AKTUR, and to a lesser extent, DTA/NNF) , the remaining
sizable minorities in each case would be sufficiently at
odds with the basic political philosophy of the majority as
to create a very unstable situation. This eventuality gains
credibility when the virtually non-existent track record of
multi-party states in Africa is taken into consideration.
Despite this, since the Whites would probably offer the
stiffest resistance to political compromise among the
327Cowley, p. 1^6

conservative elements, their absence might afford reasonable
expectations of tentative accomodation among the Africans.
C. MITE ATTITUDES AND PERCEPTIONS
In trying to come to grips with the attitudes and
perceptions of Namibian Whites towards independence under
the different systems proposed by the main political bodies,
the separation of reality from propaganda is a problem
once again. Some reports speak glowingly of the progress
of racial reconciliation in Namibia, while others urgently
protest against integration and project dire circumstances
ahead. As will be seen, it is felt the latter case is
closer to the truth of the general White perceptions.
Further, there is a close building-block relationship
between propaganda and reality, as White anxiety tends to
facilitate the acceptance of propaganda as reality, thereby
distorting the perceptual basis against which further and
more strident propaganda is received and evaluated.
Before discussing the nature of racial propaganda in
Namibia and its apparent effects on White perceptions , the
inherited racial attitudes of the Whites need to be
addressed briefly.
1. The Afrikaners
The Afrikaner Herrenvolk mentality has been distilled
through centuries of rationalizing White racial domination
and a long struggle for Afrikaner survival which has
assumed mythical and even religious proportions in
Afrikaner history. One end result has been the general
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Afrikaner view that not only do Africans on the whole
suffer flaws in their intelligence and character make-ups
which have precluded economic and cultural advances
parallel to the Afrikaner, but that they are somehow
impure and that left to their own, they are also naturally
unclean and somewhat offensive physically and that close
contact with them should be minimized. Another result has
been the desire to maintain the Afrikaner identity as an
ethnic group and as a nation. The Afrikaner is intensely
proud of what he perceives himself to be and he doesn't
want to lose his identity through submergence in a non-
racial state. While the foregoing might seem extreme
compared to most of the pronouncements currently emanating
from Namibian and South African sources and while the
progress of some urban and educated Africans is noted
with paternalistic pride, interviews with presumably
sophisticated Afrikaners have left the author with the
impression that these are true root feelings, frequently
hidden by only a thin veneer of tolerent enlightenment. c
Finally, from his position of dominance and self-assured
superiority, the Afrikaner (all Whites for that matter) has
long assumed that the African wanted to emulate him and was
genuinely honored when he was allowed to associate with the
^ Mbitiru: Venter taped correspondence; Redelinghuys
interview; David Steward, Counsellor, South African Mission
to U.N. , New York, in interview with author, 1 August 1978
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Whites and partake of their advanced economic or cultural
329development in some- way. Now that modern African
nationalism has given the lie to this last assumption and
has revealed the African resentment and hatred which was
suppressed for so long, the traits of the Afrikaner character
discussed above have, in Namibia, generally precluded
both an honest acceptance and a sincere attempt to adapt
to the approaching independence and the roles of equality
the Non-Whites intend to claim for themselves.
The vast majority of Namibian Afrikaners now support
the AKTUR political coalition. Indications of the gut level
reaction of most Afrikaners to the tone of the territory's
movement towards independence have included the desertion
of Afrikaners from the DTA to AKTUR after DTA advocated
330that all residential areas be opened to all races
,
attacks on mixed couples (usually German or English-
331
speaking Whites) by gangs of Afrikaner youths in Windhoek, J
AKTUR publication of a picture of the Administrator-General
(viewed as too liberal by most Afrikaners) kissing the cheek
of an African girl at a debutante ball , -"^ and an AKTUR
^ ^Ottile Abrahams, The Namibian Review , No. 3, March
1977, p. 8,9
33 "Councillor responds to "fence-sitter" accusation,"
The Windhoek Advertiser , 10 January 1978, p. 1,2, in JPRS ,SA
" Eric Marsden, "DTA hopes to dominate assembly,"




election campaign poster depicting a pretty, teen-aged
White girl sitting in a field of wild flowers, with the
caption, "for her sake."
It is expected that approximately 30,000 South
African Afrikaners will return to South Africa after
independence, regardless of the power structure of the new
government. It is the author's opinion that many more will
eventually follow, even if a conservative DTA government
is formed, as the changing situation will eventually prove
unacceptable to their cultural sensitivities.
2. The Germans
The Germans carry a legacy of colonial brutality
which exceeds anything demonstrated by the South Africians
in Namibia. The Germans have also heartily supported
apartheid. In spite of this, the Germans don't appear to
have clouded the issues of White dominance and African
subjugation with the same stubborn emotionalism the
Afrikaner has. The Germans have viewed the Africans simply
as a group of people who could be forced into their service
and kept there with no attempt to rationalize this relation-
ship. There has been much less reluctance to work side-by-
side with the African on the German ranch, and African or
Coloured mistresses apparently don't raise German eyebrows.
Germans throughout the world are noted as pragmatic.
In Namibia they have to be. Their roots in Namibia are
deeper than the Afrikaners and their homeland is much
further removed geographically. The German appears better
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suited than the Afrikaner to accept most of the equalizing
changes which will come his way, provided there will still
be room for a reasonable degree of free enterprise
,
private property and freedom from harassment. German schools
in Windhoek now accept African students and the first mixed
333
marriage recently took place. JJ
Under a SWAPO government most Germans now feel they
would probably be forced to leave the new country. In part-
icular, SWAPO has long made a specific point of excessive
German ranch lands and the need for a more equitable dis-
tribution. Most German farmers now believe that if SWAPO




and driven out. J This won't happen without lent
resistance from at least some of the farmers.
3. The English-speaking
The attitude of the small English-speaking White
population in Namibia towards the ascendancy of African
power is similar to that of the Germans. As businessmen
they have enjoyed the profitability that apartheid afforded
them, but they are willing to continue without it under the
same conditions as the Germans. With relatively little
333- The End of the Biond Pieds Noirs," Brussels Special
27 September 1978, p. ^2,^3. JPRS.SA translation
^ ARBi January 1-31, 1976, p. 3909; F3IS.SA , 21 Decern
1976, p. E6; FBIS ,SA , 25 October 1977 , p. 27; 'Nujoma ex-
pulsions," Paris Valeuis Actuelles , 20 November 1978, p. 52,
JPRS ,SA translation
^"The End of the Blond Pieds Noirs"
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involvement in agriculture, the English-speaking Whites
don't suffer from dispossession anxieties the way the other
Whites do. •
k. Collective Attitudes
Although many Whites may feel willing to accept
any situation short of a SWAPO government, there is still
considerable foot-dragging in preparations at this point.
The administration has been slow to implement decisions of
its own and of the constitutional conference for dismantling
apartheid. After measures are put into effect, the Whites
soon find ways to circumvent them. Both Afrikaner and
German farmers see the land won and developed by their fore-
fathers as being snatched from them. There is even some
bitterness towards Pretoria for appeasement at their
expense
.
After the urban bombings in December, side arms
on White civilians have apparently become common and urban
streets are almost deserted at night. For every SWAPO claim
that they are willing to accept and protect the Whites in a
SWAPO -organized society, there is also a threat that all Whites
must go. The revolutionary violence against the Whites in
Zaire and Rhodesia has been a depressing reinforcement of
the worst fears of vengeful African guerrilas let loose
among White civilians.
The White exodus in both Angola and Mozambique exempli
the likely future. This occurred in Mozambique despite both
constant FRELIMO assurances before and after independence
200

and a marked lack of violence against Whites. Unassuaged
anxieties and a refusal to accept the degradation of equal-
ization were the overriding considerations. ^ These factors
probably would have even greater impact in Namibia, as SWAPO
hasn't been nearly as conciliatory towards the Whites as
FRELIMO was and the Whites maintain a position of greater
elevation and separation than did the Portuguese.
Events of the past year in Zambia may have oeen even
more unsettling to the Whites. The Zambian government,
which bills itself as non-racial and is closer to the NNF
model than the DTA, has been unable or even unwilling to
control crime and violence against Whites in the copper belt,
337
on the farms, and in Lusaka. •" The facts that the level of
harassment actually wasn't great and that Africans have
suffered also probably received little notice in Namibia.
The White Namibians , conservative and frightened as a whole,
are easily influenced by adverse propaganda.
-^ Allen Isaacman, "Mozambique Since Independence,"
Africa Report , July-August 1978, p. Li-
-^'John Burrell , "As in Zaire, White exodus hurts Zambia's
copper belt," Christian Science Monitor , 27 June 1978, p. 9;
"Reflections of increased crime: White exodus feared,"
Johannesburg The Star , 17 July 1978, p. 17, in JPRS.SA ;
Lawrence Pintak, "Angry White Farmers threaten to burn crops
if Zambia does not halt guerrilla attacks," London Times ,
13 November 1978, p. 7; "White farmers can pack and go
Dr. Kaunda Says," London Times , 28 November 1978, p. 10
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D. ETHNIC DIVERSITY AND PRIMORDIAL CONFLICT
There has been a great deal of comment on the ethnic
diversity of the Namibian population and its impact on the
pending independence. The subject has generally been
addressed within two contexts. The first is that of
the legitimacy of SWAPO's claim of representation of the
interests of the Namibian popular majority and the dissent-
ing claims of various competing ethnic and political
groups. This has already been discussed to some extent
and will only be decided by a fair election. The second
context is with respect to the prospects for post-independence
stability, regardless of the ultimate governmental structure.
The scope and passion of these claims and projections tend to
vary with the political interests of the different advocates
and are frequently contradictory. In this subsection one
aspect of this subject will be discussed--the prospects for
primordial violence among Non-Whites in Namibia.
In order to focus exclusively on the Non-White inter-
ethnic attitudes and to project their possible intensities
if given free reign, consideration of any mitigating in-
fluence of White control or counteraction has been minimized
-^ Theoretical background for this discussion was drawn
from Clifford Geertz, "The Integrative Revolution," in Old
Societies and New States , ed. by Clifford Geertz, (London,
U.K.: Collier-Macmillan Ltd. , 1963) , and Irving L. Markovitz
,
Power and Class in Africa, (Englewood Cliffs, N.J".: Prentice-
Hall, Inc.
, 1977) , p. 110-119
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or omitted. This should not be taken as an implied
forecast that Whites won't have any role in an independent
Namibia.
1. The History of Ethnic Conflict
South Africa has generally characterized Namibia's
history as one of chaos and genocide which resulted from
ethnic differences which placed the different groups
"poles apart in traditions, customs, and culture. "33S Tn e
argument continued that despite the passage of considerable
time, the forced integration of these disparate ethnic
groups into a single unit and the withdrawal of South
African authority would mean a return to the bloody disorder
of their history, as supported by the course of events in
many other African countries.
In relating the current situation to African history
in Namibia, the groups which were antagonistic towards each
other in the 19th century (Herero and Nama) appear to have
34l
resolved their differences long ago. The group which
now allegedly seeks to dominate all the others, the Ovambo
,
was historically uninvolved in ethnic warfare and had very
little contact of any kind with the other groups. The
Damara, who were enslaved by both the Herero and the Nama,
have indicated through heavy support for the NN? that they
don't harbor significant ethnic anxieties. Hence, historical





^-First, p. 31, 32 203

Namibian attitudes. The only factor which has historical
roots seems to be the Herero sense of its history of
martyred struggle against colonization. The feeling among
conservative Herero is that: l) except for the Nama, no
other group lifted a finger against the Germans and that
until recently, no other group had resisted the South
African administration to the extent they had; and 2) If
the Herero hadn't been decimated in the German War, their
population would be much greater than it is now and they
would be accorded a greater role in Namibia's future.
Therefore, they feel they deserve extra consideration and
3^2
are reluctant to subordinate themselves to another group.
2. The South African Administration and Ethnic Attitudes
Since the suppression of the 190^-1907 rebellions,
there has been an absence, until recently, of anything
which could be construed as violence among the Namibian
Non-White ethnic groups. The South Africans are partially
correct in their assertions that this has been due to their
administration and control of the Africans as this has
included the generally drastic reduction in the stocks of
cattle owned by Non-Whites, the inability of most Non-Whites
to own land, the segregation first into reserves and later
into homelands, and the restrictions on mobility imposed by
the pass laws. Thus, not only were the traditional issues
of ethnic conflict tremendously suppressed, but the
3^2 .y Tjamuaha interview
204

possibilities for contact and antagonism in any form among
the various ethnic groups were drastically reduced. At the
same time however, the prevalent ethnic isolation and
laudatory administration propaganda associated with the
homelands and separate development policies greatly rein-
forced the ethnic identifications of the various groups.
Despite this, through lack of issues and contacts, ethnic
antagonism among the groups withered. It eventually paled
in comparison to an increasingly intense fear and resentment
of the Whites. The key question will be how well the art-
itif ically intensified ethnic identities can cope with a
general lack of experience in group interaction when all
external restraints are removed.
The contract-labor system and the associated
residential compounds found at all sites of extensive
employment have tended to both heighten and diminish ethnic
sentiments. On the one hand, the sense of displacement and
alientation experienced by the individual laborers and the
ethnic grouping in the housing developments has led to a
reaching out and affiliation with others of similar back-
grounds and a conscious accentuation of their ethnic identity
to a greater extent than existed within their homeland.
Alternatively, it is these same enclaves and the transient
nature of most of their populations which have facilitated
the spread and intensification of SWAPO nationalism which
has increasingly transcended ethnic political differences,
205

especially among the younger and urban populations. Not
only have these concentrated bodies of uprooted males
provided fertile ground for nationalistic prosyletizing,
but the departing laborers have carried the message home to
areas legally inaccessible to most of the agitators.
It was in one of these urbanized black enclaves that
incidents of spontaneous, politically-related, ethnic vio-
lence occurred from February through April 1978 and resulted
in approximately 50 deaths and hundreds of injuries in
3^3Windhoek. J While the motives behind this violence were
essentially nationalistic (SWAPO vs. DTA) , the fact that the
participants were divided along ethnic lines (Ovambo vs.
Herero) has probably strengthened ethnic animosity and
anxiety (at least for the Herero) between the two groups.
Fanon has commented on the source of this aspect of
primordial violence in connection with the intensification
of nationalism. He attributed it to the African's constant
state of tension and his actual or conditioned inability to
relieve this tension through removal of the source— the
White colonizer. Thus, violence along ethnic lines becomes
a surrogate for violence against the real oppressor. If
3 3 "SWAPO- -DTA clash," Johannesburg The Star , 1 March
1978, p. 3, in JPRS.SA ; FBIS.SA , 8 March 1973, p. E^ ; M 31oody
battle rages as tribes clash at funeral," Monterey Peninsula
Herald , 9 April 1978, p. 1
3 Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Zarth (New York,
N.Y.: Grove Press, Inc. , 196l) J p. 5^
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this is so, the question of just how divisive these tendenc
i
are and how residual the effects of this induced primordial ism
will be once the real source of aggravation is removed
become more significant and harder to answer.
3. Primordialism within the Nationalistic Movement
As the pre-eminent nationalist movement, SWAPO claims
to have transcended primordial discord. To a certain degree
however, its history argues against this. In its original
forms, first as the OPC and then as the 0P0 , it was ex-
clusively an Ovambo-oriented organization. Many of its
leaders were also members of the National Executive Committee
of the South West African National Union (SWANU) , which
they expected to become the united national party. J The
name change from Ovambo People's Organization to South West
African People's Organization in i960 was politically
cosmetic and stemmed from influence and legitimacy rivalries
among the South West African petitioners at the L.N.
Recognizing the importance of the legitimacy that a
broad-based nationalism would confer, the leaders of various
nationalistic organizations have made numerous attempts at
political union (SWANLIF, NUDO , SWANUF , NNC , personal
^Gibson, p. 132
^ A 17 November 1959 letter from Mburumba Kerina at the
U.N. to Herman ja Toivo in South West Africa contained the
following instructions , "You see what I want to say is that do
not fallow the 0P0 when it is changed into (SWAPO) to be
dominated by other groups. Be very careful about this very
much.", as reported by Louw, p. 18
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agreements among leaders) which have either fallen short of
their objectives or. failed completely due to leadership
3/4,7
rivalries and ethnic disaffection.
With respect to SWAPO External, dissenting members
of its leadership have usually cited "tribalism" as one of
the reasons for their disenchantment.-^ SWAPO External's
touted ethnic diversity at the leadership level has also
frequently been discounted as a cosmetic ploy to lend
legitimacy to its claims of majority representation.
SWAPO Internal appears to have been much more
successful in projecting a non-ethnic image. It has drawn
support from various Non-White political organizations of
differing ethnic affiliations as well as individuals of
diverse ethnicity from the urban, intellectual, religious,
and youth categories.
The deaths of apparently thousands of Kwanyama Ovambo
at the hands of PLAN and FAPLA in Angola have stemmed more
from Kwanyama support for UNITA and refusal to join SWAPO
than from tribal animosities on the part of SWAPO, although
the Kwanyama probably wouldn't accept this reasoning now.
is unlikely that SWAPO retribution would carry over to
Kwanyama in Namibia in the future unless they were to actively
resist SWAPO authority.
3 7Gibson, p. 118-1^1; Duignan & Gann, p. 31
3^8 Gibson, p. 133
^ Duignan & Gann, p. 27; United Nations Department of
Political Affairs, p. 20-21; Andries Botha, SWAPO; Dialogue




k. Ethnicity in General
Outside SWAPO there is genuine apprehension among
some non-Ovambo groups that they will be dominated by the
Ovambos in a unitary Namibia. South Africa and the DTA
have played successfully on these fears. In 1975 there
was considerable promotion by many African leaders in
Namibia of an Ovambo-originated scheme for a separate
Ovambo nation, uniting the Angolan and Namibian Ovambo.
*
The creation of the ethnic battalions has frequently been
cited as not only having fanned the flames of ethnicity,
but as having given it teeth as well.
Ethnic cultural and social affiliations permeate
most facets of life in Namibia, but this is common in many
countries, and the nature of these associations don't
appear to hold potential for violence of a serious nature.
At this point, despite the Ovambo numbers and the
conservative Herero sense of deserved destiny, no Non-White
ethnic group is ascendent over another, either economically
or politically. Nor has any been in that position for a
long time. Should SWAPO attain a pre-eminent position in
an independent Namibian government, it would appear that only
the Herero might react immediately with serious civil violence.
As will be discussed in section VI however, if this should
occur, it probably would not escalate into a serious threat
to national stability.
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The educational system for Non-Whites in Namibia has
historically been grossly inadequate. As a result, the
educational level of the vast majority of those Non-Whites
who have received some education is extremely low. Despite
the instigation of some educational reform by the South
African administration in the past decade, Namibia will
still enter into independence with a Non-White majority
educationally unprepared to assume the governmental
authority and national responsibilities to which it will be
legally entitled.
The discussion in this sub-section will focus on the
Non-White educational dilemma in Namibia and the impact
it is likely to have on Namibia's post-independence
stability.
1. The Dilemma
When Allard Lowenstein visited Namibia in 1959 > there
were no in-country facilities for university level education
and it was against government policy to allow Africans to
attend "tribal colleges" in South Africa. Only one Non-
White had ever been granted permission to accept a scholar-
ship at a university outside South Africa. Only two
Africans had ever received undergraduate degrees (Mburumba
Kerina and Jariretunda Kozonguizi, both at the U.N. at that
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In 1959. there were a total of 9t969 Africans in
schools in the Police Zone (south of the Caprivi, Kaoko
,
Ovambo , and Kavango reserves). Of these, only 1,0 58 were
in state schools and the rest were in mission schools.
Only 3^7 students were above the equivalent of fifth grade
and there were no Non-Whites studying beyond the eleventh
grade. North of the Police Zone, including the populous
Ovambo reserve, there were no state schools and no students
352beyond the fifth grade." Hans Beukes, a Easter, summarized
the territory's apartheid education at the time as "...intended
to isolate Non-Whites from cultural contact and influence
3 53from the rest of the world. "^ The i960 report of the U.N.
committee on South West Africa summarized the educational
system as being directed towards "...preparing the Natives
as a source of cheap labor for the benefit of the Europeans.
-*-* Allard K. Lowenstein, Brutal Mandate , (New York,
N.Y.: Macmillan Co., 1962), p. 118; Ruth Sloan, The
Educated African , ed. Helen Kitchen (New York, N.Y.:
Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1962), p. 297-8; Gibson, o.
122,132









Despite South African improvements in the territorial
education system since then, it was estimated by the U.N. in
1977 that only two percent of the African students reach
secondary schools and that in 1973 there were probably only
ten African university graduates in all of Namibia.
"
It is interesting to note that the U.N. report just
mentioned didn't discuss the number of African graduates
there might be outside of Namibia. This is important
because until recently, virtually the only opportunities
for university schooling for Africans were outside South
Africa. SWAPO has pointed out that it has been responsible
for the education and training (presumed to mean university
level) of more Africans in 1^ years than South Africa has
in over 60 years. This was done through U.N. scholarships
and aid from various associations and foundations arranged
by SWAPO (SWAHU also for a time).^ If this is so, it
would seem that SWAPO would certainly have an attraction
for the brightest and most ambitious African students, the
"cream of the crop." Additionally, to carry this one step
further, the U.N.'s low estimate for graduates inside
Namibia would seem to indicate that most of these foreign-
educated graduates are remaining outside Namibia, most
likely in affiliation with SWAPO External.
^-^United Nations Department of Political Affairs
-*-> Hage G. Geingob, "Namibians Train for Tomorrow




In light of the crucial role normally played by an
educated elite in a nationalistic movement, it is to 3WAP0 '
s
credit that it has been able to accomplish as much as it
has despite the paucity of advanced educational opportun-
ities. Still, despite whatever managerial expertise
SWAPO leaders may have acquired through the administration
of an extensive and compartmentalized organization and an
apparent "corner on the market" of young educated Africans,
it is unlikely that they will be adequately prepared in
numbers or expertise to assume an exclusive role in direct-
ing the affairs of an independent Namibia.
Similarly, it is unknown but questionable as to how
well the functions of "tribal" governments, the Turnhalle
negotiations, and the heightened political organizing of
recent years have prepared the non-SWAPO Africans for roles
in national government and administration.
Some White Namibians now recognize their failure
in developing the Africans. " Duignan and Gann present
evidence of dependent Namibia being "over-governed" by a
vast bureaucracy. Disregarding a SWAPO solution, there
has been much discussion about a two or three-tiered
government following independence. When this is coupled
with the requirement to assume many national responsibilities
357, i^j-e Sh0U]_(i have built up African citizens,"
Windhoek Advertiser, 3 February 1978, p. 1, in J?RS ,SA
^ Duignan & Gann, p. 21
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now handled by South Africa, it would appear that the post-
independence bureaucracy could be quite extensive also.
By rights, the Non-White majority should participate
heavily in the administration of this bureaucracy and the
country. Unfortunately, given the number of positions
which should theoretically be open to them, there will most
certainly be a paucity of Non-Whites initially qualified to
fill them. This incapability to participate in the face of
opportunity is likely to produce widespread frustration.
In summary, the historic neglect of Non-White
education in Namibia will certainly diminish the prospects
for post-independence stability. In a moderate, multi-
racial government along the lines projected by the DTA, the
Non-Whites will be faced with an inability to compete on an
equal footing with the Whites in government administration.
A crucial aspect of this problem is the unknown degree or
intensity of Non-White expectations. If they fully recognize
their deficiencies and are willing to participate in an
appropriate preparation and transition process under White
tutelage (again, assuming a "moderate" form of government)
,
the situation might eventually be rectified in a stable
manner. If, however, the Non-Whites refuse to acknowledge
their shortcomings and, out of impatience and mistrust of
White promises, insist on assuming their rightful positions,
the result could be widespread frustration, resentment, and
instability. Should SWAPO accede to power and form a
government along the lines of its current projections,
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there would most likely be a mass exodus of Whites. SWAPO
would be vastly unprepared to cope in a stable manner with
the ensuing economic chaos and possible resistance from some
of its current political opposition. If not in effect or
happening already, this situation would require the
imposition of repressive measures of control and would invite
an influx of Eastern economic, administrative, technical,
and military aid and advisors, as has happened in Angola.
F. ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS
Due to the preclusive length of a detailed study and
the absence of current pertinent information, Namibia's
3<o
economy is addressed only in very general terms. •" It is
felt this is sufficient for discussing the economic factors
which might contribute to significant post-independence
conflict. Following a description of the current economy,
the alternatives and problems which might be encountered
under the two likely independent economic systems will be
discussed. While these projections either don't cover or
have over-simplified some aspects of the total situation,
3 ergJJ Although constrained by a lack of current specific
statistics, relatively detailed studies on Namibia's economy
can be found in The Role of Foreign Firms in Namibia , by
Roger Murray, Jo Morris, John Dugard, and Neville Smith,
Africa Publications Trust, Uppsala, Sweden, 197^ i and
Zimbabwe Namibia , Dr. Samuel C. Adams, Jr., Project Director,
Sponsored by the African-American Scholars Council under
contract with the Agency for International Development,
15 March 1977- These works provided the basis for the
economic discussion contained herein.
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it is felt that the basic issues with respect to the potential
for violent conflict have been addressed.
1. The Current Economy
Namibia's economy has three significant features:
it is oriented primarily towards narrowly-based export
industries; it is dominated by foreign capital and enter-
prises; and it is labor intensive, with a heavy need for
manual labor.
The economy is divided into two sectors. The
wealthy, White-owned sector is a modern, commercial economy
based on intensive exploitation of natural resources, part-
icularly mineral and human resources. In physical terms
this constitutes two -thirds of the territory and contains
most of the known mineral reserves, land suitable for
animal husbandry, ports and railways. The subsistence
sector includes most of the African population and is based
on small stock (sheep and goats) with some cattle-raising
and maize-growing in the north. The African areas are
generally characterized by a lack of natural resources
,
insufficient water and usable land, and an inadequate
infrastructure. The subsistence sector provides the cheap
labor on which the money economy is based.
2. Areas of Endeavor
Namibia's economy is based primarily on three areas




Mining is the largest sector of the economy,
comprising 60% of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and 60$
of exports. Namibia is among the larger producers of
minerals in the world. The sector is dominated by diamond,
copper and lead production. Uranium production began a few
years ago and may eventually be the most important mineral
product, with current mines having sufficient reserves to




The agricultural sector includes cattle and
beef products largely for export, and the export of Karakul
sheep pelts. Both industries have suffered setbacks in
recent years. Rising production costs and reduction of
South African quotas have affected the cattle industry,
?6l
while decreased European demand has hurt the sheep sector.
c. Fishing
In the past, the sardine fishing industry out
of Walvis Bay, together with the agricultural industries,
has provided 20% of GDP. It also has suffered in recent
years due to overfishing by local and foreign concerns.
36
°Adams, p. 197, 208
3 Cattle raisers said to be financially in trouble,"
Windhoek Die Suidwester , 20 January 1978, p.l, JPRS.SA
translation
3
"Decline of fishing industry since 1970 described,
'





Except for food, drink, and tobacco, manufacturing
and other secondary industries are relatively underdeveloped
due to the sparse and generally poor population, huge
distances between towns, and shortages of key raw materials.
This type of activity contributes less than ten percent to
GDP. The subsistence sector contributes about three percent
of GDP. 363
3- South African Linkages
Namibia's institutional arrangements, its civil
service, its exports and imports, and all taxes and duties
are controlled by South Africa. Money from these revenues
has been used to finance infrastructure improvements
,
commercial subsidization, and South Africa's territorial
administration, all largely to the benefit of the Whites.
Namibia will be at a distinct disadvantage after independence
compared to most ex-colonies in that these systems will
completely disappear and there may be few remaining
carriers of institutional memory.
South Africa will also have legal jurisdiction over
Walvis Bay, Namibia's primary port and the center of the
South African-owned fishing industry. This will also
minimize customs revenue to an independent Namibia.
The commercial economy has been developed as an




Africa purchasing around $0% of Namibia's exports and
providing about SOfo of imports. South African-owned
companies control the majority of Namibia's lucrative
mineral production. The transportation system is focused
on South Africa, accentuating these links.
k. Foreign Participation
Overseas corporations, primarily from the U.S.
and western Europe, control most of the mineral production
outside the South African interests and operate with very
large profit margins. One-third of the GDP went to foreigners
in 1973 and i"t was estimated then that this would have
increased to one-half by 1975*
5- The Africans
One estimate of African economic participation in
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As noted previously, the subsistence sector is
located in the homelands. The other sectors are located
in the White areas and ^3,000 of the Africans participating
in them were on contract from the north. The contract
workers, primarily Ovambo, work under the worst conditions
and have become the most militant. Local, non-contract
workers include the Herero , Nama, and Damara. While all
groups oppose South African rule, the differences between
contract and non-contract employment account for some of
the differences in levels of political activity among
African workers.
The African professional class consists largely
of teachers, nurses, and clergymen, with most located in
the homelands. There is virtually no other employment in
the homelands, with an estimated 70% unemployment level in
Ovamboland. -*
Wages in Namibia have been remarkable for two reasons
White wages are exceptionally high, with many South Africans
regarding Namibia as a place to "get rich quick", while
African wages are lower than those in South Africa? with most
earning less than the subsistence level. These inequalities
are reflected in the per capita GDP, which in 1972 was
estimated to be $5>525 for Whites and $325 for Africans.







useful land per person as the African. When the White
average is compared to the situation in crowded Ovamboland,
the ratio becomes 170:1.
6. The Prospects
In order to avoid strife, the primary economic
goals of any independent Namibian government will have to
be the integration of Africans into all sectors and levels
of the economy and a more equitable distribution of wealth
and resources throughout the population, to include sub-
sidization of the low-profit, labor-intensive agricultural
sector by the high-profit, low-labor mining sector.
Obstacles to the accomplishment of these goals will be the
lack of African education and training, the economic
necessity of perpetuating labor-intensive industries, the
lack of African infrastructure, White land ownership, and
foreign control of many productive resources. Based on the
platforms of the primary political contenders, the economy
of independent Namibia will be either highly socialistic or
an essential continuation of the present free-enterprise
system.
Under a free-enterprise system, and given the
probably assurance of South African military protection,
most Whites would probably remain in Namibia, at least
initially. The territorial administration would gradually





service, and economic relations with South Africa and
foreign corporations would probably remain much as they
are now, although with more stringent regulation of foreign
profitability. With the White concern for maintenance of
standards, the economic equalization plan would likely be
one of eventually raising the Africans to the White
levels. Although some qualified Africans would find
immediate, equal placement in the government and civil
service, the process would be extremely costly and slow
overall. Redistribution of land would probably also be
limited. While multiple-farm ownership might be officially
eliminated, the mechanisms for accomplishing this would
probably preclude all but the most affluent Africans from
obtaining any land. While the patience of the Africans under
a government with this type of economic program (essentially
DTA) can't be gauged in advance, it is likely that
frustrations due to the apparent lack of change under the
same dominant group of Whites would eventually surface, first
among the sizable opposition, but then among government
supporters as well. The unchanged situation would probably
be touted as final proof of negative White attitudes and
of the need to drive them out and start over again.
Under a socialist system administered by an elected
SWAPO government, there would probably be extensive national-
ization of private property and most Whites would probably
leave. Although new profit arrangements would certainly
be negotiated, the operations of the foreign corporations,
and perhaps even the large South African concerns, might
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not be jeopardized. Despite the resentment focused on
these corporations by SWAPO and its international advocates,
the resulting economic dislocation could be horrendous as
exemplified by the cases of Angola and Mozambique. Still,
although there are several parallels, particularly in
369Angola, it is questionable whether the SWAPO leadership
will heed either the obvious lessons or the experienced
advice of the leaders of those countries. It could be that
the nationalistic passion within SWAPO would be such that
accepted concepts of economic pragmatism would be swept
aside in the desire to root out anything representative of
South Africa or, to a lesser extent, indicative of potential
neo-colonialism. There may even be some radical elements
within SWAPO which view a period of economic hardship and
struggle as essential for unification and "purification" of
the new state.
369 . .J One significant similarity is the existence of large
diamond mining concerns. In Angola, the DIAMANG corporation
underwent a form of nationalization. Subsequent White flight
and increased diamond smuggling contributed to an SOfo decline
in production. The South African diamond concerns in Namibia
could face a similar fate. With a much larger role in the
Namibian economy, similar drops in production would have a
proportionately greater effect. Additional similarities
are the foreign-owned oil operation in Angola and the foreign-
owned mining operations in Namibia. Angola's hands-off
policy has permitted Gulf Oil to continue profitable operations
and its state revenues have become one of the primary props of
the economy. Similar agreements with the mining concerns in
Namibia could yield similar benefits. The communists have
probably promised significant management and technical assist-
ance to SWAPO for the operation of these large concerns should
they be nationalized. It is reasonable to assume that similar
assistance has been attempted in Angola, but the results have
been sufficiently poor for President Neto to have begun pu
out economic feelers to the West. Finally, both Angola and
Mozambique have resumed extensive trade with their former
colonizer and have urged expatriate Portuguese to return and
assist in building the new countries.
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There are several factors besides the Angola and
Mozambique examples which could militate against such a
course of action, however. The state revenues from these
corporations would be needed to subsidize the agrarian reform
which is more central to African aspirations. Another
reason for stopping short of a total ejection of South
African corporations would be the need to reach accomo-
dation on Walvis Bay. While it might be possible to isolate
this enclave to the point that it would wither into commer-
cial uselessness to South Africa, the process would
seriously disrupt the tremendous export sector of the
economy (assuming foreign concerns were still operating)
and would severely limit the influx of foreign aid which
would be needed. Finally, as reported by SWAPO dissidents,
the SWAPO leadership has been guilty of financial chi-
canery in the past at the expense of the organization.-'
Although not deemed likely, the possibility that side
agreements might be made which would permit the large
corporations to continue operations must be considered.
While the White exodus would drastically reduce
the country's internal commercial activity, the expected
influx of foreign aid and technical and administrative
assistance might be sufficient for the purposes of a
spartan new regime. With respect to national stabili* .
the most important aspect of a strict socialist economy
J' Abrahams, p. 2
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would be the immediate levelling effect for the population.
Not only would most. of the Whites be gone, but the irrita.
of the economic disparities and the lack of opportunity
which they represented would also be gone. African income
levels and living standards which had been unacceptable
within the context of the inflated and White-controlled
free-enteprise system might now be more acceptable with
everybody in the same situation and facing the same struggle,
G. WALVIS BAY
The issue of sovereignty over Walvis Bay is sufficiently
complex that the U.N. Security Council didn't include its
resolution as a pre-condition in its Namibian independence
plan for fear of snarling negotiations indefinitely. The
current understanding is that it will be a matter between
South Africa and an independent Namibia. The crux of the
problem is that the port and 1,124 sq. km. surrounding it
legally belong to South Africa, while economic necessity and
geographic logic argue in favor of Namibian sovereignty.
Administration of Walvis Bay was recently returned to the
Cape Province after having been administered as part of
371South West Africa for convenience since 1922.
All political leaders in Namibia, even those accused
of favoring and relying on South Africa, feel that Walvis
^Political involvement in Walvis Bay denied," - h
e
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Bay should be incorporated into an independent Namibia.
Most Walvis Bay citizens consider themselves as Namibians.^
South Africa recognizes that it will have to give up
Walvis Bay eventually. At this point, with South Africa
feeling like it has conceded more than its share on the
Namibian issue with no thanks or apparent change in attitude
from the international community, the retention of Walvis
Bay has become an Afrikaner point of honor. ^
South Africa also intends to retain Walvis Bay to
see whether Namibia gets a moderate, cooperative government
or one that is radical and hostile. Not only would South
African retention prevent Walvis Bay from becoming a
military base for a hostile power, but to a certain extent,
the Army, Navy and Air facilities already there would permit
South Africa to hold a radical Namibia hostage in order
to minimize revolutionary hostilities on its western bound-
aries. In SWAPO's point of view, it fears that a sizable
South African military presence at Walvis Bay would ex-
ercise a powerful influence over Namibia's freedom of
action.
While Walvis Bay could probably be sustained expensively
but indefinitely as a military complex, it couldn't survive





for long as a commercial community against the will of an
independent Namibia. Once Namibian territorial waters are
extended out to 200 miles, Walvis Bay would be left with a
narrow corridor ^0 km. wide and the fishing industry would
have to shut down. As a port, it couldn't survive without
a flow of goods to and from the interior. Water and power
37^
could also be easily denied.
A situation permitting them to retain military
installations might be acceptable to South Africa. This
would provide sovereignty and use of the port to Namibia,
but the South African presence might be unacceptable to SWAPO
Namibian businessmen have proposed that Walvis Bay be turned
into a free port with South Africa retaining its military
bases. Although there would be a loss of customs revenues,
this might be offset by the attractions of tourists and
37 5investors.
Despite the complexity of the issue, it isn't likely
to lead to armed conflict. If a moderate government is
formed, an accomodation will probably be arrived at in an
amicable fashion. If a SWAPO government is elected, the
resolution of the problem will be much more difficult,
but still would probably not include the use of force.
South Africa could not be ejected militarily by SWAPO
37
^ARB, July 1-31, 1978, p. ^937
3'%ric Marsden, 'South Africa hangs on to Walvis Bay,"
London Times , 12 May 1978, p. 10
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without the active participation of foreign troops. Given
the legality of the issue and the primary role the U.N.
has played overall, it is unlikely that this type of
assistance would be forthcoming. In the event the whole
Namibian question is eventually successfully resolved in
favor of SWAPO through active Cuban, East German, and
Soviet military participation, it is unlikely that Walvis




The last set of considerations to be discussed before
making projections on possible Namibian conflict scenarios
are the apparent capabilities, attitudes, and intentions
of the various potential participants and some of the
associated underlying factors. Some aspects of these
considerations have already been discussed in section III.
With its likely actions and reactions being probably the
most important pieces in the puzzle and yet the least
predictable, South Africa will be discussed first and in
greater length than the other actors.
A. SOUTH AFRICA
Throughout the history of the conflict, South Africa
has reiterated the view that Namibia's future has to be
determined by its people and that South African security
forces would remain until that could be accomplished in a
peaceful manner or for as long as the recognized authorities
requested protection. South Africa has encouraged the
people in the territory not to be deterred by the spectres
of conflict or of failure to achieve international
recognition through absence of SWAPO electoral participation.
South Africa is firm in the conviction that it is looking
after the slighted interests of a sizable portion of Namibia'
population, perhaps even a majority. The righteous sen
behind this view is reinforced by the South African
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perspective that this segment of the Namibian population as
represented by the DTA, and somewhat by AKTUR , is obviously
more rational and sensible (as evidenced by its westernized
approach to independence), and therefore more worthy of a
dominant position in the new country.
The impressive figures of the recent South African-
supervised elections in Namibia appear to have bolstered
South African confidence in DTA s ability to perform well
and will be a very important factor in any South African
agreement to go ahead with the U.N. election process.
The South Africans also desire the establishment of
a government such as advocated by DTA so that it could be
exemplified as proof that the one-man, one-vote unitary
state advocated by agitators in South Africa is not the
only solution to its own problems. While there are sub-
stantial differences between the DTA platform and South
Africa's own plans for separate development, there are also
similarities, at least in spirit.
In estimating the prospects for a suitably stable
government in Namibia, South Africa probably also feels the
need for significant White participation as a moderating
influence. The system currently advocated by the DTA pro-
vides for this, providing sufficient White presence is
maintained. There is also a feeling in South Africa, built
up through Afrikaner blood relations and years of close
association and interaction, that if the White "South
Westers" aren't South African, they are at least still
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strong kith and kin. For both these reasons South Africa
can be expected to maintain a posture of military presence
or readiness which will be reassuring to Whites in Namibia.
South African attitudes towards the U.N. roles of
mediation and supervision of the independence issues and
process have been characterized by charges of SWAPO favor-
itism and the suspected inability of any peace-keeping
force to monitor and constrain guerrilla bases and
activities. Still, South Africa is desirous of obtaining
U.N. recognition for elections in Namibia, for it is feared
that lack of legitimacy will provide the pretext for the
possibility of eventual direct communist participation.
Given the possibility that a SWAPO government might
permit the large South African mining concerns in Namibia
to continue operations with a more equitable distribution
of profits, it is felt that the economic importance of
Namibia to South Africa isn't sufficient to be a serious
factor in judging South Africa's determination to dictate the
outcome of events in Namibia.
In considering eventualities in which South Africa
would feel required to maintain a defensive presence in
Namibia or to combat an escalated war which would include
an invasion with communist participation, South Africa faces
a basic dilemma. It revolves around how much and how long
can sustain an active commitment in Namibia in light of
current and anticipated constraints on its resources, economy
and force levels, as balanced by its perception of a threat
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to its own stability and security that could be held by an
antagonistic, communist-backed, African state on its
western border.
The possible South African military commitment needs
to be considered at two levels, the first being an
essential continuation of the current presence and activities
with the possibility of an eventual, gradual reduction if
and when the Namibian indigenous forces become capable of
assuming a greater portion of the security effort. The
second level of consideration would be an escalated presence
on a more conventional basis should PLAN ever carry the
struggle to that level with Cuban, Soviet, or East German
participation.
Developments in Rhodesia and South Africa itself enter
this equation. On one hand, the deterioration of the
situation in Rhodesia and the recent incidents of guerrilla
activity in South Africa make a stable western border very
desirable. On the other hand, these developments "closer
to home" may presage an increased, long-term requirement for
security forces within South Africa which could degrade its
capability to maintain a viable military presence in Namibia.
Related considerations are the unknown degrees to which
siege mentality and the perception of a threat of total
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war aimed at the annihilation or expulsion of the White
minority have developed in South Africa.
South Africa currently has a large and very credible
conventional force of tanks, helicopter transport, and
strike aircraft. Despite claims of increasing self-
sufficiency in military industrial production, South Africa
couldn't afford to wage an extended, intensive conventional
war in the face of unlimited Soviet material support for
PLAN and other foreign participants. Not only would the
Soviets be able to replace PLAN material losses faster
than South Africa could replace its losses, but South Africa
might soon face the requirement to withdraw in order not to
leave the Republic itself dangerously vulnerable due to
diminished military capability. Still, South Africa surely
recognizes that to be successful in any conventional
military confrontation, the combined communist forces would
have to mount a campaign of greater size and sophistication than
any of their previous African endeavors. Exclusive of other
factors, South Africa isn't likely to compromise its
priniciples or slacken its resolve on Namibian independence
until such intent and commitment have been demonstrated by
SWAPO's military supporters.
^ A White Paper on Defense was tabled in the South African
Parliament on 29 March 1977' It contained formal statements
of the perceived strategies, policies and aims of South Africa's
enemies as well as South African national objectives and
policies. These statements all evidence acute awareness
immediate threats both from international "Marxists' and
regional 'Pan-African M forces. See South Africa ic~~




Should its military involvement in Namibia be opposed
to a final U.N. decision on Namibian governmental legitimacy,
South Africa would face a very real threat of increased or
even complete international trade sanctions. The threats of
total trade sanctions haven't impressed South Africa in the
past, as it felt the Western members of the U.N. Security
Council would be affected seriously enough themselves to
prevent such a thing happening. There has been recent
speculation that this confidence may not be as strong as in
377the past in some South African circles, however.
Significant increases in defense expenditures in recent
years have contributed to a stagnation of economic growth
in South Africa. Prolongation or worsening of this re-
cession will cause the African unemployment situation to
deteriorate, resulting in further aggravation of the civil
situation within South Africa. Should the war escalate to
a more conventional level and should South Africa begin to
suffer serious material casualties, some industry would
have to be diverted to defense production in light of the
current international arms embargo. While import sub-
stitution in the event of total sanctions might give the
economy a temporary boost for a few years as it did in
Rhodesia, this would soon give way to serious economic
deterioration and heightened African unrest.
-"'"South Africa Yields on U.N. Forces for Namibian,"
aan Francisco Chronicle, k December 1978, p. 1^
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Even without sanctions there would probably be an
undetermined point at which economics would eclipse
security apprehensions over Namibia. While there certainly
wouldn't be a trade-off point between economic and defense
considerations in the case of a threat aimed directly at
South Africa, the South Africans would not be willing to
sacrifice to that extent over Namibia.
The loss of South Africa's nearly exclusive source of
petroleum in Iran will exacerbate both economic and
military considerations. While industry energy require-
ments are provided largely by coal, transportation and the
military are almost totally dependent on petroleum. New
sources will be more expensive and, given South Africa's
standing with most of the Third World, may be tenuous at
best. While reserves, oil-from-coal processing and severe
civilian rationing could ameliroate the situation for a time,
a conventional war effort in Namibia against world opinion
might soon become unsupportable
.
The consideration of South Africa's perception of the
threat to it's internal stability from a SWAPO-govemed
Namibia is based on the following:
First, a South African withdrawal from Namibia in the
face of adverse political or military developments, or even
a hesitancy to oppose such developments, might be construed




Second, the birth of another militant, majority-rule,
African state on its border would be expected to have a
psychologically agitating effect on South African Blacks.
Similarly, it is likely feared that the anticipated exodus
of Whites from Namibia under these circumstances, coupled
with a similar exodus from Rhodesia, might create the
adverse psychological impression among all races that the
Whites were finally on the run.
Third, South Africa also may be psychologically unable
to admit that despite whatever it can or will do, SWAPO '
s
struggle against perceived South African authority in
Namibia will continue and perhaps escalate. To accept this
would place increased strains on the credibility of its
plans and pronouncements concerning South Africa's own
future.
In estimating the actual threat to South Africa which
a hostile Namibia could connotate, the primary consideration
would be the common border which could facilitate guerrilla
infiltration and would require military and police presence.
Half the border follows the Orange river and the other half
goes through the Kalahari Desert. While the border terrain
is conducive to surveillance and defense against a con-
ventional force, small groups of guerrillas could penetrate,
although the barren terrain and considerable distances
generally involved would require a guerrilla capability
for extended self-sufficiency which might be prohibitive.
Of greater threat perhaps would be a change in relations
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between Botswana and South Africa. Under a Namibian
government opposed to South Africa, and assuming it also
controlled Walvis Bay, Botswana v/ould have an opportunity
for access to an ocean exclusive of South African pressure.
Although the construction of adequate transportation links
might take quite awhile, this new degree of independence
from South Africa would make Botswana more susceptible to
African pressure to support South African guerrillas along
the extensive common border. Although much of this also is
Kalahari Desert, the increased surveillance and security
requirements for South Africa would significantly burden the
security forces.
The issue of Walvis Bay has already been discussed
with respect to its own physical survivability, its utility
in holding a SWAPO government hostage, and what it could
mean to Botswana. An additional consideration would be the
requirement to prevent the Soviet Union from obtaining free
access to a port which could be used to funnel arms and
equipment to South African guerrillas in Namibia and Botswana,
The recent expansion of the naval facilities there is an
indication of South Africa's current intentions for Walvis
Bay. 3?8
Similarly, in spite of the U.N. negotiating process and
the possibilities of imminent occupation by the U.N.
peace-keeping force and subsequent elections, South Africa
has continued to upgrade its military facilities throughout
378FBIS,SA
,
30 October 1978, p. E^
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the territory. This would seem to indicate plans for more
than a temporary presence.
Although the war effort in Namibia has consisted
essentially of small-unit counter-guerrilla warfare, the
large operations discussed earlier have indicated a South
African capability and willingness to strike hard and
sudden over long distances. While this might not be a
consideration with respect to the conduct of a conventional
war in Namibia, it has bearing on the possibilities for
intervention to achieve limited objectives.
Other aspects of some of these South African actions
have been their lack of international expectation, their
contradiction of the apparent directions of South African
diplomacy just prior to each case, a strategy whereby "the
best defense is a good offense," a tendency to react to
military provocations with tremendously magnified retal-
iations, and a disregard for adverse international opinion.
In light of these successful sorties and the expanse
and terrain in Namibia, it can be conjectured that the
South African response to a conventional type of invasion
by PLAN with communist support would include significant
air-mobile operations behind the advancing enemy lines and
thrusts into Angola 2nd Zambia. South Africa doesn't have
the resources to repel a significant force over a long





Despite major military setbacks in the past year and
some restrictive operational pressures from its host
countries, current PLAN activity levels seem to reflect
an increased SWAPO aggressiveness. Outwardly sure of its
majority support, SWAPO has adopted the position that if
it doesn't win an election, then obviously the election
379
was unfair, in which case it will continue to fight.
It is convinced that with sufficient communist backing
it can eventually wear down South Africa. Although SWAPO
has long maintained that it doesn't need active part-
icipation from external actors to carry out its liberation
of Namibia, it is felt that attitude has surely changed as
the struggle has dragged on with nothing tangible to show
for it. As noted earlier, any popular uprising on SWAPO '
s
behalf would probably have limited effectiveness and could
be contained for a long time by police and the military.
Finally, SWAPO ' s changing positions on the military aspects
of the U.N. ceasefire and peace-keeping plans and its
continued military activities have been viewed by many as
deliberate attempts to abort the election process in favor
of an eventual military solution, perhaps out of private




C. THE UNITED NATIONS
While the presence of a U.N. peace-keeping force would
probably provide a moral deterrent to military participation
by most external actors, it would be unlikely to deter
SWAPO or South Africa should either feel particularly
threatened by the other. In fact, with SWAPO presuming
favorable inclination by the U.N. and the members of the
peace-keeping force, it might be inclined to attempt to
establish itself in key geographical positions within the
territory. If this went unchecked by the U.N. force, it
could be expected that South Africa would attempt to push
SWAPO out of those positions by force of arms and would
thereafter be reluctant to relinquish them.
Should the U.N. elections result in a political situation
which is inherently unstable and unresolvable , it is doubtful
that any of the contending political groups would attempt
to seize control through violence while the U.N. peace-keeping
force and trasitional administration were present unless
this presence began to drag on indefinitely. 3y the same
token, it is unlikely that the U.N. would withdraw its
presence from Namibia should the elections result in an
obviously volatile situation, although it isn't clear what
further ameliorating actions it might be able to take.
It is also unlikely that the U.N. would legitimize
election results in disagreement with the neighboring 31ack
African states.
^80Henry Miller, Advisor, U.S. Mission to the U.N.
,
interview with the author, New York, N.Y. , 2 August 1978
2^1

Finally, although the official U.N. position remains
unchanged, in some circles there has apparently been a
softening of the opinion that SWAPO is the sole represent-
ative of the Namibian people.
D. THE SOVIET UNION, CUBA, AND EAST GERMANY
In discussing the potential for active Soviet, Cuban, or
East German military support or participation with PLAN in
an escalated conflict within Namibia, they will be referred
to collectively as the communists since their interests and
attitudes are generally in concert and probably won't
seriously contradict those of the Soviet Union.
Soviet objectives in Africa which could pertain to
Namibia might include: the spread of its political and
economic influence in a manner concomitant with its role
as a world power; the diminution of Western influence and
control, including the denial of important raw materials;
and the promulgation of Soviet political-security interests,
especially as they involve the Soviet Navy. The promotion
of instability within Southern Africa is conducive to the
accomplishment of these objectives.
The Cuban criteria for involvement in combat in Africa
appear to emphasize those situations which have: a high
381FBIS,SA
, 10 January 1979. p. E6
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Soviet priority; a favorable military situation; and a
generally recognized legitimacy. ^
The last criterion listed above is most central at this
point in time. With the degree of U.N. involvement in the
whole Namibian question, it is highly unlikely that the
communists would engage in overt participation with PLAN
until such time as the U.N. negotiation efforts collapse
completely or unless the results of this process prove
inconclusive or are rejected by the U.N. , the OAU, and the
neighboring frontline states. By the same token, should
the situation reach an impasse and with the OAU, the front-
line states and SWAPO clamoring for the military ejection
of South Africa, the communists might be favorably disposed
to enter the fray.
At this point, military criteria would become operative.
The indications so far are that the communists would be
unlikely or unable to embark on a major undertaking in
Namibia until the guerrilla oppostion within Angola was
reduced to insignificance. Although perhaps not one of
the most important factors in the equation, the PLAN
capacity, both numerically and qualitatively, to function in
anything more than a token role of legitimization in a
conventional war is questionable and might cause some
^ ^Dr. Edward Gonzales, Professor of Political Science,
University of California at Los Angeles, in a talk at the
U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, 16 November 197
2^3

communist hesitancy. Finally, and most importantly, for the
first time in Africa the communists would be facing a strong,
well- trained, well-organized, and modern foe. While there
is no doubt that the communists could eventually defeat even
the most determined South African resistance, the effort
required would be much larger than anything undertaken so
far in Africa and PLAN'S role would pale to insignificance.
The communists are unlikely to become actively involved as
participants if the prospects for a relatively quick,
decisive victory aren't favorable. A decision to participate
on these requisite levels would depend not just on the
situation in Namibia, but also on a positive assessment of
the other regional and international pressures on South
Africa at that time. Even after initial African encouragement,
a military display of this magnitude might have serious
long-range repercussions both in Africa and internationally,
although this probably wouldn't be an issue of concern to the
Soviets at the outset.
E. ZAMBIA
Based on Zambia's record to date, it isn't expected
that Zambia would play much of a role in any expanded
Namibian war effort. While having allowed liberation
movements to use Zambia as sanctuary and despite the
vehemence of its anti-South African and anti-Rhodesian
pronouncements, Zambia's actions have ultimately demonstrated
pragmatic restraint and incapacity even in the face of
2*44

serious reprisal incursions. In the case of Namibia, the
short stretch of Zambia's common border in an area which
probably wouldn't be considered as vital to Namibia's con-
quest also mitigates against any Zambian involvement. As
evidenced by the pressures it has applied on SWAPO in the
past and its need for regional stability before it can begin
to strengthen its fragile economy, Zambia wouldn't feel
compelled to reject a conservative government in Namibia
provided the U.N. vouched for the honesty of the elections.
F . ANGOLA
Angola has hosted and supported the bulk of SWAPO '
s
struggle since early 1976. There have also been recent
reports of willingness to provide troop detachments to
384
assist in Namibia's liberation. Despite this, any active
participation in some sort of future combined assault on
South African forces in Namibia would probably be reluctant
and at most a token quid pro quo for PLAN participation
against UNITA. Given the history of negotiation pressures
and operational constraints it has placed on SWAPO, Angola,
like Zambia, has no desire to become involved militarily
with South Africa. Given the cloak of U.N. legitimacy,
Angola would accept the presence of a conservative non-SWAPO
government in Namibia.
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As in Zambia, the prime concern of the Angolan leaders
is the perpetuation of their regime. Towards this end they
must get the economy moving. Western economic assistance
at this point is largely contingent on a reduction of Cuban
military presence, but the continuing strife within the
country and along its southern border preclude this. Recent
international political and diplomatic events have left
South Africa as almost the sole external support for the
remaining Angolan guerrilla movements, primarily UNITA.
South Africa will continue to promote this instability as
long as it is of diversionary value to its security effort
in Namibia, which will be as long as SWAPO continues to
press the struggle from Angola. Again, Angola would be
willing to accept a conservative Namibian government and
withdraw its support for SWAPO, provided the U.N. conferred
electoral legitimacy.
While Angola might be subject to Soviet pressure to
continue support for SWAPO regardless of the U.N. position,
there would also be some resistance to this pressure in
that more progress in neutralizing guerrilla activities
has been made through Angola's own regional and inter-
national diplomacy than through the Soviet military con-
sortium. Additionally, the communists have thus far been
unable to spark the Angolan economy, which has also accounted
for the recent trend toward broader MPLA horizons.
2^6

G. THE WESTERN NATIONS
Aside from roles similar to their present ones as
negotiators or as logisticians for a U.N. peace-keeping
force, it is unlikely that any of the Western nations would
become militarily involved in any escalation of the Namibian
conflict. With respect to South Africa, the threat of
economic sanctions through the U.N. Security Council would
be the only weapon they would brandish. These would be a
factor only in a case where South Africa refused to permit
U.N. supervision of elections and independence transition
even after SWAPO agreed to and did in fact abide by all
South African stipulations or South Africa flagrantly re-
fused to accept the outcome of U.N. supervised elections and
attempted to impose its own solution on Namibia. Even in
these cases there might be reluctance to impose economic
sanctions. Not only would the economic interests and the
conservative elements in some of the Western nations come
into play, but the removal of sanctions even after the
Namibian question was settled would probably be opposed
by most of world opinion as long as South Africa's own
internal situation was still a matter of international
concern. Finally, if communist participation in support
of PLAN became much more visible, the Western nations would




VI. SCENARIOS OF VIOLENCE
Based on the discussion of the previous sections and
as a conclusion to this paper, several conceivable Namibian
political scenarios will be analyzed with respect to their
potentials for incurring or inviting external military
intervention. At this point in time the internal support
for each of the contending political parties is too
speculative to permit prediction of one scenario over
another.
A. SCENARIO 1
Should South Africa and the current DTA-dominated
Constitutional Assembly together decide to forego U.N,
supervised elections, the resulting government would probably
be recognized only by South Africa. With no apparent future
in negotiations, SWAPO would continue guerrilla war in the
north. SWAPO ' s internal organization would quickly become
more militant. Nationwide strikes and school boycotts would
soon occur. Civil disobedience would take place on an
increasing scale and there would probably be an escalation
in the exodus of young Africans. Due to limited weapons
availability, internal guerrilla warfare probably would be
restricted to isolated cases however. Communist participa -
in PLAN operations would gradually increase and the South
African military presence would increase commensuratel .
with more frequent cross-border strikes. If and when UNI

was neutralized within Angola (although perhaps not a
prerequisite) and if other regional and international factors
were favorable, a communist-supported PLAN invasion might
be attempted.
The foregoing scenario would be unlikely to play all the
way through however. Despite probable ups and downs in the
future negotiating process, it is felt that South Africa
will ultimately agree to some from of U.N. supervision of
Namibia's transition to legitimate independence. Accepting
the single-minded determination of the Afrikaner political
body, the long term spectres of either a doubtful pyrrhic
victory or a psychologically damaging withdrawal and the
possibilities of increased sanctions in some form, all
accompanied by further estrangement from the rest of southern
Africa and the world in general would certainly seem to
overshadow any security benefits to be derived from
preventing a SWAPO government in Namibia. At this point,
there is no assurance that a relatively moderate government
might not be elected in Namibia. It also isn't certain that
a SWAPO government would significantly increase the overall
threat to South African security. Although there would be
significant differences between the two situations, the fact
that South Africa and Mozambique have thus far peaceful
co-existed and interacted might provide some hope for a
similar relationship with Namibia under a SWAPO government.
This would certainly be more likely if SWAPO were to assume
2^9

power through elections than if it forcibly seized power
after extended and escalated warfare.
B. SCENARIO 2
A scenario in which South Africa was adamantly opposed
to U.N. election results in favor of SWAPO wouldn't be
likely to produce armed conflict. South African opposition
could arise over perceived partiality in the electoral
process or simply out of antagonism towards 3WAP0. In either
case, having acquiesed to the U.N. elections and with the
U.N. peace-keeping force in place, South Africa wouldn't
challenge the organization militarily at that point. All
of the possible deterrents discussed in scenario 1 above
would apply here as well, but with even greater surety.
C. SCENARIO 3
A scenario in which SWAPO refused to participate in
U.N. elections could have several outcomes.
In the event SWAPO refusal resulted from what were
widely perceived as unreasonable stipulations by South
Africa, a train of events similar to those discussed in
scenario 1 would begin, although at a slower pace as the
Western nations would attempt to continue negotiations. ^r
the same reasons cited in scenario 1, it is likely that
further compromise would be reached eventually. The fact
that the DTA would probably be able to strengthen its
support base in the intervening period would give South
Africa added confidence to compromise further.
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In the event SWAPO ' s refusal was widely perceived as
based on its own intransigience , the scenario might play
itself out in one of two ways. In the first case, the
guerrilla war would continue as before and the frontline
states would continue to pressure SWAPO to modify its position,
With a final U.N. decision on legitimacy still pending and
with SWAPO cast as the spoiler, it is unlikely that
communist participation would escalate to the point of
supporting a PLAN thrust into Namibia. If the situation
became quite extended, SWAPO might even become more re-
luctant to participate in elections as DTA support
strengthened through popular association with numerous civic
improvement projects funded by continuing massive infusions
of South African money. With SWAPO perceived more and more
as a hard-core revolutionary organization, some of its in-
ternal support might also erode in favor of the NN?. The
frontline states might eventually become less adamant in their
public support for SWAPO. Some moderate African states and
some Western states might also soften their views of SWAPO
electoral participation as an absolute requirement. This
erosion of general support would eventually lead to the
effective disintegration of SWAPO as presently constituted.
A small, militant faction would continue infrequent terrorist
activities from abroad. The rest of the organization and
its support would be absorbed into more conventional political
roles in Namibia, either collectively as a regular party
with a diminished base of support, or individually in
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alignment with other parties. The scenario would be similar
to that which evolved in Cameroon in the 1960's.
A less likely second case stemming from blatant SWAPO
intransigence would be a U.N. decision to conduct elections
without SWAPO participation. Once SWAPO realized the firm
intent of the U.N. it would surely acquiese and participate.
In both of these cases however, the likelihood of external
participation in any escalation of conflict by PLAN would be
almost nil.
D. SCENARIO k
In the event SWAPO found itself in an unexpected minority
position following legitimate U.N. elections, it is unlikely
that any of SWAPO ' s African supporters would advocate the
continuation of a guerrilla struggle. Host countries would
soon close down SWAPO bases as a precondition to establish-
ing relations with the new state. While communist countries
might attempt to continue covert assistance to SWAPC for a
struggle within Namibia, the new government would probably
call upon either South African or U.N. assistance if the
guerrillas ever posed a serious threat.
E. SCENARIO 5
Another possible scenario involves the election of
SWAPO into a dominant position in Namibia, the formation
a very socialistic government, and the acceptance of this
situation by South Africa. Violence from this situation
might develop in several ways.
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Should White resistance to SWAPO nationalization efforts
become violent, either individually or through the old
commando network, or should there be blatant and threatening
harassment of the Whites in general, and should the U.N.
peace-keeping forces be unable to control it, South Africa
probably wouldn't hesitate to take whatever actions it felt
might be required to ensure the safety of the Whites. This
would probably take the form of a Kolwezi-type security and
rescue operation of limited objectives and duration, but on
a much larger scale. With SWAPO legitimacy against it,
South Africa certainly wouldn't attempt to impose any
governmental forms on Namibia. With communist military
advisors probably already present in Namibia and main force
units readily available just across the Angolan border,
South Africa would make its military objectives very clear,
would exercise restraint in confrontations with PLAN forces
,
and would withdraw once the safety of the Whites was insured,
essentially through evacuation of those who wanted to leave.
If these incidents concerning Whites should take place
after the departure of the U.N. peace-keeping force, the
European communist advisors might exercise somewhat of a
restraining influence on SWAPO and would probably facilitate
the rapid emigration of all those 'Whites who wanted to leave.
South African intervention on behalf of the Whites would only
be attempted should violence become widespread and without
provocation. SWAPO, its communist advisors, and communist
military units would ' ve become well established throughout
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the country by this time. South African military options
would be very limited, especially from the standpoint of
avoiding a rapid, entangling escalation. Any intervention
attempts would probably be limited to those towns with White
suburbs which might facilitate rapid airborne evacuation,
probably to Walvis Bay.
It is unlikely that either of the above scenarios would
occur. SWAPO is not likely to implement governmental reforms
which might require violent or repressive enforcement as long
as the U.N. peace-keeping forces are present. Further,
although SWAPO has stated that Whites aren't required for the
future success of Namibia and that it fully expects most of
them to leave, it has also stated that they are welcome to
stay on SWAPO terms and there have been no specific threats
of violence. Contrary to White propaganda, the overall
history of African violence against Whites also militates
against wanton reprisals. Most Whites that would leave
Namibia would probably do so during the U.N. transition
period via South African or West German airlifts, thereby
greatly reducing the number of Whites which could later
become targets of violence or harassment. Finally, should
any Whites still in the rural areas after the U.N. departure
violently resist nationalization of their farmlands, SWAPO
would need to make only a few "examples" for the rest to
realize the futility of resistance. South Africa might
rationalize that these Whites had been given ample opportune
25^

to emigrate during the transition period and would not risk:
serious military involvement on their behalf.
Another source of potential conflict under an elected
SWAPO government would be African ethnic animosities and
anxieties. Should a situation involving ethnic violence
erupt while the U.N. peace-keeping force was in place and
it proved unable to exert control, South Africa would pro-
bably send troops into Namibia temporarily. The objective
of these troops would be more to protect the Whites
from spill-over violence until their evacuation than it
would be to actually quell the African violence. Should
ethnic violence occur sometime after the U.N. had departed,
it is doubtful that South Africa would attempt to intervene
at all. As noted before, it might feel sympathy for any
Whites remaining in the country at that time, but no moral
commitment. It's attitude towards the Africans would
probably be one of letting them fight it out among them-
selves. Should the ethnic opposition prove substantial,
there is a good possibility that South Africa might provide
covert support (similar to that provided UNITA) if it felt
that low risk destabilization of the Namibian government
served its own security needs. Still, the potential for
external intervention due to African ethnic violence is
very small. It is highly unlikely that SWAPO would permit
Ovambo to perpetrate actions against any minority ethnic
group. Not only is SWAPO avowedly non-racial, but the
records of other genuine national liberation movements
doesn't support this type of action. The presence of the
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U.N. peace-keeping force would also serve as an initial moral
deterrent. Ethnic violence would be more likely to result
from anxieties or perceived injustices on the part
of one of the minority groups, the Herero being a likely
example. In the short term and following the U.N. departure,
this could result from SWAPO elimination or detention of
opposition political leadership. Such actions could be
perceived by their ethnicly-grouped followers in prim-
ordial contexts (e.g., as in the SWAPO/Ovambo vs. DTA/
Herero clashes inWindhoek in early 1978). SWAPO wouldn't
act in this manner while the U.N. was still on the scene
however, and it is likely that any African leaders who might
feel seriously threatened would emigrate during this trans-
ition period along with the hard core of their followers.
In the longer term there is potential for ethnic violence
should the Ovambo assert themselves disproportionately in
all facets of the government and economy, a likely event-
uality. To have any effectiveness, the various minorities
would need to band together, a less likely eventuality.
External participation would entail suppressive assistance
to SWAPO from foreign communists within Namibia and could
include covert South African support for the dissenting
ethnic group(s), although South Africa would stop short of
any direct involvement.
Walvis Bay represents a very real potential for conflict
between South African and an elected SWAPO government,
especially if SWAPO maintains an antagonistic posture.
Although South Africa might be willing to negotiate with
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cooperative SWAPO government on the commercial and civil
aspects of Walvis Bay, it might also insist on the perpetuation
of its own military facilities, the preclusion of any other
foreign military bases, and some sort of regulation over
military equipment shipments through the port to Namibia.
These conditions probably would be unacceptable to SWAPO and
the stalemate would result in either the permanent acceptance
of a trade and customs situation unfavorable to Namibia or
an attempt to eject South Africa militarily. While foreign
communists would probably render artillery and staff planning
support for such an endeavor, the legitimacy of South
Africa's position would probably deter their participation
in Walvis Bay proper, at least initially. Foreign units
might also be expected to assume temporary defensive
responsibilities in other parts of Namibia to free PLAN
troops for participation in the take-over attempt. South
African resistance in Walvis Bay would be stiff and
diversional strikes against other areas in Namibia would be
likely. Depending on both international reaction to the
conflict and PLAN success, foreign communists might be
encouraged to participate more fully in combat. Regardless
of the degree of direct communist participation however, the
logistic links to Walvis Bay would be too vulnerable for
South Africa to hold out indefinitely in the face of a
determined PLAN offensive.
The last scenario for violence on the part of external
actors in association with an elected SWAPO government
involves the evolution of a situation similar to the one
257

currently existing on both sides of the northern Namibia
border. The establishment of South African guerrilla bases
in southern Namibia with PLAN protection and subsequent
guerrilla incursions into South Africa would be sure to
spark pre-emptive and retalitory South African strikes.
This eventuality, while probably certain under a SWAPO
government, wouldn't transpire in the near future. South
African guerrillas lack sufficient strength and organization
at this point to pose a threat of that nature from Namibia.
F. SCENARIO 6
A scenario in which the DTA or a coalition headed by
it becomes the dominant political power through U.N. re-
cognized elections would be unlikely to develop situations
conducive to external military involvement other than South
African assistance as requested. Although the communists
would attempt to continue covert assistance to SWAPO, the
external sanctuaries would probably soon be rescinded. Ar
subsequent attempt to organize guerrilla activity within
Namibia which couldn't be contained by Namibian forces
under South African advisors would result in a request for
SADF assistance.
Within this scenario continued economic disparities
might eventually result in unrest and violence. Again, if
this couldn't be contained by Namibian resources, South




The final scenario to consider is one where U.N. elections
produce a situation in which no political body or coalition
is able to claim a decisive majority and in which there is
little likelihood of compromise or cooperation between the
main contenders. The volatility of the situation would be
readily apparent and the U.N. would find itself forced to
maintain a peace-keeping force for longer than anticipated.
As the UoN. presence dragged on, and without substantial
change in the opposing political positions, the population
would become more restive and civil violence such as occurred
in early 1978 could break out. If the U.N. was unable to
control this violence and if one group's position appeared
in jeopardy, intervention by an external actor on behalf of
its client would be likely, if only to reestablish order and
maintain the status quo. This intervention would probably
precipitate a similar response from the opposing external
actors however, and a situation of tense confrontation or
even active combat would soon exist. One possible break in
the deadlock would be if a great many V/hites decided the
future was too unstable and decided to leave. Not only
would this remove much of the backbone from the conservative
resistance to compromise, but it would also reduce South
Africa's sense of commitment to support militarily the re-
maining conservative element. Failing this, it is like
that active combat would soon break out throughout the
country with PLAN and the communists on one side and the
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Namibian ethnic forces and the SADF on the other. Although
the unsettled guerrilla situation in Angola together with
an initial military superiority would probably sway
the near-term course of this conflict in favor of South
Africa and the conservatives, the continuing absence of
international legitimacy would engender a situation similar
to the one discussed in scenario 1, and with the same
eventual results. Based on the realization of this ultimate
probability, South Africa might act with limited objectives
and with more restraint than just described.
H. CONCLUSION
Depending on the composition and legitimacy of the
eventual Namibian government, it is almost certain that
the external actors who provided support to the dominant
political body in that government during the independence
struggle will be asked to lend their presence and provide
defensive assistance to the new state, at least initially.
This presence will be legitimate, will probably be respected
in most quarters, and will probably deter intervention by
opposing external actors.
Incidents of racial or ethnic violence aren't likely
to be significant at the outset and won't invite external
intervention from actors not already legitimately on the
scene. There is long range potential for broader violence
based on ethnic and economic disparities. Any overt ex-
ternal participation in these cases would be at the request
of the legitimate government for the purpose of maintain!
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control. It is probable that the rebelling group(s) in these
situations would receive covert assistance from external
actors opposed to the legitimate government,
The resolution of the Walvis Bay question or an electoral
situation which results in a narrow majority and uncompromising
attitudes appear to hold the greatest potentials for overt,
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